

POLITICS OF DIGNITY: HOW STATUS INEQUALITY SHAPED REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS IN INDIA

POULOMI CHAKRABARTI

WORKING PAPER N°2026/15

JULY 2026

WORLD
INEQUALITY
..... LAB

Politics of Dignity: How Status Inequality shaped Redistributive Politics in India

Poulomi Chakrabarti*

September 15, 2023

How does social hierarchy affect redistribution? While mainstream theories of welfare are premised on the material interests of social classes, I argue that in societies with long histories of ascriptive discrimination, distributive politics is shaped by status inequality. High-status groups are more likely to oppose redistribution to maintain their ascriptive privilege, while low-status groups aim at reducing social hierarchy by prioritizing descriptive representation, which I refer as the *politics of dignity*. I test this theory through a mixed-methods research design on India. Using original state-level data over five decades, I find a strong negative association between high-status (i.e., upper-caste) political elites and redistributive spending. Elites from politically mobilized low-status (i.e., lower-caste) groups have instead pursued representation in the state bureaucracy through caste quotas. Rather than just patronage or symbolic politics, I demonstrate that the interaction of descriptive representation in the bureaucracy and legislature is associated with higher redistribution. Qualitative evidence suggests that a representative bureaucracy can weaken elite patronage networks, thereby reducing barriers to redistributive policies.

* Visiting Scholar, Lakshmi Mittal and Family South Asia Institute, Harvard University.
Contact: pchakrabarti@fas.harvard.edu.

Previous drafts of this research have benefited from extensive feedback from Ashutosh Varshney, Melani Cammett, Rebecca Witz-Shapiro, and Patrick Heller. I am thankful to Adam Auerbach, Abhijit Banerjee, Rachel Brule, Jennifer Bussell, Chris Carter, Kaustav Chakrabarti, Kanchan Chandra, Kathy Cramer, Aaditya Dar, Hakeem Jefferson, and Milan Vaishnav for helpful suggestions. Discussions at the APSA and MPSA Conferences, the Identity Politics Workshop at Stanford University and the Comparative Inequality and Inclusion Cluster Workshop at Harvard University were also helpful. I am grateful to Sanjay Kumar and Himanshu Bhattacharya at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi for providing access to the data on the social background of MLAs and National Election Studies datasets. Shikha Bhanu and Bhaskar Kumar provided excellent research assistance. The larger project that this paper draws from received funding from the International Growth Center, American Institute of Indian Studies, Smith Richardson Foundation, and various centers at Brown University.

1. INTRODUCTION

After centuries of upper-caste dominance, the power balance in the Indian state of Bihar shifted dramatically when the first lower-caste political coalition led by Lalu Prasad Yadav of the *Rashtriya Janata Dal Party (RJD)* assumed power in 1990. The party's supporters included some of the most impoverished people. Theories of democratization and welfare should have predicted radical redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990). But instead of improving social infrastructure, the *RJD* government focused on appointing lower-caste officials in important positions in the bureaucracy. Yadav famously declared his agenda as, "*vikas nahi, samman chahiye*" (we need dignity, not development). Such prioritization of bureaucratic appointments is not unique to India. After Evo Morales became Bolivia's first indigenous President in 2006, one of the most visible initiatives of his government was to recruit and promote more indigenous officials. These measures were seen as a direct attack on racial hierarchy where the bottom ranks of both the society and state apparatus was disproportionately indigenous (Postero 2017). Similarly in South Africa, transforming the racial composition of civil service was one of the key agendas for the *African National Congress* (Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018).

While the political rise of marginal groups in many countries has been widely supported on the normative principles of democratization and decolonization, representational policies pursued by governments led by these groups are either examined through the lens of cultural recognition (Fraser 1995; Lamont 2018), or as patronage politics (Chandra 2004; Stokes et al. 2013). This understanding reflects the larger debate between expressive and instrumental theories in ethnic politics. Expressive theories, rooted in social-psychological models, attribute preference for co-ethnics due to a fundamental need for self-esteem (Shayo 2009; Horowitz 1985). Instrumental theories discount psychological attachment to the in-group and instead see co-ethnics as a means of maximizing material benefits (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). The role of *ascriptive discrimination* is peripheral in both accounts. The distinction between expressive and instrumental theories or symbolic and material goods is unable to explain redistributive politics in hierarchical societies.

Due to legacies of caste, slavery, colonialism, or apartheid, groups in "ranked ethnic systems" are stratified by both class and *social status* (Horowitz 1985). Since low-status groups have been historically excluded from institutions of power, representation in the state is not just a way to enhance self-esteem and access to material resources, but *the state itself is a source of status*. Theories of redistribution,

on the other hand, are premised on material interests of social classes – the wealthy elite oppose taxation, while the working-class support expansive social rights (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). But the role of ethnic-group-based coalitions has largely been overlooked by the literature on the welfare state.¹ Should we expect socially dominant groups to oppose welfare policies and low-status groups to support redistribution?

This research builds on insights from social psychology, status politics, and the welfare state to examine how *status inequality* shapes redistribution in hierarchical societies. I argue that ethnic groups are motivated by concerns of material well-being *as well as* status. Political elite from high-status groups seek to preserve their ascriptive privilege and are hence more likely to oppose redistributive policies. I call this the *politics of dominance*. Mobilization by low-status groups challenges social hierarchy by seeking equalization of status, or the *politics of dignity*. The politics of dignity is manifested through representational policies, particularly through demands for descriptive representation in state institutions.² Descriptive representation not only allows historically excluded groups to be seen as legitimate members of the political community, but can support redistribution by reducing the control of dominant groups in the state.

The legacy of the caste system in India, one of the most rigid forms of social stratification, provides the ideal setting to explore the effects of status. Like other forms of social hierarchy, caste is reproduced through humiliating norms of social segregation. Ambedkar, India's most prominent *Dalit*³ leader and the principal architect of its Constitution, described the system as an “ascending scale of reverence and a descending scale of contempt” (Jaffrelot 2003, 20). Though lower-castes have made significant gains in recent decades, caste remains central to politics. There is a wide consensus among scholars that the nature of redistributive politics in India is strongly shaped by the status inequality rather than pure material deprivation (Weiner 2001; Varshney 2000; Ahuja 2019; Jaffrelot 2003; Witsoe 2013).

¹ I use ethnicity to refer to descent-based attributes like race, language, religion, tribe, caste etc., that are acquired genetically or through cultural and historical inheritance (Chandra 2006).

² Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which representatives resemble the identity of those being represented (Pitkin 1967).

³ *Dalits* are formerly untouchable castes.

Low-status groups include ex-untouchable castes called *Scheduled Castes (SC)*, indigenous groups called *Scheduled Tribes (ST)*, and intermediate castes called *Other Backward Classes (OBCs)*. The vast literature on caste and development has almost entirely focused on *SCs* and *STs*, who qualify for legislative quotas (Pande 2003; Chin and Prakash 2011; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Chauchard 2014; Jensenius 2017; Ahuja 2019; Gulzar, Haas, and Pasquale 2020). Caste mobilization in India, however, has largely been led by *OBCs* that comprise close to half the population (Varshney 2000; Jaffrelot 2003). While emerging works have studied the effects of *OBC* affirmative action on educational outcomes (Khanna 2020; Lee 2021), the distributive effects of *OBC* representation remains underexplored. Further, most research on descriptive representation has focused on village-level institutions, though development policy is largely formulated by states.⁴

This research addresses this important gap by utilizing data on the caste-identity of *all* state-level legislators, including *OBCs* and upper-castes. For my outcome variable – redistribution, I digitized more than fifty years of public expenditures records. I also generate a new dataset on caste quotas from the colonial period and develop an original measure of status inequality. This study takes a multi-method approach. The theory is informed by historical research and insights from over twenty-four months of fieldwork across India. Regression analysis examines the relationship between status and redistribution in all major states from 1960 to 2012 – first by testing the independent effects of status inequality and representation of high-status (*upper-caste*) and low-status (*OBC*, *SC*, and *ST*) legislators, and then by examining the interaction effects of political representation and caste quotas. I interpret the findings and explore the possible mechanisms that connect descriptive representation to redistributive politics by drawing on fieldwork in the state of Bihar.

I find that redistributive politics in India is shaped by the competing dynamics of the *politics of dominance* and the *politics of dignity*. States with higher caste-based status inequality, which reflects upper-caste dominance, are also less likely to be redistributive. Status inequality is, in fact, a stronger predictor of redistribution than income inequality. *Upper-caste* political representation is consistently associated with negative redistributive spending, in line with our understanding of the economic elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992; Esping-Andersen 1990). These results hold after accounting for a range of relevant economic, political, and structural factors and remain

⁴ Some notable exceptions are Pande (2003), Chin and Prakash (2011), and Jensenius (2017).

robust to alternative measurement and estimation strategies. Unlike working-class coalitions, low-status groups do not present a clear association with redistribution. However, when these groups mobilize to gain political power, they have consistently prioritized representational policies. *OBC* representation in government is a strong predictor of *OBC* quotas, and when combined with *OBC* political representation, quotas are associated with higher redistributive spending. I do not observe a similar pattern for *SCs*. Qualitative evidence suggests that representation of low-status groups in the bureaucracy can weaken elite patronage networks and provide greater agency to these groups in state institutions, thereby reducing barriers to redistribution.

These findings challenge influential works that have been pessimistic about the redistributive potential of *OBC* politics (Jaffrelot 2003; Weiner 2001; Kohli 2012). At the same time, the distinction between *OBC* and *SC* representation is instructive to understand the limitations of ethnic quotas. While *SC* quotas are constitutionally mandated, *OBC* quotas are a consequence of political mobilization. My findings on *SCs* are consistent with the existing literature (Jensenius 2017; Dunning and Nilekani 2013), reinforcing the argument that in the absence of strong mobilization, formal representation may not provide enough agency to influence policy decisions. This research contributes to a growing literature on caste-based representation. While existing studies have focused on contemporary representation (Gulzar, Haas, and Pasquale 2020; Bhavnani and Lee 2021), my work highlights the historical evolution of this representation, thus allowing for more nuanced understanding of how caste mobilization has shaped redistributive policies over the long-term.

Beyond India, this research contributes towards our understanding of redistributive politics in multiethnic societies. A number of recent studies have challenged the influential “diversity-deficit thesis” by arguing that inequality between groups is a better predictor of public goods outcomes as compared to ethnic diversity (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Pardelli and Kustov 2022). Scholars of welfare politics have also emphasized that inequality and social distance between groups hinders cross-class alliances that are necessary for successful class mobilization for redistribution (Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992; Lupu and Pontusson 2011). Since economic disparity and segregation between groups is rooted in historical discrimination in many places, this research proposes a new mechanism that shapes the politics of public goods provision – *status inequality*. The Indian case further suggests that concerns of status broaden the policy agenda of the political elite, by generating demands for representation in addition to economic redistribution.

Relatedly, this study shows that such representational demands are not just symbolic. The bureaucracy is a larger and more permanent part of the state but most research on descriptive representation has focused on the legislature. It is assumed that politicians can exercise their policy preferences through the state apparatus if they are able to gain political power. Yet studies across different contexts have emphasized the inability of governments led by marginal groups to pursue radical economic redistribution (Piven and Cloward 1979; Van Cott 2005; Kohli 2012). While some scholars attribute this to the incentive structure of electoral institutions (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Jensenius 2017), this research suggests that politicians from low-status groups may also face resistance from the bureaucracy. The ethnic composition of the administration can shape the conditions for redistributive politics in important ways.

This study also advances the emerging research on status politics (McClendon 2018). By examining the behavior of high-status-poor individuals, like the white-working-class or poor-*Brahmins*, existing studies are able to decouple status from other material endowments and hence convincingly demonstrate the independent effects of status on political and economic outcomes (Suryanarayan 2019; Baccini and Weymouth 2021). The cases they examine are, however, exceptions. In hierarchical societies, ethnicity and class generally coincide. Blacks in the United States and *Dalits* in India are more likely to be employed in low-paying and low-status occupations. The politics of dignity describes the other side of the equation – how status inequality shapes political mobilization by marginal groups. Towards this end, this research also develops an original measure of social hierarchy that is independent of the economic and political power of groups.

2. THE POLITICS OF DIGNITY AND REDISTRIBUTION

2.1 Ascriptive Discrimination and Descriptive Representation

Status broadly refers to the ranking or position in a social hierarchy in terms of prestige, respect, and worth (Ridgeway 2019). The idea of status goes back to Weber's conceptualization of inequality, which he argued is based on three interrelated but *distinct* sources: resources, power, and status (Weber 1978). In ranked societies, status hierarchy is enforced through norms of inter-group interaction and segregation (Horowitz 1985). Though institutions like slavery and untouchability were legally abolished, status inequality continues to shape social relations. Members of low-status groups are more

likely to face *humiliation*, regardless of their class position.⁵ Barack Obama, for example, has written about being subject to racism, even as a senator, “I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason” (Obama 2006, 233). Meira Kumar, the former Speaker of the Lower House in the Indian Parliament, noted that she continued to be served in separate utensils (a remnant of the practice of untouchability) when invited to upper-caste homes (Jensenius 2017).

The consensus on status rankings among both high- and low-ranking actors is what makes status powerful in shaping social relations (Ridgeway 2019). Status is closely tied to the concept of *recognition* or *dignity* – the society conferring respect or worth to groups. In contexts where institutions of power have been historically dominated by members of high-status groups, one of the means through which group status is enhanced is through representation in the state. Mendelberg (2022) argues that political mobilization is not just an attempt to gain resources and power, but is often a way to obtain status. Since official laws reflect the norms of the group that control the state, people infer status from public displays of authority and group representation. Politics grants social rank through symbolic signals of norms of social value (Gusfield 1986). The state is hence a source of status. I argue that political mobilization by low-status groups focuses on descriptive representation for three reasons – *ideological*, *psychological*, and *instrumental*.

First, inequality in social relations is fundamentally tied to ideas of social justice. Social psychologists argue that people value fairness, irrespective of material benefits, because injustice hurts their status (Miller 2001). Biographies of leaders from low-status groups consistently show that their experience of humiliation served as one of the main motivations for mobilization. Before Gandhi led the Independence movement in India, he campaigned for civil rights in South Africa for two decades. As a young lawyer, Gandhi was thrown out of a first-class train compartment, which at the time did not allow non-Europeans. He describes the incident in his autobiography, “My overcoat was in my luggage, but I did not dare to ask for it lest I should be insulted again, so I sat and shivered” (Gandhi 1983, 209). Such experiences of racism pushed him to protest discriminatory laws. A plaque on the

⁵ I use the terms low-status and marginal, and high-status and dominant interchangeably.

platform in Pietermaritzburg Station reads, “This incident changed the course of his life.” Similarly, in interviews with *Justice Party* leaders in Tamil Nadu, Barnett (1976) found that their decision to join the movement was almost always triggered by personal experiences of humiliation at the hands of *Brahmins*. The party’s 1916 manifesto, aptly named the “Non-*Brahmin* Manifesto”, advocated for greater representation of backward castes in administration. Discrimination plays an important role even in cases where state policies are redistributive. In Bolivia, for example, Van Cott (2005, 64) argues that indigenous movements broke away from the Left and established ethnic parties because their leaders had grown frustrated with the “interference, manipulation, deceit, and racism” in those alliances.

Second, representation can contribute towards the destigmatization of low-status groups, thus allowing them to gain membership in the political community (Lamont 2018). Expressive theories of ethnic politics attribute preference for co-ethnics to the psychological need for self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Shayo 2009). While self-esteem is inward-looking, recognition from others is essential to the construction of the self and relates to enhancement of group-status from the perspective of both dominant and marginal groups (Taylor 1994).⁶ The *Mandal Commission Report* in India, for example, recommended caste-based quotas in the bureaucracy to enhance the status of lower-castes by arguing that, “*Government service has always been looked upon as a symbol of prestige and power...When a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, the material benefit accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated*” (Government of India 1980, 57).

Third, descriptive representation shapes state power. The state is in a unique position to declare and enforce norms for the entire community (Gusfield 1986). Instrumental theories treat ethnicity as an heuristic device to seek material goods in a low-information environment (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). In a context where the state has been exclusionary, rather than lack of information, low-status groups’ preference for co-ethnics is informed by their (real and perceived) experience of discrimination. Voters exposed to greater discrimination, for example, have been shown to place higher value on descriptive representation, even when such representation provides few material

⁶ See Malik (2022) for the distinction between personal and collective self-esteem.

benefits (Malik 2022). Inequality between groups, a remnant of historical discrimination in many cases, is associated with ethnic-voting (Houle, Kenny, and Park 2019). Parties led by marginal groups are more responsive to the demands of their groups (Chandra and García-Ponce 2019).

The representation gap is especially significant in non-elected institutions like the bureaucracy. In the Indian case, even as legislatures gradually became more representative (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009), the bureaucracy continued to be dominated by upper-caste elites (Witsoe 2013). In South Africa the bureaucracy was central to the creation and maintenance of Apartheid (Evans 1997). A significant body of work on ethnic conflict, especially in postcolonial countries, attributes ethnic mobilization to discrimination and underrepresentation in the bureaucracy (Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 2002).

2.2 The Politics of Dignity

The desire for status has been shown to be a fundamental and independent motive for people that cannot be reduced to other powerful factors (Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015). I argue that ethnic groups are motivated by concerns of enhancing their material well-being as well as social status. Mobilization by dominant groups like *Ku Klux Klan* against African Americans, or *Brahmins* against lower-castes, for example, aim at preserving their status. This may translate to supporting segregationist policies that restrict access to institutions historically occupied by high-status groups. I broadly construe such mobilizations as the *politics of dominance*. Members of high-status groups may oppose egalitarian measures in order to preserve their social position, sometimes even at the cost of material interests (Suryanarayan 2019; Mutz 2018). The literature on elite backlash broadly speaks to the politics of dominance (Baccini and Weymouth 2021; Gidron and Hall 2020).

In contrast, mobilization by low-status groups is motivated to fight prejudice and domination. Movements by African Americans, black and colored South Africans, and indigenous communities in the Americas demand recognition and representation (Fraser 1995). Ethnic subordination as a means of organizing social relations lost its legitimacy with the spread of liberalism and norms of equality in the twentieth century. With it, the idea of *dignity*, or the equal worth of all humans, replaced traditional norms of honor (Taylor 1994). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United

Nations begins with “recognition of the *inherent dignity*...of all members of the human family.” I refer to mobilization by marginal groups aimed at equalization of status hierarchy as the *politics of dignity*.⁷

Dignity broadly encapsulates the idea of respect or recognition.⁸ In the political sphere, it translates to equality before the law, including freedom from harassment by state actors. I argue that the politics of dignity is manifested through representational claims, most concretely through demands for descriptive representation in state institutions.⁹ Political theorists have made a strong case for descriptive representation on democratic principles, especially in cases where state institutions have been exclusionary (Mansbridge 1999). Descriptive representation is valuable not only because of psychic and material benefits as expressive and instrumental theories of ethnic politics have noted, but access to the state is itself a source of social status.

Descriptive representation in the bureaucracy can further be instrumental in transforming the structural conditions that generate demand for redistribution. In addition to designing policy, bureaucrats are the main individuals involved in the implementation of government programs and generally enjoy considerable discretion in the process (Lipsky 2010). Local bureaucrats are also often the most visible presence of the state in citizen’s lives. Their inability or unwillingness to enforce development projects can hence have important implications in determining the success of policies of the political class.

On the supply side, descriptive representation in the bureaucracy can weaken elite patronage networks at the local level, thus reducing barriers in assigning state resources to its intended beneficiaries (Witsoe 2013). Representation can also allow for better utilization of resources by reducing discrimination in policy implementation (Desai and Dubey 2011; Hoekstra and Sloan 2022). Myron Weiner (1991) in his classic study of child labor in India, for example, uncovered a widespread *belief* amongst upper-caste policymakers that the education system should reinforce the occupational divisions of the caste system – between people who work their *minds* and people who work with their *hands*. He attributed

⁷ I borrow the term from lower-caste leaders who frame their mobilization as the struggle for “dignity.” See Rosen (2012) for an intellectual history of dignity.

⁸ The concept of dignity has also been used in the context of disenfranchisement of the white-working-class (Fukuyama 2018).

⁹ Marginal groups also demand *symbolic representation* through the public recognition of their distinct culture and history (Fraser 1995).

India's poor performance in mass education to caste bias. Bureaucrats from low-status groups may also have more information about their own group which can improve policy design and implementation (Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018).

On the demand side, descriptive representation can generate demand for public goods by making the state more accessible to low-status groups, and low-status groups more responsive to public programs. In South Africa, for example, white officials continued to incite fear and anger even after Apartheid was dismantled. Fernandez et al. (2018) find that black residents were more likely to trust black officials, thus improving policy enforcement. Descriptive representation in India has been shown to reduce social hierarchy at the local level (Chauchard 2014), which can in turn allow marginalized citizens to make claims on the state (Kruks-Wisner 2018).

2.3 Alternative Explanation: Is Dignity Politics a mask for Patronage?

Government positions carry material benefits besides status. Existing studies, especially in poor democracies, have largely viewed political appointments in the bureaucracy as patronage politics (Stokes et al. 2013; Chandra 2004). I do not contest the claim that political elite can use the state machinery to extend their patronage networks. But unlike pure patronage, I argue that dignity politics is motivated by a clear ideology aimed at reducing social inequality based on ascriptive identity. While it may not be possible to separate ideology from patronage empirically and electoral politics is also influenced by *realpolitik*, issues of social justice are reflected in a broader policy agenda of low-status governments.

In the Indian case, most contemporary caste-based parties draw on influential thinkers like Ambedkar, Lohia, and Periyar who believed that caste, more than class, was the basis of Indian society. They advocated for social justice through state intervention and group-based policies (Yadav 2010). Kanshi Ram, a prominent lower-caste leader, supported caste quotas on the rationale that, "...reservation is not a question of our daily bread; reservation is not a question of our jobs; *reservation is a matter of participation in the government and administration of this country*" (cited in Jaffrelot 2003, 398). This argument resonates with debates on backward caste quotas at the turn of the twentieth century. T.M. Nair, one of the founders of the *Justice Party*, argued, "We claim our social, moral and political rights, and our share of government appointments, not because we think that government appointments will transform the *non-Brahman* communities into the most prosperous of mankind, but because *government*

appointments carry with the political power, of which, as lord of the soil and inheritors of noble traditions, they must have their legitimate share” (cited in Jaffrelot 2003, 176). Lower-caste leaders believed that quotas would transfer political power to marginal groups, which in turn could trigger a larger social transformation (Jaffrelot 2003; Yadav 2010; Government of India 1980).


In spite of India’s characterization as a “patronage democracy” (Chandra 2004), recent research finds limited empirical support for patronage. In contrast to the conventional left-right paradigm, Chhibber and Verma (2018) demonstrate that ideological differences in Indian politics are based on the role of the state in regulating groups-rights and affirmative action. Parties generally described as patronage-based have in fact shown a commitment to marginalized groups. Almost 92% of its campaign speeches of the *Dalit-led Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)*, for example, were about social justice. The party emphasized its agenda before elections by releasing the caste profile of its candidates in lieu of a manifesto (Chandra 2004). Similarly, discourse on caste-related issues doubled in Bihar assembly during the *RJD* tenure (Chakrabarti 2019). Contrary to mainstream view, *RJD*’s core base was not any more likely to benefit from favorable appointments in the bureaucracy than other marginal groups (Appendix D.2).

More importantly, this research emphasizes the hitherto neglected role of descriptive representation and “patronage” in redistributive politics. Revisionist history of political machines in American cities show that the recruitment of the Irish, Italian, and Jewish (new immigrant groups that faced discrimination) contributed to their political inclusion (Bearfield 2009). Moynihan and Wilson (1964, 296) argue that patronage in New York state did not influence voting, but its main function was recognition of various ethnic groups – “the symbolic and vicarious satisfaction of seeing “one of their own” given prestige, power and income.” Institutions like the Tammany Hall were no doubt corrupt, but patronage-based appointments were instrumental in reducing the political dominance of Anglo-Protestant elites and paved the way for progressive social reforms before the New Deal (Golway 2014). Emerging research on Brazil also demonstrates that patronage can improve the accountability and effectiveness of bureaucrats (Toral 2024).

2.4 Observable Implications

Incorporating status concerns into economic models of redistribution generates two main observable implications in the Indian context. First, since caste and economic hierarchy largely overlap,¹⁰ I expect the *politics of dominance* to be manifested through upper-caste opposition to economic redistribution.¹¹ Places with higher status inequality should also be associated with less redistribution. Second, from the perspective of *politics of dignity*, I expect political elite from low-status castes (*OBCs*, *SCs*, and *STs*) to seek equalization of status hierarchy through descriptive representation in the bureaucracy, which can in turn support redistribution by reducing the control of dominant groups (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Relationship between Political Representation and Redistribution



3. CONTEXT: CASTE MOBILIZATION IN INDIA

The caste system divides the Hindu society into endogamous occupational groups in the following hierarchical order: *Brahmins* (priests), *Kshatriya* (warriors), *Vaishyas* (merchants), *Shudras* (workers), *Dalits* or *Scheduled Castes (SC)* and indigenous groups or *Scheduled Tribes (ST)* (Figure 3).¹² The first three groups are known as *Forward castes*. The caste system is rooted in notions of ritual purity and pollution.

¹⁰ *Upper-castes* have the highest levels of land ownership, consumption expenditure, income, and educational attainment followed by the *OBCs* and *SCs* (Desai and Dubey 2011).

¹¹ Empirical analysis of non-economic forms of politics of dominance, like opposition to social integration, is beyond the scope of this study. See Suryanarayan (2019) and Girard (2018) for upper-caste backlash.

¹² Though caste originated in Hindu society, other religions in South Asia are also stratified along caste lines.

SCs were considered untouchable because they engaged in “polluting” occupations like tanning and sanitation.


Caste hierarchy has been actively challenged by social movements since the colonial period. The Indian state also took measures to reduce caste oppression. Untouchability was abolished in 1950. Legislative quotas for SCs and STs were mandated. The Constitution also resolved to make provisions for economically deprived *Shudras* sub-castes called *Other Backward Classes (OBCs)*.¹³ Two federal-level *Backward Classes Commissions* led by Kaka Kalelkar and B.P. Mandal were appointed in 1953 and 1978 respectively. But it wasn’t until the early nineties that caste mobilization made a serious dent in the North. Land reforms, including abolition of the *zamindari* system and the Green Revolution empowered peasant-OBCs (Weiner 2001; Dasgupta 2018), and quotas in public employment benefited sections of SCs (Chandra 2004; Jaffrelot 2003). In what has been described as the “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003), the parliament and legislatures in most states began to resemble the caste identity of the population by the turn of the twenty-first century (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009).

This political revolution was largely led by *Shudras*. By some estimates, this heterogenous group of “middle” castes make up almost half the population. Most *Shudras* are peasants. But they also include service-castes (like potters and weavers) who did not suffer from untouchability, but their economic condition is closer to that of SCs. At the other end of the spectrum, some *Shudras* sub-castes called *dominant-castes* are not ritualistically high, but dominate the economic life in many regions.

Due to structural reasons, South India was better positioned for such movements – *Forward castes* formed a smaller share of the population and more egalitarian land tenure systems limited their control over economic resources (Jaffrelot 2003; Varshney 2000; Banerjee and Iyer 2005). The *Justice Party* in the Madras Presidency was led by landowning-*Shudras* who experienced a sense of “status dislocation” due to colonial policies that privileged *Brahmins* (Subramanian 2000). The Madras legislature was already two-third non-*Brahmin* by the 1935 provincial elections (Baker 1976).

¹³ The term *OBC* traces its roots to the Madras Presidency in the 1870s. The British administration combined *Shudras* and *Untouchable* castes under the label “backward classes” to identify non-*Brahmins*. *Untouchables* were reclassified as *Scheduled Caste* in the 1935 *Government of India Act*. After Independence, the Indian government continued to use this classification for extending affirmative action (Jaffrelot 2003).

Figure 2: *Shudra* Representation in State Legislatures



Note: A value of 1 indicates that a group's representation is proportional to its population (see Section 4.2 for measurement)

Caste mobilization in the North was shaped by the politics surrounding affirmative action. Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced administrative reservations for *OBCs* based on the recommendations of the *Mandal Commission* months after the *Janata Dal* came to power in 1989. This led to massive protests by upper-castes throughout North India. Electorally, it helped consolidate upper-caste vote in favor of the right-wing *Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)* (Suryanarayan 2019). At the same time, counter-mobilization by the otherwise fragmented *Shudra* sub-castes transformed “*OBC*” from abstract administrative category into a politically salient group (Jaffrelot 2003). Yadav (2000) argues that the rise in electoral participation in the nineties coincides with the “*Mandalization*” of politics. *Shudra* political representation expanded to the North as a result (Figures 2 and 5).

4. DATA AND MEASUREMENT

4.1 Empirical Approach

This study employs a mixed-methods research design. Statistical analysis (Section 5.1) examines the links between status and redistribution – first by testing the independent effects of status inequality and representation of high-status (*upper-caste*) and low-status (*OBC*, *SC*, and *ST*) legislators, and then by examining the interaction effects of political representation and caste quotas. This analysis covers the period 1960 through 2012 and sixteen major states, accounting for about 95% of the population. Evidence from historical research and qualitative fieldwork is used to interpret the findings and uncover the possible underlying mechanisms driving the results (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). I use state as a

unit-of-analysis because most decisions on development policy and affirmative action are carried by state governments in India's federal system. States, for example, accounted for 82% and 74% of the spending in education and public health respectively in 2014-15. These numbers are substantively meaningful. Progressive social policy in states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have led them to achieve literacy and infant mortality levels comparable to Western Europe, while the quality of public services in some North Indian states is amongst the worst in the world. I describe the main variables below. Appendix A describes the data, measurement strategies, coding protocol, and alternative theories in greater detail.


4.2 Main Variables of Interest

Economic Redistribution: I measure economic redistribution as the proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. The use of taxation to measure redistribution is problematic in the Indian context not only because of the low tax-base, but also since state governments don't control important taxes.¹⁴ The use of public spending to measure social development is consistent with the literature on welfare politics (Esping-Andersen 1990) as well as development in India (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Singh 2016; Thachil and Teitelbaum 2015; Murali 2017; Banerjee, Gethin, and Piketty 2019). I depart from existing studies by drawing a distinction between *state capacity* and *policy preference*. State capacity, or the bureaucratic ability to implement state policy, is independent of the normative goals of the state (Centeno et al. 2017). High-capacity states are more effective in administering redistributive as well as growth-oriented policies as compared to states that lack the ability to implement their most basic mandated programs. The per capita developmental spending in Bihar in 2012, for example, was less than a third of Tamil Nadu, though their proportional social spending is comparable. Proportional spending is hence a more accurate reflection of the *political will* of state elite to prioritize redistribution than absolute expenditure. I rely on the *State Finance Reports (1960-2015)* collected from the *Reserve Bank of India (RBI)* archives. More than fifty years of budget reports were digitized for this study.

¹⁴ Personal income tax is levied by the federal government and distributed to states based on a formula specified by the *Finance Commission*. Income from agriculture, that employs the largest share of workforce, is not taxed (M. G. Rao and Singh 2005). The tax-base in India was between 0.2 and 1% during 1960 and 1990. It increased to just over 5% by 2023-24, but remains substantially lower than comparable countries (Chancel and Piketty 2019; GoI 2024).

Caste-based Political Representation: I conceptualize social bases of power to reflect the rank-ritual and economic hierarchy of social groups as well as their relationship to the state. I classify castes into three broad groups (Figure 3): i) *upper-castes*, which includes *forward-castes* and *dominant-castes* from all religions; ii) *OBCs* constitute peasant-and-service-caste *Shudras*,¹⁵ and iii) *lower-castes* include *SCs*, *STs* and non-Hindu lower-castes. 85% of *lower-caste* legislators are *SC* and *ST* (Table A1 in Appendix A). This distinction between *OBCs*, and *SCs* and *STs* is relevant because the later qualify for legislative quotas, which in turn shapes political representation and the nature of mobilization.¹⁶

Figure 3: Structure of Caste Hierarchy



I rely on the original datasets on the caste and religion of state-level legislators collected for the edited volume, *Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies* (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009). The source includes data on hundreds of sub-castes or *jatis*, the narrowest ethnic identity salient in political mobilization in India. This allows me to capture the vast heterogeneity within *Shudras* that existing studies have overlooked. I measure political representation in both the state legislature and government. Data on parties constituting the ruling-coalition was gathered from secondary sources (Table E8 in Appendix E). Since the caste distribution varies considerably across states, the measure accounts for population.

$$Political\ Representation_{cit} = \left(\frac{\sum Legislator_{cit}}{\sum Legislator_{it}} \right) \div \left(\frac{\sum Population_{ci}}{\sum Population_i} \right)$$


where, c =caste group, i =state, and t =year

¹⁵ Though some *dominant-castes* have successfully lobbied for *OBC* quotas in recent years, I use the term *OBC* to describe this category because most *OBCs* are *peasant* or *service* caste and the term is contextually relevant in Indian politics.

¹⁶ See Table E5 for state-level *SC* and *ST* quotas.

Figure 4 plots the representation of the three groups; the reference lines indicate median values of the respective caste. A value of 1 indicates that a caste's political representation is proportional to its population. *Upper-castes* are overrepresented in most states, but their numbers have steadily declined over time. *Lower-caste* representation has remained relatively stable because of legislative quotas (median: 0.92). *OBCs* show the greatest variation, with median values increasing from 0.34 in the 1960s to 0.64 in 2000s (also see Figure A8).

Figure 4: Distribution of Caste-based Representation in State Legislatures by decade




Caste Quotas: To measure representational policies, I generate an original dataset on *OBC*, *SC*, and *ST* quotas in public employment. About forty *OBC* commissions and committees were set up at the state-level after Independence (Table B1 in Appendix B). I trace the recommendations of these commissions and reactions to their reports, including political debates, public protests, and legal objections by going through government reports, newspaper articles, and existing studies (Table B2). The data on *OBCs* goes back to 1921, when caste quotas were first instituted. I also document the caste and party affiliation of Chief Ministers under whose tenure *OBC* quota was enforced (Table B3). This measure accounts for the caste distribution.

$$Caste\ Quotas_{cit} = \left(\frac{\sum Quota\ in\ Public\ Employment_{cit}}{\sum Population_{cit}} \right)$$

where, c =caste group, i =state, and t =year

OBC reservation was limited to four southern states right after Independence (Figure 5). Demands for representation aligned with colonial policies that had used group-based quotas as a strategy to strengthen their control of India. The sharpest increase in *OBC* quotas is observed after 1993, following the implementation of the *Mandal Commission Report*. Currently, all states have some level of affirmative action for *OBCs*.

Figure 5: State-level *OBC* Quotas in Public Employment



Note: A value of 1 indicates that *OBC* quota is proportional to its population

Status Inequality: Status inequality refers to difference in ascriptive social status across groups. In the Indian context, since the caste system is reproduced through norms of endogamy, I operationalize status through state-level data on inter-caste marriage. Higher levels of inter-caste marriage indicate a breakdown of social segregation and caste hierarchy. I use the *India Human Development Survey (IHDS)*, one of the few nationally representative surveys that collects data on all castes. I use the following question: “Do you know anyone in your community/*jati* who has had an inter-caste marriage?”. As compared to existing studies that use group-size or endowment to measure status dominance (Suryanarayan 2019; Suryanarayan and White 2021), this measure is able to draw a clearer distinction between the strength of social hierarchy, and economic and political power of groups. Alternative measures of status inequality utilize income and class attributes of caste groups (Appendix A.4).

4.3 Alternative Theories and Controls

I draw on the rich literature on political economy of development in India to account for a host of factors likely to influence redistribution. This includes *economic* variables: income reflected by Net State Domestic Product (NDSP) (Ravallion and Datt 2002), growth rate, and income inequality (intra-state


gini), and *social/demographic* factors: ethnic diversity measured through ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007), proportion of upper-caste population (Jaffrelot 2003), and social cohesion as reflected by strength of subnational identity (Singh 2016). I generate measures for *fiscal and administrative* controls like state capacity and fiscal assistance from the federal government (Khemani 2003), and control for *political* variables: political ideology (governments led by left, right, or centrist parties) (Kohli 1987), party-type (*Congress*, *BJP*, or regional-party led governments) (Banerjee, Gethin, and Piketty 2019), party-system (two-party or coalitions and narrow or encompassing ethnic party) (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Thachil and Teitelbaum 2015) and political participation, reflected by voter turnout (Besley and Burgess 2002). Finally, I account for *structural* factors, like time-periods: distinct phases of macro-economic policy and politics (1947-67, 1968-91, 1992-12) and decades, and *pre-existing level of development* reflected by literacy rate. Table A4 summarizes the data and estimation techniques employed by existing studies as well as the controls I use to account for these explanations.

5. FINDINGS

5.1 Descriptive Representation and Redistribution

Political Representation and Redistribution: I begin by exploring the relationship between the caste identity of legislators in state governments and proportional spending in social sectors (Figure 6). As theories on social-coalitions and redistribution predict, redistributive spending declines with increase in *upper-caste* representation. The trend is positive for both *OBCs* and *lower-castes*.

Figure 6: Redistributive Spending and Caste-based Political Representation in Indian States



Regression analysis aims to test the statistical significance of this association by accounting for other explanations. Since the measure for status inequality is time-invariant and most variables are slow-moving, I employ random effects estimators (Beck and Katz 2011; Clark and Linzer 2015).¹⁷ All political variables, including representation, are lagged by one year since spending reflect government decisions of the previous year. I run regression models of the form:

$$\text{Redistribution}_{it} = \alpha + \beta \text{Representation}_{cit-1} + \gamma \text{Status Inequality}_i + X \text{Controls}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where, c =caste group, i =state, and t =year

Table 1: Redistributive Spending and Caste Identity of Political Elite

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-5.355** (2.146)	-4.171*** (1.433)	-2.607*** (0.962)	-2.430*** (0.780)	-2.416*** (0.823)	
<i>OBC</i> Representation	2.830 (2.651)	4.804** (2.152)	1.495 (1.844)	2.148 (1.374)	2.530 (1.414)	2.487* (1.324)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-1.897 (2.470)	-0.603 (1.003)	-0.859 (2.165)	-0.00864 (1.069)		1.641 (1.155)
Status Inequality	-0.173*** (0.0458)	-0.165*** (0.0447)	-0.110*** (0.0303)	-0.109*** (0.0274)	-0.0912*** (0.0268)	-0.104*** (0.0237)
<i>SC</i> Representation					-0.521 (0.803)	
<i>ST</i> Representation					1.074 (0.725)	
<i>Forward-Caste</i> Representation						-1.531*** (0.486)
<i>Dominant-Caste</i> Representation						-0.159*** (0.0402)
Constant	67.94*** (6.142)	63.86*** (5.596)	90.02*** (31.29)	81.95*** (24.81)	88.50*** (23.93)	75.51*** (24.47)
Basic Controls			√	√	√	√
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	564	564	558	558	558	558

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. See Table C3 in Appendix C for the full set of controls.

¹⁷ See Appendix C.1 for estimation strategy. Hausman tests lends support for RE estimation. The main results remain consistent if I drop status inequality and run FE estimation (Table C1).

Table 1 summarizes the main results. Models (1) and (2) are limited to the key variables of interest. Models (3) through (6) introduce factors expected to affect redistribution directly: state capacity, income, ethnic diversity, left-led government, voter turnout, subnational cohesion, proportion of upper-caste population, political periods, and literacy rate. Models (1) and (3) present the results for all legislators. The remaining models examine representation in government.

Four main findings emerge. First, the analysis demonstrates the independent effects of status – states with higher levels of caste-based status inequality are less redistributive. Notwithstanding the limitations of longitudinal data on caste-inequality, it is interesting that the coefficients of status inequality are stronger than income inequality (Model (3) in Table C7). The findings are robust to alternative measures of status (Table C4). Second, *upper-caste* representation is associated with negative economic redistribution across all model specifications. The result remains consistent when I disaggregate *upper-caste* into *Forward* and *Dominant* castes (Model (6)). Third, the coefficients for *lower-caste* and *SC* representation are inconsistent and not statistically significant. Finally, the coefficients for *ST* and *OBC* representation, though positive, are not associated with redistribution at conventional thresholds in most models.¹⁸

These results survive the inclusion of additional controls and robustness checks, summarized in Appendix C.2. This includes alternative estimation techniques: fixed effects (Table C1) and OLS with PCSE (Table C5). The use of proportional spending in health and education as an alternative DV and government-term as a unit-of-analysis generates similar results (Table C5). Since I measure caste identity of legislators in terms of representation (and not proportion), collinearity should not be a concern. But running separate models for *OBC* and *lower-caste* representation produces comparable estimates (Table C6). Table C7 accounts for central transfers, economic inequality, growth rate, decadal controls. I also consider the role of religious cleavages: religion-based ELF and Muslim representation (Models (5-6) in Table C7). Finally, the findings remain robust to additional political controls: ideology of the ruling-party, type of party, and party-systems (Table C8).

Political Representation and Caste Quotas: Next, I examine the links between political representation and quotas. Since *SCs* and *STs* quotas were constitutionally mandated, I focus on *OBCs*.

¹⁸ *OBC* representation is significant (generally at 10%) in only seven of the thirty-six models presented in Appendix C.

As discussed earlier, most states constituted expert commissions on the socio-economic condition of *OBCs*. Scholars have argued that their recommendations for *OBC* quotas did not find support among upper-caste-led governments (Jaffrelot 2003; Yadav and Singh 1994). Of the seventeen legislations on *OBC* reservations in the pre-*Mandal* period, only two were enforced by *Forward*-caste Chief Ministers (Table B3 in Appendix B). I examine the determinants of *OBC* quotas statistically in Table 2. The main models employ state fixed effects to account for unobserved differences between states.¹⁹ Models (1) and (3) lag quotas by 1 year. All other models lag quotas by 3 years to allow for time in policy enforcement.

$$OBC\ Quota_{it} = \alpha + \beta Representation_{cit-3} + X Controls_{it-3} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where, c =caste group, i =state, t =year, and μ =state fixed effects

The analysis shows that *OBC* representation in government is a strong predictor of *OBC* quotas. The statistical significance and size of the effect increases with time-lag. Models (3) through (7) control for caste-based fractionalization. The coefficients for *upper-caste* representation are generally negative, though not significant. The result remains consistent when I introduce the political ideology of the ruling-coalition (Models (5-6)) and type of party in power (Models (3-5) in Table C9). While fixed effects estimation does account for state-specific characteristics, the results remain robust when I explicitly control for strength of the *OBC* population (Model 7). Since reservations are more contentious among Hindus, Models (1) and (2) in Table C9 limits the sample to upper-caste Hindus. The findings further hold with random effects estimation while accounting for all above controls (Tables C10 and C11).

Table 2: *OBC* Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-0.0891 (0.0735)	-0.0615 (0.0820)	-0.0770 (0.103)	-0.0518 (0.105)	-0.0500 (0.106)	-0.0758 (0.102)	0.000725 (0.0936)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	0.368** (0.157)	0.410*** (0.132)	0.306* (0.164)	0.360** (0.127)	0.344** (0.129)	0.280** (0.107)	0.430*** (0.155)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	0.0647 (0.302)	0.136 (0.265)	0.0422 (0.289)	0.118 (0.254)	0.115 (0.254)	0.100 (0.256)	0.0405 (0.206)
ELF (Caste)			3.261 (2.409)	2.602 (1.874)	2.583 (1.824)	2.292 (1.867)	0.746 (0.640)
Left-led Government					0.119 (0.200)		
Right-led Government						0.150** (0.0547)	


¹⁹ Hausman test indicates that FE model is more consistent than random effects (Table C2).

Proportion of <i>OBC</i> population							-0.00409 (0.00430)
Constant	0.371 (0.384)	0.205 (0.393)	-1.370 (1.358)	-1.184 (1.166)	-1.178 (1.144)	-0.941 (1.181)	-0.0614 (0.555)
R-squared	0.036	0.047	0.073	0.074	0.077	0.086	-
State Fixed Effects	√	√	√	√	√	√	
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	551	551	551	551	551	551	551

All models examine representation in government. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Interaction of Political Representation and Caste Quotas: Finally, to understand if quotas shape redistributive policy, I regress social spending on the interaction between political representation and administrative quotas for both *SCs* and *OBCs*.²⁰ For consistency, I employ the same model specifications as the original analysis in Table 1. The results are summarized in Appendix C.4. I find that though *OBC* political representation and *OBC* quota are not statistically significant independently (Table C12), states with higher *OBC* political *and* administrative representation are likely to be more redistributive, measured through both proportional and absolute spending in social sectors. Figure 7 shows the marginal effect of *OBC* quotas on redistribution. The interaction term is consistently positive and significant for lagged values of *OBC* quotas (by 1, 3, and 5 years). The results remain consistent when I control for *OBC* population and use government-term as a unit-of-analysis (Tables C13 and C14). *SC* representation, however, does not generate similar results, i.e., the interaction of *SC* representation and *SC* quotas is not associated with redistribution (Table C15).

Figure 7: Marginal Effects of *OBC* Quotas on Redistribution



Note: Shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals (Model (2) from Tables C13 and C14 in Appendix C.4)

²⁰ I acknowledge that quotas may not reflect the actual caste composition of the bureaucracy. Since the proportion of *OBC* and *SC* officials is likely to be equal or lower than proposed quotas, the interaction term may in fact underestimate the effect of descriptive representation.

5.2 Does Descriptive Representation Matter?

How should we make sense of the overall findings? Upper-caste dominance, reflected by higher levels of *upper-caste* representation and caste-based status inequality, is associated with negative redistribution. This is consistent with existing studies that show that growth-oriented policies have been most successful in states led by upper-caste capitalists (Murali 2017; Kohli 2012).²¹ More broadly, the analysis suggests that the policy preference of high-status groups is similar to that of the economic elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992; Esping-Andersen 1990). But unlike the working-class coalitions, low-status groups do not present a clear association with economic redistribution. *SC* and *OBC* political representation is not directly associated with redistributive spending. But *OBC* representation in government is a strong predictor of *OBC* quotas, and a combination of *OBC* political representation and quotas predicts higher social spending.

Further, the *type* of representation matters. The results on *SCs* seem surprising from the perspective of class politics, but are consistent with existing studies that find that the distributional effect of *SC* representation has been limited (Jensenius 2017; Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Unlike *OBCs*, *SC* representation is largely an outcome of political quotas. Scholars have argued that in the absence of strong *SC* mobilization, their policy preferences are likely to be diluted by the agenda of the parties they represent (Ahuja 2019; Jensenius 2017). With the exception of the *BSP*, most parties are controlled by non-*SC* politicians. Mainstream parties are known to choose weak *SC* leaders who remain marginalized within the organization (Jensenius 2017; Chandra 2004). Kanshi Ram, one of the most influential *SC* politicians, famously referred to *SC* politicians elected through quotas as *chamchas* (sycophants), who merely follow the orders of the party leaders (Jensenius 2017). This may explain why we observe negative coefficients for *SC* representation in several models and why the interaction effect of *SC* political representation and quotas is not significant.

The finding on *STs* is also consistent with the literature. While the coefficients for *ST* representation are not significant in Table 1, *STs* are associated with higher welfare spending, measured through total expenditure in social sectors and education and health (Models (1-2) in Table C5). Unlike *SCs* and *OBCs*, *STs* tend to be geographically concentrated. Scholars have suggested that this allows them to

²¹ Higher proportional spending in growth-oriented sectors implies less support for redistribution.

target resources to their community, which may explain the relative success of *ST* political quotas (Chin and Prakash 2011; Pande 2003). *STs*, however, constitute only 6% of legislators.

While the limits of *SC* representation may be explained by institutional factors, the results on *OBCs* are puzzling because *OBC*-led parties have successfully assumed power in many states. The effects of *OBC* representation remains underexplored because of limitations of data, but scholars have generally been skeptical of the development agenda of *OBC* politics. Governments led by *OBC* parties have been described as “neo-patrimonial” – states that pursue the interests of a narrow group at the expense of public goods (Kohli 2012). *OBC* quotas have been explained as “an offer to share the spoils of office, *not* a promise of social justice for the poor” (Weiner 2001, 204). This research, however, shows that the relationship between *OBC* representation and redistribution seems to be mediated by the identity of the bureaucracy.

5.3 Potential Mechanisms: Why the Identity of Bureaucrats Matters?

To uncover some of the ways that the identity of bureaucrats and politicians collectively shape redistributive policy, I draw on qualitative sources. Primary evidence is based on fieldwork in the state of Bihar between 2011 and 2016. Bihar provides a useful case because the *OBC*-led *RJD* prioritized representational policies as one of its key agendas when it came to power in 1990. This was achieved through formal quotas as well as appointment of members of low-status groups in key administrative positions. The proportion of *OBC* and *SC* officers in the local administration doubled as a result. *RJD*'s tenure is marked by poor governance, but the state witnessed a shift towards redistributive policies during this period (Chakrabarti 2019). I rely on interviews with current and retired civil servants and politicians who observed, and at times shaped, transformative changes in the state's governance during this period.

I highlight three main mechanisms. First, the representational measures resulted in greater alignment in the goals and values of the political and bureaucratic class. Several scholars have emphasized that the crisis in governance in Bihar was rooted in conflict between the new political class and an upper-caste bureaucracy, what Witsoe (2013, 81) describes as “bureaucracy versus democracy.” The posting of *OBC* and *SC* officers was one of the most controversial measures of government, especially since it bypassed formal procedure. Yadav justified the policy as a means to correct for historical injustice, using the following analogy, “*Humne to bas roti ko palta hai. Ek side sadiyon se jal raha tha*” or “One side

of the bread had been burning for centuries. We just flipped it (to make it even).”²² In my interviews with government officials over six years, I found that their caste identity was a reasonably good predictor of their normative position on the *RJD* government. Upper-caste officials believed that patronage politics had seriously hurt state capacity. Several *OBC* and *SC* bureaucrats, in contrast, had personally experienced discrimination. They did not disagree with *RJD*’s poor record in governance but emphasized that such measures empowered lower-castes, which they believed was necessary for development programs to succeed. These officials were instrumental in designing and implementing the transfers. This resonates with Narayan’s (2018) account of the Tamil Nadu administration as a *Indian Administrative Service* (IAS) officer. Caste quotas led to transformative changes in its bureaucracy in the sixties and seventies. He attributes Tamil Nadu’s robust welfare state to this change, arguing, “...there was politicization of the bureaucracy, and over time, the ideas of social justice of the political class were accepted and adopted by the administrative class, and this constitutes a major reason for the success of the programmes.” (Narayan 2018, xvii).

Second, the appointment of *OBC* and *SC* officials contributed towards breaking down long-established upper-caste patronage networks at the local level. While describing elite networks in previous governments, for instance, an official narrated the following example, “In the 1970s the *Congress* government appointed about 1 lakh (100,000) teachers – most of these were *Brahmins* and *Rajputs*. Many of them were unqualified and had no interest in teaching...The parameters were fixed in such a way that only certain castes were selected to cater to certain pressure groups. This stopped with *RJD*.”²³ Reducing upper-caste dominance in local politics was believed to be necessary to prevent elite capture of government programs. Many politicians and officials also believed such appointments would reduce discrimination in implementation. This was a reasonable assumption given that caste bias in development projects has been widely documented in various sectors in India, including education and healthcare (Desai and Dubey 2011; Thorat and Lee 2012; Weiner 1991).

Third, greater representation of *OBC* and *SC* officials was instrumental in making state institutions more accessible. Historically, lower-caste citizens had limited freedom to voice their demands in public where positions of power were occupied by upper-castes. An official, for example, narrated the

²² Interview with Lalu Yadav, 14th June 2014, Patna, Bihar.

²³ Interview with Bihar/Jharkhand-cadre IAS officer, 12th January 2012, New Delhi

following example to describe the implications of administrative changes, “Lower castes would not have dared to enter the office of the *DM* or *BDO* (state officials). They thought that if they said something, they would be punished. That changed. Now they have the confidence to raise their voice against the *DM*. They don’t know if their job will get done, but they can enter his office without fear.”²⁴ This observation is insightful because while it acknowledges poor service delivery due to low state capacity, the ability of low-status groups to make claims on the state itself represented a major departure in Bihar. Claims-making can generate demand for social goods over time (Kruks-Wisner 2018). Studies in other parts of India show that representation brings members marginalized groups into the public sphere, which can reduce traditional forms of social dominance (Chauchard 2014), and allow marginalized citizens to transgress social norms and develop the civic and political skills necessary to make claims for both dignity and material goods (V. Rao and Sanyal 2010). I outline these mechanisms in greater detail in Appendix D.

6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The argument developed here is based on insights from India, but it has implications for other multiethnic societies. A number of scholars have emphasized that mobilizations for the “struggle for recognition”, under the banners of nationality, ethnicity, and race have become the paradigmatic form of social movements since the end of the twentieth century (Fraser 1995). Though the constituents of dignity are contextually specific, representational claims have been at the core of these mobilizations (Laing 2012; Yashar 1999). In cases like India, where ethnic parties led by marginal groups have been able to assume political power, the policy agenda of their government has reflected these concerns (Postero 2017; Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018). India’s deep-rooted caste hierarchy, history of social mobilization, and extensive affirmative action offers a unique opportunity to examine how status mediates the complex relationship between the identity of the political elite and the nature of distributional politics.

I rely on multiple sources of historical data and find support for both the *politics of dominance* and the *politics of dignity*. Upper-caste dominance, reflected by higher levels of *upper-caste* representation and caste-based status inequality, is associated with opposition to redistribution. The politics of dignity challenges this dominance through the inclusion of low-status groups in the public sphere and state

²⁴ Interview with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 11th June 2014, Patna

institutions. I find that while *SC* and *OBC* representation is not associated with redistributive spending directly, political elite from these groups have consistently supported caste-based reservations. Constitutional provisions for *SC*s, in large part, can be attributed to activism by Ambedkar (Jaffrelot 2003), and *OBC* reservations were a result of mobilization by *OBC*-led parties. More importantly, places with higher *OBC* political and administrative representation spend more on social development.

Rather than just patronage or symbolic politics, this research suggests that descriptive representation in the bureaucracy seems to be the mechanism through which low-status groups are able to pursue redistributive politics. However, I observe this result only in cases where the group is politically mobilized. Without political agency, representation remains a form of tokenism. The research design does not allow me to definitively identify the source of barriers to redistribution – if low-status politicians do not prioritize redistribution until representational policies are implemented, or if they face resistance from the high-status bureaucrats to pursue redistributive policies effectively. Future research may disentangle the effects of the policy preference of the political elite and the structural barriers encountered by low-status groups to enact their preferences.

The role of social status in the interaction between the political and administrative elements of the state opens up an exciting research agenda on ethnicity and development. Emerging studies find that the (threat of) inclusion of low-status groups can reduce state capacity (Suryanarayan and White 2021), but ethnic heterogeneity has been shown to strengthen public institutions over the long-term (Charnysh 2019). The status anxiety generated after the announcement of franchise expansion in 1917 in Tamil Nadu, for example, led upper-castes to deliberately weaken state institutions (Suryanarayan 2021). Contemporary Tamil Nadu, however, stands out for the quality of its administration and welfare state. The state also has the highest caste quota in the country. *OBC* reservations are relatively new in North India and *OBC* legislators are still underrepresented in most states. If the political trajectory of the South provides some cues to the future of redistributive politics, concerns for group-based demands gradually gave way to an inclusive civil society, encompassing ethnic parties, and eventually a broad welfare agenda (Varshney 2000; Heller 2000; Thachil and Teitelbaum 2015; Ahuja 2019). The “politics of retribution” or “elite backlash” may reflect short-term reactions. Future work might examine the specific mechanisms through which ethnicity shapes state capacity over the long-term by adopting a historical approach (Charnysh 2019; Pardelli and Kustov 2022).

My findings also present important normative and policy implications. A class-based understanding of social justice is based on equality of opportunity, regardless of an individual's material endowment. It hence prescribes economic redistribution, especially through public education and universal healthcare (Sen 1999). Status inequality presents a distinct set of challenges to equalization of social opportunity that mere investment in public goods cannot capture. An identity-based idea of justice faces the additional burden of dismantling status biases, both psychological and institutional. Towards this end, it would be useful for future research to examine *if* and *how* descriptive representation contributes to reducing status hierarchy over the long-term. From a policy perspective, this study calls for the need to examine the role of discrimination in policy design and implementation. Further, by suggesting that the inclusion of low-status groups in the bureaucracy can influence development outcomes, this research pushes the boundaries of existing debates on affirmative action that have largely revolved around questions of meritocracy and efficiency (Bhavnani and Lee 2021). These issues are particularly relevant in India where quotas in public sector continue to generate massive protests.

Finally, the findings of this research present several parallels with the broad tenets of the literature on ethnicity and nationalism (Wimmer 2002; Horowitz 1985). According to this school, the transformation of societies from hierarchical empires to modern nations involves the incorporation of ethnic groups into the state-building process. The principles of modernity – “political participation, equal treatment before the law and protection from the arbitrariness of state power, *dignity* for the weak and poor, and *social justice* and security”, Wimmer (2002, 1) argues, “were fully realized only for those who came to be regarded as *true members* of the nation.” Exclusion of certain groups from state power is at the heart of ethnic conflict (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Much like lower-caste elites in India, the emergence of a middle-class in excluded ethnic groups is accompanied with the political struggle over access to state power, resulting in the ethnicization of the bureaucracy (Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 2002). The common thread that connects the egalitarian principles of the nation to the welfare state appears to be *representation*. Findings of this study strongly suggest that the path to redistribution in hierarchical societies has to address the question of dignity along its way.

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ahuja, Amit. 2019. *Mobilizing the Marginalized: Ethnic Parties Without Ethnic Movements*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, Cameron, John Angus Hildreth, and Laura Howland. 2015. "Is the Desire for Status a Fundamental Human Motive? A Review of the Empirical Literature." *Psychological Bulletin* 141 (3): 574–601. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038781>.
- Baccini, Leonardo, and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. "Gone for Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash, and US Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review* 115 (2): 550–67. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000022>.
- Baker, Christopher. 1976. "The Congress at the 1937 Elections in Madras." *Modern Asian Studies* 10 (4): 557–89. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X00014967>.
- Baldwin, Kate, and John Huber. 2010. "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision." *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 644–62.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Amory Gethin, and Thomas Piketty. 2019. "Growing Cleavages in India? Evidence from the Changing Structure of Electorates, 1962–2014." *Economic and Political Weekly* 54 (11): 34–44.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95 (4): 1190–1213.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Rohini Somanathan. 2007. "The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence from India." *Journal of Development Economics* 82 (2): 287–314.
- Barnett, Marguerite Ross. 1976. *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bearfield, Domonic. 2009. "What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination." *Public Administration Review* 69 (1): 64–76. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.01941.x>.
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz. 2011. "Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series–Cross-Section Political Economy Data." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (1): 331–52. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071510-103222>.
- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1415–51. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935061>.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil, and Alexander Lee. 2021. "Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service." *American Journal of Political Science* 65 (1): 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12497>.
- Centeno, Miguel, Atul Kohli, Deborah Yashar, and Dinsha Mistree, eds. 2017. *States in the Developing World*. Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Chakrabarti, Poulomi. 2019. "One Nation, Many Worlds: Varieties of Developmental Regimes in India." PhD Dissertation, Providence RI: Brown University.
- Chancel, Lucas, and Thomas Piketty. 2019. "Indian Income Inequality, 1922–2015: From British Raj to Billionaire Raj?" *Review of Income and Wealth* 65 (S1). <https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12439>.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. "What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (1): 397–424. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170715>.

- Chandra, Kanchan, and Omar García-Ponce. 2019. "Why Ethnic Subaltern-Led Parties Crowd Out Armed Organizations: Explaining Maoist Violence in India." *World Politics* 71 (2): 367–416. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S004388711800028X>.
- Charnysh, Volha. 2019. "Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland." *American Political Science Review* 113 (2): 423–41. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000042>.
- Chauchard, Simon. 2014. "Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India." *American Political Science Review* 108 (02): 403–22. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000033>.
- Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. "Do Party Systems Count?: The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2): 152–87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003260981>.
- Chhibber, Pradeep, and Rahul Verma. 2018. *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India*. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
- Chin, Aimee, and Nishith Prakash. 2011. "The Redistributive Effects of Political Reservation for Minorities: Evidence from India." *Journal of Development Economics*, 13.
- Clark, Tom, and Drew Linzer. 2015. "Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?" *Political Science Research and Methods* 3 (02): 399–408. <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.32>.
- Dasgupta, Aditya. 2018. "Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India." *American Political Science Review* 112 (4): 918–38. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800031X>.
- Desai, Sonalde, and Amaresh Dubey. 2011. "Caste in 21st Century India: Competing Narratives." *Economic and Political Weekly* 46 (11): 40–49.
- Dunning, Thad, and Janhavi Nilekani. 2013. "Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils." *American Political Science Review* 107 (01): 35–56. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000573>.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Polity Press.
- Evans, Ivan. 1997. *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fernandez, Sergio, Samuel Koma, and Hongseok Lee. 2018. "Establishing the Link between Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: The South African Case." *Governance* 31 (3): 535–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12319>.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1995. "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'post-Socialist' Age." *New Left Review* 1 (212): 68–93.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2018. *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gandhi, Mohandas. 1983. *Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Gidron, Noam, and Peter A. Hall. 2020. "Populism as a Problem of Social Integration." *Comparative Political Studies* 53 (7): 1027–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019879947>.
- Girard, Victoire. 2018. "Don't Touch My Road. Evidence from India on Affirmative Action and Everyday Discrimination." *World Development* 103 (March):1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.008>.
- GoI. 2024. "Why Should I Pay Tax." Income Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. <https://incometaxindia.gov.in/Charts%20%20Tables/Why%20should%20I%20pay%20tax.htm>.

- Golway, Terry. 2014. *Machine Made: Tammany Hall and the Creation of Modern American Politics*. New York: Liveright.
- Government of India. 1980. "Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission)." New Delhi: Government of India.
- Gulzar, Saad, Nicholas Haas, and Benjamin Pasquale. 2020. "Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India's Scheduled Areas." *American Political Science Review* 114 (4): 1230–46. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000532>.
- Gusfield, Joseph. 1986. *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement*. University of Illinois Press.
- Heller, Patrick. 2000. "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India." *World Politics* 52 (4): 484–519.
- Hockstra, Mark, and Carly Will Sloan. 2022. "Does Race Matter for Police Use of Force? Evidence from 911 Calls." *American Economic Review* 112 (3): 827–60. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201292>.
- Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press.
- Houle, Christian, Paul Kenny, and Chunho Park. 2019. "The Structure of Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting." *Journal of Politics* 81 (1): 187–200. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700200>.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Sanjay Kumar, eds. 2009. *Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of the Indian Legislative Assemblies*. New Delhi; Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Jensenius, Francesca. 2017. *Social Justice Through Inclusion: The Consequences of Electoral Quotas in India*. Oxford University Press.
- Khanna, Gaurav. 2020. "Does Affirmative Action Incentivize Schooling? Evidence from India." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 102 (2): 219–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00848.
- Khemani, Stuti. 2003. "Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3016. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Kohli, Atul. 1987. *The State and Poverty in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 2012. *Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle. 2018. *Claiming the State: Active Citizenship and Social Welfare in Rural India*. Cambridge University Press.
- Laing, Anna Frances. 2012. "Beyond the Zeitgeist of 'Post-Neoliberal' Theory in Latin America: The Politics of Anti-Colonial Struggles in Bolivia." *Antipode* 44 (4): 1051–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01010.x>.
- Lamont, Michèle. 2018. "Addressing Recognition Gaps: Destigmatization and the Reduction of Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 83 (3): 419–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122418773775>.
- Lee, Alexander. 2021. "Does Affirmative Action Work? Evaluating India's Quota System." *Comparative Political Studies* 54 (9): 1534–64. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989755>.
- Lipsky, Michael. 2010. *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lupu, Noam, and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 316–36. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000128>.
- Malik, Mashail. 2022. "Discrimination & Defiant Pride: How the Demand for Dignity Can Create Slack for Poor Governance." SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 4043185. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4043185>.

- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 628–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2647821>.
- McClendon, Gwyneth. 2018. *Envy in Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Meltzer, Allan, and Scott Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5): 914–27. <https://doi.org/10.1086/261013>.
- Mendelberg, Tali. 2022. "Status, Symbols and Politics: A Theory of Symbolic Status Politics." *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 8 (6): 50–68. <https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2022.8.6.03>.
- Miller, Dale. 2001. "Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice." *Annual Review of Psychology* 52 (1): 527–53. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.527>.
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, and James Q. Wilson. 1964. "Patronage in New York State, 1955-1959." *American Political Science Review* 58 (2): 286–301. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1952863>.
- Murali, Kanta. 2017. *Caste, Class and Capital*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, Diana. 2018. "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115 (19): E4330–39. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115>.
- Narayan, S. 2018. *The Dravidian Years: Politics and Welfare in Tamil Nadu*. Oxford University Press.
- Obama, Barack. 2006. *The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*. Crown.
- Pande, Rohini. 2003. "Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India." *The American Economic Review* 93 (4): 1132–51. <https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803769206232>.
- Pardelli, Giuliana, and Alexander Kustov. 2022. "When Coethnicity Fails." *World Politics*, February, 1–36. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887121000241>.
- Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. 1979. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. Vintage books.
- Posner, Daniel. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Postero, Nancy. 2017. *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia*. University of California Press.
- Rao, M. Govinda, and Nirvikar Singh. 2005. *The Political Economy of Federalism in India*. Oxford University Press.
- Rao, Vijayendra, and Paromita Sanyal. 2010. "Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 629 (1): 146–72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716209357402>.
- Ravallion, Martin, and Gaurav Datt. 2002. "Why Has Economic Growth Been More Pro-Poor in Some States of India Than Others?" *Journal of Development Economics* 68 (2): 381–400.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia. 2019. *Status: Why Is It Everywhere? Why Does It Matter?* New York, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Rosen, Michael. 2012. *Dignity: Its History and Meaning*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber, and John Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 103 (2): 147–74. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090194>.
- Singh, Prerna. 2016. *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107324909>.
- Subramanian, Narendra. 2000. *Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Suryanarayan, Pavithra. 2019. "When Do the Poor Vote for the Right Wing and Why: Status Hierarchy and Vote Choice in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (2): 209–45. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758752>.
- . 2021. "Status Politics Hollows out the State: Evidence from Colonial India." Working Paper.
- Suryanarayan, Pavithra, and Steven White. 2021. "Slavery, Reconstruction, and Bureaucratic Capacity in the American South." *American Political Science Review* 115 (2): 568–84. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000933>.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Inter-Group Behavior." In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by William Austin and Stephen Worchel. Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Taylor, Charles. 1994. "The Politics of Recognition." In *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, edited by Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Thachil, Tariq, and Emmanuel Teitelbaum. 2015. "Ethnic Parties and Public Spending: New Theory and Evidence from the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (11): 1389–1420. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015576743>.
- Thorat, Sukhadeo, and Joel Lee. 2012. "Food Security Schemes and Caste Discrimination." In *Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India*, edited by Sukhadeo Thorat and Katherine S. Newman, 287–307. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Toral, Guillermo. 2024. "How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments, Bureaucratic Accountability, and Service Delivery in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 68 (2): 797–815. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12758>.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2000. "Is India Becoming More Democratic?" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (1): 3–25.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. University of California Press.
- Weiner, Myron. 1991. *The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 2001. "The Struggle for Equality: Caste in Indian Politics." In *The Success of India's Democracy*, edited by Atul Kohli, 193–225. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set." *American Sociological Review* 74 (2): 316–37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240907400208>.
- Witsoe, Jeffrey. 2013. *Democracy against Development: Lower-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
- Yadav, K.C., and Rajbir Singh. 1994. *India's Unequal Citizens: A Study of Other Backward Classes*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.

- Yadav, Yogendra. 2000. "Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s." In *Transforming India*, edited by Francine Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava, and Balveer Arora. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- . 2010. "What Is Living and What Is Dead in Rammanohar Lohia?" *Economic and Political Weekly* 45 (40): 92–107.
- Yashar, Deborah. 1999. "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America." *World Politics* 52 (1): 76–104.

Appendix

The Politics of Dignity: How Status Inequality shaped Redistributive Politics in India

Poulomi Chakrabarti

Table of Contents

List of Figures	2
List of Tables	3
A. Data and Measurement	4
A.1 Economic Redistribution	4
A.2 Caste-based Political Representation	8
A.3 Caste Quotas	15
A.4 Status Inequality	16
A.3 Control Variables	19
A.6 Descriptive Statistics	24
B. OBC Quotas	25
C. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks	36
C.1 Estimation Strategy	36
C.2 Determinants of Redistributive Spending	39
C.3 Determinants of OBC Quotas	46
C.4 Interaction Models	48
D. Exploring Mechanisms: The Case of Bihar	52
D.1 Case Selection and Methods	53
D.2 The Politics of Dignity in Bihar	54
D.3 Mechanisms: Representative Bureaucracy and Redistribution Politics	59
E. Background Data	70
References	87

List of Figures

Figure A1: State-level Spending in Development and Social Sectors, 1960-2012	6
Figure A2: State-level Proportional Spending in Social Sectors, 1960-2012	7
Figure A3: Proportion of <i>Upper-caste</i> Legislators, 1960-2012	8
Figure A4: Proportion of <i>OBC</i> Legislators, 1960-2012	9
Figure A5: Proportion of <i>Lower-caste</i> Legislators, 1960-2012	9
Figure A6: State-level Representation of <i>Upper-caste</i> , <i>OBC</i> and <i>Lower-caste</i> Legislators, 1960-2012 ..	13
Figure A7: <i>Upper-caste</i> Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000	14
Figure A8: <i>OBC</i> Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000	14
Figure A9: <i>Lower-caste</i> Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000	14
Figure A10: State-level <i>OBC</i> and <i>SC & ST</i> Quotas in Public Employment by decade	15
Figure A11: Mapping Alternative Measures of Status Inequality at the State-level	18
Figure D1: Caste Representation of Bihar Government, 1952-2020	52
Figure D2: Caste Composition of local bureaucrats in five districts in Bihar, 1980-2014	53
Figure D3: Lalu Yadav being sworn in as Chief Minister in Patna, Bihar, 1990	56
Figure D4: Content Analysis of Government Speeches in Bihar, 1960-2014	56
Figure D5: Proportional Developmental Spending in Social Sectors in Bihar, 1960-2012	60

List of Tables

Table A1: Proportion of <i>Upper-caste</i> , <i>OBC</i> and <i>Lower-caste</i> Legislators, 1960-2012	10
Table A2: Representation of <i>Upper-caste</i> , <i>OBC</i> and <i>Lower-caste</i> Legislators in State Legislatures, 1960-2012	12
Table A3: Representation of <i>Upper-caste</i> , <i>OBC</i> & <i>Lower-caste</i> Legislators in State Governments, 1960-2012	12
Table A4: Summary of Existing Studies and Controls Employed	23
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics: Main Variables	24
Table B1: Backward Classes Commissions and Committees in India, 1918-2020	25
Table B2: <i>OBC</i> , <i>SC</i> and <i>ST</i> Quotas in Public Employment in Indian states, 1921-2020	26
Table B3: Caste Identity of Chief Ministers under whom <i>OBC</i> Quotas was enacted, 1947-2019	32
Table C1: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Estimation: Redistributive Spending	37
Table C2: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Estimation: <i>OBC</i> Quotas	38
Table C3: Main Results: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite	39
Table C4: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Alternative Measures of Status	40
Table C5: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Alternative DVs, Units of Analysis, and Estimation	41
Table C6: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite	42
Table C7: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Controls for Economic and Structural Factors	43
Table C8: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Controls for Political Factors	44
Table C9: <i>OBC</i> Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: FE Estimation	46
Table C10: <i>OBC</i> Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: RCM Estimation	47
Table C11: <i>OBC</i> Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: RCM Estimation	47
Table C12: Redistribution, Identity of Political Elite and <i>OBC</i> Quotas	48
Table C13: Interaction Effects of <i>OBC</i> Representation and <i>OBC</i> Quotas: Redistribution	49
Table C14: Interaction Effects of <i>OBC</i> Representation and <i>OBC</i> Quotas: Social Spending	50
Table C15: Interaction Effects of <i>SC</i> Representation and <i>SC</i> Quotas	51
Table D1: Voter Base of RJD and RJD-Allies (%), 2000 and 2005	57
Table D2: Caste Composition (%) of BDOs in Bihar (five districts), 1980-2015	58
Table D3: Caste Composition (%) of BDOs in Bihar (five districts), 1980-2015	58
Table E1: Population Distribution of Castes and Religions in Indian States	70
Table E2: Comparison of Population Estimates from Census of India and <i>NES</i> in Indian States	71
Table E3: Comparison of <i>SC</i> and <i>ST</i> population estimates from Census of India, <i>IHDS</i> , and <i>NES</i>	72
Table E4: Estimates of <i>OBC</i> Population in Indian States	73
Table E5: Comparison of % <i>SC</i> and <i>ST</i> Reserved Seats with % <i>SC</i> and <i>ST</i> Population	74
Table E6: Coding Protocol for Caste	75
Table E7: Coding Protocol for Class	76
Table E8: Summary of State Assembly Elections, 1951-2014	77

A. Data and Measurement

A.1 Economic Redistribution

I measure state preference for redistribution as the *proportion of developmental spending dedicated to social sectors*, based on the recently released data on state-level public expenditure from the *State Finance Reports (1960-2015)* collected from the *Reserve Bank of India (RBI)* archives in Mumbai. These budgets are originally prepared by the *Office of the Controller and Auditor General* with input from the *Finance Departments* and *Planning Commission* at the state level. The *Department of Economic and Policy Research* at the RBI then consolidates the reports. Fifty-two years of income and expenditure data were digitized by a team of research assistants.

I use the standard Government of India classification to categorize sectoral spending as either social or economic. *Social sectors* include education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing, welfare of lower-castes, social security and welfare, labor and labor welfare, and *economic spending* includes agriculture, rural development, special area programs, irrigation, power, industry, civil works, transport, science, and forests. I combine as “Revenue” and “Capital” expenditures. These figures are corrected for inflation through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) released by the World Bank (World Bank 2012). Population estimates from the Census of India were used to calculate per capital allocations.

$$Preference\ for\ Redistribution_{it} = \left(\frac{Social\ Sector\ Spending_{it}}{Developmental\ Spending_{it}} \right)$$

where, i =state, and t =year

Data on public expenditure is based on nineteen major states for the following years. Figure A1 plots the per capita spending in development and social sectors from 1960 to 2012. Figure A2 plots the main dependent variable – redistributive spending by state.

1. Andhra Pradesh (1960-2012)
2. Assam (1960-2012)
3. Bihar (1960-2012)
4. Chhattisgarh (2000-2012)
5. Gujarat (1960-2012)
6. Haryana (1966-2012)

7. Himachal Pradesh (1970-2012)
8. Karnataka (1960-2012; Mysore until 1974)
9. Jharkhand (2001-2012)
10. Kerala (1960-2012)
11. Maharashtra (1960-2012)
12. Madhya Pradesh (1960-2012)
13. Odisha (1960-2012)
14. Punjab (1960-2012)
15. Rajasthan (1960-2012)
16. Tamil Nadu (1960-2012; Madras until 1967)
17. Uttar Pradesh (1960-2012)
18. Uttarakhand (2000-2012)
19. West Bengal (1960-2012)

Figure A1: State-level Spending in Development and Social Sectors, 1960-2012






Figure A2: State-level Proportional Spending in Social Sectors, 1960-2012



A.2 Caste-based Political Representation

The caste and religious background of state-level legislators is based on the original dataset collected by the authors of the edited volume *Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies* (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009) provided by the *Lokniti* Unit of the *Center for the Study for Developing Societies*, New Delhi. I classify Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) into three caste groups: i) *Upper-caste*, that includes *Forward-and-Dominant-caste* groups from all religions, ii) *Other Backward Classes (OBC)*, including both peasant and service caste *Shudras*¹, and iii) *Lower-caste*, which includes *SCs*, *STs* and non-Hindu-lower-castes.² Table E6 presents the coding protocol for caste. Figures A4, A5 and A6 present the proportion of different categories of *Upper-caste*, *OBC* and *Lower-caste* legislators.

Figure A3: Proportion of *Upper-caste* Legislators, 1960-2012



¹ Though some *dominant*-castes have successfully lobbied to qualify for administrative quotas in recent years, I use the term “OBC” because most OBCs are *peasant* and *service* subcastes and the term is relevant in the context of Indian politics.

² Hindu *SC* & *STs* comprise 22% of the MLAs; the proportion of *Lower-caste* MLAs from all religions is marginally higher at 26% (See Table A1).

Figure A4: Proportion of *OBC* Legislators, 1960-2012




Figure A5: Proportion of *Lower-caste* Legislators, 1960-2012




Table A1: Proportion of *Upper-caste*, *OBC* and *Lower-caste* Legislators, 1960-2012

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
<u>Upper Caste</u>				
Hindu Forward Caste	30.10	32.97	17.09	568
Dominant Caste	17.57	9.87	17.88	568
Upper Caste (All religions)	50.75	52.50	15.62	568
<u>Other Backward Classes</u>				
Peasant OBC	15.85	10.45	13.69	568
Lower OBC	3.25	0.85	5.53	568
OBC (All religions)	19.10	13.17	17.03	568
<u>Lower Caste</u>				
SC	15.57	15.38	5.29	568
ST	6.50	4.41	7.04	568
SC and ST	22.08	21.70	8.01	568
Lower Caste (All religions)	26.32	25.28	8.41	568
<u>Other</u>				
Muslim	5.36	3.85	4.94	568
Christian	0.22	0.00	0.60	568
Sikh	2.22	0.00	9.78	568

I measure the caste background of the political elite in terms of *representation* to account for variation in the caste distribution of the population across states. A state with a high proportion of *OBCs*, for example, can be expected to have a higher proportion of *OBCs* in the legislature. The caste distribution of the population is estimated through the *National Election Studies* (NES),³ based on the round in which the proportion of *SC* and *ST* most closely matched the actual population estimates of the 2011 Census. The NES presents a high correlation (ranging between 0.9 to 1.0) with Census data on caste and religion, making it a more reliable measure than available alternatives (see Table E2).⁴ Consistent with the existing literature, I assume that the caste distribution of states has remained relatively stable over time (Borker et al. 2017; Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). Table E1 presents the population distribution of major castes and religions at the state level based on NES estimates.

³ NES surveys, conducted by the *Lokniti* Unit at the *Center for the Study for Developing Societies*, are based on random sampling immediately after state elections to capture voting patterns and gauge public opinion on a host of issues on politics and government.

⁴ Some researchers have used district-level estimates of the 1931 caste census, which was the last time that a caste census was carried out for which data is available (Banerjee and Somanathan 2007; Suryanarayan 2019). These estimates may be biased not only because they are almost a century old, but also because district boundaries have changed many times in the last eight decades which makes it difficult to construct current state boundaries using the 1931 information. The Government of India carried out a caste census in 2011, the results of which were not made public.

I construct measures for *representation of political elite* in the state legislature and government (legislators in the ruling-coalition). Data on the seat and vote share of different political parties was collected from the *Election Commission of India* (ECI 2015). Data on the constituents of the ruling alliance, i.e., parties that formed the government, was gathered from a number of secondary sources. Table E8 presents data on parties that formed the ruling alliance in all major states from 1951 to 2014. Representation of a caste j in a particular institution (legislature or government) is calculated as the ratio of the proportion of MLAs from that group in that institution in state i at year t to the proportion of the caste in the respective state population, given by the form below:

$$Political\ Representation_{cit} = \left(\frac{\sum Legislator_{cit}}{\sum Legislator_{it}} \right) \div \left(\frac{\sum Population_{ci}}{\sum Population_i} \right)$$

where, c =caste group, i =state, and t =year

Concerns of Missing Data: The dataset includes information on MLAs in 16 major states for the following assembly elections, but the quality of data is not consistent across states and years. To reduce errors in estimating the effects of caste-based representation, I do not include observations where the proportion of MLAs for which caste/religion identity is not available is more than 15%. The descriptive statistics, presented later, also reflect the limited sample. Figure A7 presents the representation of *Upper-caste*, *OBC*, and *Lower-caste* MLAs by state from 1960 to 2012. Figures A8, A9 and A10 maps the representation of MLAs from the three groups in three specific years over this period, 1960, 1980 and 2000.

1. Andhra Pradesh (1955, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994, 1999)
2. Assam: 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1991)
3. Bihar (1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010)
4. Chhattisgarh (2003)
5. Gujarat (1962, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998)
6. Himachal Pradesh (1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003)
7. Haryana (1957, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996)
8. Karnataka (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1994)
9. Kerala (1957, 1960, 1967, 1970, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996)
10. Maharashtra (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999)
11. Madhya Pradesh (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993, 2003, 2008)
12. Punjab (1962, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1985, 1992, 1997, 2002)

13. Rajasthan (1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008)
14. Tamil Nadu (1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1991, 1996)
15. Uttar Pradesh (1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2002, 2007, 2012)
16. West Bengal (1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, 2001)

Table A2: Representation of *Upper-caste*, *OBC* and *Lower-caste* Legislators in State Legislatures, 1960-2012

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
<u>Upper Caste</u>				
Hindu Forward Caste	2.89	1.90	3.46	568
Dominant Caste	2.62	1.50	4.80	568
Upper Caste (All religions)	1.74	1.65	0.62	568
<u>Other Backward Classes</u>				
Peasant OBC	0.78	0.61	0.59	568
Lower OBC	0.32	0.08	0.57	568
OBC (All religions)	0.50	0.46	0.28	568
<u>Lower Caste</u>				
SC	0.97	0.96	0.33	568
ST	0.69	0.89	0.53	568
SC and ST	0.94	0.99	0.28	568
Lower Caste (All religions)	0.89	0.92	0.24	568
<u>Other</u>				
Muslim	0.54	0.50	0.38	568
Christian	0.91	0.00	2.70	390
Sikh	1.71	0.00	6.33	442

Table A3: Representation of *Upper-caste*, *OBC* & *Lower-caste* Legislators in State Governments, 1960-2012

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
<u>Upper Caste</u>				
Hindu Forward Caste	2.79	1.92	3.65	568
Dominant Caste	2.52	1.48	4.70	568
Upper Caste (All religions)	1.71	1.61	0.65	568
<u>Other Backward Classes</u>				
Peasant OBC	0.74	0.58	0.63	568
OBC (All religions)	0.47	0.42	0.30	568
<u>Lower Caste</u>				
SC	15.57	15.38	5.29	568
ST	6.50	4.41	7.04	568
SC and ST	22.08	21.70	8.01	568
Lower Caste (All religions)	26.32	25.28	8.41	568
<u>Other</u>				
Muslim	5.36	3.85	4.94	568
Christian	0.22	0.00	0.60	390
Sikh	2.22	0.00	9.78	442

Figure A6: State-level Representation of *Upper-caste*, *OBC* and *Lower-caste* Legislators, 1960-2012




Figure A7: *Upper-caste* Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000




Figure A8: *OBC* Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000





Figure A9: *Lower-caste* Representation in State Legislatures: 1960, 1980 and 2000



A.3 Caste Quotas


I measure caste-based reservations by tracing the legislations on *OBC*, *SC*, and *ST* quotas in all major states. I draw on original sources (government reports and circulars, newspapers reports) as well as existing studies in constructing this dataset (see Table E8). Data on *SC* and *ST* reservations is based on sources from 1980 onwards. I assume that *SC* and *ST* quotas for the previous three decades remained constant, since the *SC* and *ST* quotas are designed to reflect population estimates. I account for the population distribution of states in measurement.

$$Caste\ Quota_{cit} = \left(\frac{\sum Quota\ in\ Public\ Employment_{cit}}{\sum Population_{cit}} \right)$$

where, c =caste group, i =state, and t =year

SC and *ST* population is based on Census of India data from 1961 to 2011. Consistent with Khanna (2020), *OBC* population is based on state-level estimates from the 55th Round of the *National Sample Survey (NSS)* carried out in 1999-2000. For states created after 2000 (Jharkhand and Uttarakhand), I used estimates from the NSS 62nd Round (2005-06). Table E4 summarizes *OBC* population estimates from the two *NSS* surveys and *IHDS*. Figure A3 graphs *OBC* and *SC* & *ST* reservations by decade. While *SC* & *ST* quotas have remained more or less consistent over time (reservations in 1960s and 1970s may be overestimated due to lack of data), *OBC* reservations increase sharply after the implementation of the *Mandal Commission Report* in 1993.

Figure A10: State-level *OBC* and *SC* & *ST* Reservations in Public Employment by decade



A.4 Status Inequality

Status inequality reflects differences in honor across groups. It is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a measure of humiliation that can truly capture the variation in caste-relations across time and regions. Currently no nation-wide survey in India measures caste-based discrimination explicitly, though recent studies have explored the practice of untouchability and caste-based exclusion against *Dalits* in public streets based on survey research (Girard 2018; Thorat and Joshi 2020). Existing studies on status have developed measures are relevant to their specific research question. Suryanarayan (2019), for example, relies on data on overrepresentation of *Brahmins* among the literate population from the 1931 census and proportion of *Brahmin* population to explore the legacy of *Brahmin* dominance on current day voting. In another study Suryanarayan and White (2021) use proportion of enslaved population and proportion slaveholders in the white population in 1860 to measure historical racial-status inequality. I construct measures of caste-based status inequality based on three distinct principles: i) endogamy or prevalence of inter-caste marriage, ii) between-group income inequality, and iii) caste inequality based on differences in class across castes.⁵

Endogamy: As discussed in the main paper, since the caste system is reproduced through norms of endogamy in India, I operationalize the first measure of status through state-level data on inter-caste marriage. The rate of inter-caste marriages in India, even as recently as 2011, was less than 6% (Ray, Roy-Chaudhuri, and Sahai 2020). Higher levels of inter-caste marriage should indicate a breakdown of social segregation and hierarchy. I rely on the *India Human Development Survey (IHDS)*, one of the few nationally representative surveys to collect data on all caste groups. I use the following question: “Do you know anyone in your community/*jati* who has had an inter-caste marriage?”. Since norms of endogamy are strongest among upper-castes, the main measure is based on *Forward-castes (Brahmins, Kashatriya and Vaishyas)*. An alternative measure uses data on all caste groups. This measure is able to draw a distinction between status and other forms of group inequality since it does not rely on group-size or group-based endowments.

Between-Group Inequality (BGI): Given the highly interconnected nature of social and economic life in India, we should expect a high degree of correlation between material and status inequality. The

⁵ See Chakrabarti (2022) for a discussion on measurement of caste-based inequality.

second measure of status inequality relies on income inequality between caste groups. A number of studies have examined differences in group-based income through the *Between-Group Inequality* index (Huber and Suryanarayan 2016; Baldwin and Huber 2010; Houle, Kenny, and Park 2019). BGI utilizes the principles of the Gini index but is based on group's mean income instead. It is interpreted as the expected difference in the mean income of the groups of any two randomly selected individuals. BGI ranges from 0 to 1 – the larger the BGI, the higher the correlation between group identity and income. I rely on income data disaggregated by caste – Forward-castes, *OBCs*, and Lower-caste, based on data from the *IHDS* to generate caste-based BGI.

$$BGI = \frac{1}{2\bar{y}} \sum_{m=1}^k \sum_{n=1}^k p_m p_n |\bar{y}_m - \bar{y}_n|$$

where, m and n are index groups, p_m is the proportion of the population in group m, $\bar{y}_m$ is the average income of group m, $\bar{y}$ is the average income in the society, k is the number of groups in the society


Caste-Class Inequality: The third measure of status inequality also relies on the distribution of material endowment across castes but uses data on *class* instead of income. I assume that the extent to which lower-caste groups have broken the class barrier should reflect equalization of social hierarchy. For example, in Bihar, only 6% of the lower-caste can be considered upper class, as compared to 12% backward castes and 30% *upper-castes*. In Kerala, in contrast, the proportions for *Lower*, *OBC* and *Upper* castes are 36%, 37% and 50% respectively. These figures seem consistent with secondary sources – Bihar is generally regarded as one of the most unequal states, while Kerala is often cited as an example of egalitarian social relations in India (Witsoe 2013; Heller 2000). I operationalize caste-based inequality through data on the distribution of caste and class in the latest round of the *NES* state-level surveys, measured as the ratio of the *Upper-caste* groups who are upper or middle class, to *Lower-caste* who are upper or middle class. I use occupation and educational attainment to measure social class (see Table E7 for coding protocol for class). The use of occupation is an improvement over income-based measures that tend to be less reliable in household surveys in India. It also allows me to account for differences in lifestyles and amenities across rural and urban areas that asset-based measures tend to conflate. Secondly, population estimates from *NES* data are closer to the Census estimates as compared to *IHDS* data (correlation for *SC* and *ST* estimates are .91 and .98 respectively for *NES*, as compared to .86 and .95 for *IHDS*. See Table E3).

$$Caste\ based\ Inequality_i = \sqrt{\frac{(Upper\ Caste_i \cap Upper\ Class_i)^2}{(OBC_i \cap Upper\ Class_i)(SC/ST_i \cap Upper\ Class_i)}}$$

where, i =state

Figure A11 presents the distribution of the four measures of status inequality at the state level. As expected, states in the South have relatively more egalitarian caste relations across all measures. One of the main disadvantages of these measures, however, is that it does not capture change in inequality over time. Given that I examine more than five decades of data during which significant redistributive policies like land reforms, affirmative action in education and employment, and legislations against discrimination were enforced, we should expect these measures to have had some effect on caste relations. Government data and most surveys are unfortunately limited to *SCs* and *STs*.

Figure A11: Mapping Alternative Measures of Status Inequality at the State-level



A.5 Controls Variables

Economic Factors: *Economic development* is likely to generate demands for social goods as well as the capacity to meet these needs (Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). In the Indian context, Datt and Ravallion (1998; 2002) find that parts of the country with better infrastructure and human resources at the time of Independence were more successful in reducing poverty. I control for economic development through data on Net State Domestic Product (NDSP) collected from the *Reserve Bank of India* (RBI). Secondly, economic inequality has been found to be negatively associated with redistributive politics (Paul and Verdier 1996; Alesina and Giuliano 2011). The direction of causality in this relationship can understandably run in both directions, but the economic elite in more unequal societies are likely to be powerful and hence in a position to influence public policy towards a non-redistributive agenda. I control for the potential impact of income inequality through data on consumption-based inequality generated by *National Sample Survey Organization* (NSSO) from 1960 to 1994.⁶ These figures are available in the *EOPP Indian States Dataset* by Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. I compute an aggregate gini coefficient using intra-state rural and urban gini based on the following formula below. Finally, I control for *economic growth*, through data on NDSP growth rate from RBI.

$$\text{Economic Development}_{it} = \ln(\text{NDSP})_{(it)}$$

where, i =state and t =year

$$\text{Gini}_{it} = (\text{Rural Gini}_{it} \times \text{Prop of Rural Pop}_{it}) + (\text{Urban Gini}_{it} \times \text{Prop of Urban Pop}_{it})$$

where, i =state, and t =year

Social Factors: A large body of work emphasizes a strong negative correlation between *ethnic diversity* and public goods provision (Alesina and Ferrara 1999; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). In the Indian context, Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) find that greater religious and caste-based fragmentation weakens the provision of public services. The standard means to explore the relationship between ethnic diversity and development is through the Ethnic fractionalization Index (ELF). ELF captures the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different groups. It can take values between zero and one, where 1 implies a highly heterogeneous society and 0 refers to a perfectly homogenous society. The main measure of ELF accounts for the distribution of *Scheduled Caste (SC)*

⁶ NSSO uses consumption data, based on Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (MPCE), to calculate intra-state inequality.

and *Scheduled Tribe (ST)* population along with major religions Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and others) through data from the Census of India (1961 to 2011). Since the Hindu-Muslim cleavage is generally accepted to be the most significant social faction (Varshney 2003), the second measure of ELF is restricted to religions. I also account for the representation of Muslim legislators in the government as one of the robustness checks. Secondly, as discussed in the main paper, since upper-caste resistance to caste-based mobilization is a function of underlying social structure (Jaffrelot 2003; Varshney 2000), I control for the proportional population of *Upper-caste* in the main models. Finally, the literature on *social capital* suggests that social cohesion should support collective action (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Krishna 2002). Most research on social capital in the Indian context is based micro-level qualitative studies (Krishna 2002). A notable exception is Singh (2016). Though she does not focus on social capital specifically, she explores the relationship between cultural cohesion, measured through the level of subnationalism, and social development through data on literacy rate, infant mortality rate, and expenditure on education and health from 1966 to 2006. I use the dataset provided by the author to account for the effect of subnationalism.

$$ELF_{Religion+Caste} = 1 - \sum_{t,i=1}^n c_{it}^2$$

where, c_{it} is the share of caste and religious group i in year t

Administrative Factors: As discussed in the main paper, I draw a distinction between *state capacity* and the *policy preference* of the state. I measure state capacity as a product of state's *fiscal capacity* and *extractive capacity*. Fiscal capacity is conceptualized as the resources available with the state, as reflected by its total expenditure, that can be channeled for redistribution and/or growth. The extractive capacity, on the other hand, captures what has been described as the infrastructural power of the state (Mann 1984; Soifer 2008). In line with existing conceptions of state capacity based on taxation, I measure extractive capacity as the ratio of State's Own Taxes to its income or NDSP (Tilly 1992; Besley and Persson 2009). In addition, transfers from the central government can also affect a state's spending decisions by influencing the size of its overall budget. A number of scholars have found that the degree of federal transfers in India is influenced by political considerations – either affiliation with the ruling party in the center, or coalitional bargaining by state-level parties (Khemani 2003; Rodden and Wilkinson 2004). I control for central government assistance by accounting for different sources of federal funding – grants-in-aid, central plan schemes, and centrally sponsored schemes, through data from the *Reserve Bank of India*.

$$State\ Capacity_{it} = (Fiscal\ Capacity_{it}) \times (Extractive\ Capacity_{it})$$

where, i =state, and t =year

$$Fiscal\ Capacity_{it} = \ln(Total\ Expenditure_{it}) \mid Extractive\ Capacity_{it} = \left(\frac{State's\ Own\ Taxes_{it}}{Net\ Domestic\ State\ Product_{it}} \right)$$

Political Factors: A number of scholars have argued that social democratic parties and left-ideology are more likely to support wider social entitlements (Sandbrook et al. 2007; Esping-Andersen 1990). In the Indian context, the effect of social democratic parties on development has largely been explored qualitatively, most notably by Kohli (1987). I control for the effect of social democratic parties by coding for left-led coalitions through data from the Election Commission of India and other secondary sources. I use the dataset by Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) to cross check my coding scheme. Alternative models also control for other political factors (Banerjee, Gethin, and Piketty 2019), including ideology – governments led by a centrist parties, right-wing parties., and party-types – coalitions led by Congress, BJP and regional parties. Thirdly, I account for existing studies that have examined the role of party-systems. Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) argue that since two-party systems require political parties to build broad cross-cleavage coalitions by providing public services accessible to all groups, they are likely to more development oriented. They use data on multi-party or two-party states to understand its effects on absolute developmental spending and proportion of spending to salaries from 1967 to 1997. Thachil and Teitelbaum (2015) find that “narrow ethnic parties” entrench patronage politics, while “encompassing ethnic parties” are associated with higher levels of developmental spending from 1967 to 2007. Though both these studies examine the effect of party-types on total developmental spending, rather than state proportional spending in social development, I control for their theories as one of the robustness checks through datasets provided by the authors.

Greater political consciousness and political participation by the population can be expected to create pressure on the government and hence produce a positive effect on a state’s developmental spending (Besley and Burgess 2002). The superior performance in public service delivery in states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala has often been attributed its strength of public engagement . Further, in the Indian context, changes in voter turnout over time also captures the effect of greater democratization since increase in political mobilization in the last few decades has been largely driven by the lower castes and classes (Yadav 1996). In addition to political participation, voter turnout can hence also be treated

as a crude measure of the degree of democratization, that qualitative studies on development emphasize (Harriss 1999; Heller 2000; Jaffrelot 2003; Varshney 2000). Following the seminal work on government responsiveness and political consciousness by Besley and Burges (2002), a number of studies on social development in India have controlled for voter turnout. I obtain turnout data from 1960 to 2012 from the Election Commission of India as well as the *Economic Organisation and Public Policy Programme (EOPP)* Indian States Dataset by Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess.

Other Structural Factors: We can expect state government policy to be influenced by the larger trends in politics and macro-economic policy. The variable, *political period*, accounts for three distinct phases: i) 1947 to 1967, when economic policy relied on a socialist central-planning model and the center and most states were dominated by the Congress Party (Kothari 1971), ii) 1967 to 1991 witnessed the emergence of wide range of national and regional parties but the economy continued to be controlled by central planning, and iii) the period from 1991 is marked by liberalization of the economy. I also control for different *decades* as a robustness check. Finally, I account for *pre-existing level of development* by controlling for baseline levels of literacy. This also helps offset the potential limitations of using proportional spending as a dependent variable. I use data from Census of India and assume a linear growth in literacy rates between decades (census years).

Table A4: Summary of Existing Studies and Controls Employed

Control	Study	Data	Explanatory Variable(s)	Control Employed
1. Economic Development	1.1 Datt and Ravallion, 1998	1957-58 to 1990-91 for 15 major states <i>Estimation: Fixed-effects (LSDV)</i>	Public expenditure; State Gross Domestic Product	1. Log of Net State Domestic Product (NDSP) from 1960 to 2012. 2. NDSP Growth Rate (1968-1995)
	1.2 Datt and Ravallion, 2002	1960-61 to 1993-94 for 15 major states <i>Estimation: Pooled-OLS</i>	Income; Public spending	<i>Source: Reserve Bank of India</i>
2. Ethnic Diversity	Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007	1971 and 1991 for 16 major states <i>Estimation: OLS</i>	Social fragmentation; Land inequality; Political Fragmentation	1. ELF for Religion, and SC and ST population, 1960 to 2012. 2. ELF for Religious Diversity, 1960 to 2012. <i>Source: Census of India</i>
3. Cultural Cohesion	Singh, 2016	1966-2006, for 16 major states, & Comparative Historical Analysis of 5 states <i>Estimation: Pooled-OLS with lagged DV</i>	Index of Subnationalism developed by author	Index of Subnationalism, 1966 (extrapolated to 1960) to 2012. <i>Source: Singh 2016</i>
4. Social Democratic Parties	Kohli, 1987	Late 70s in West Bengal, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, explored qualitatively	Social democratic/ Left-led regimes	1. Left-led coalitions, 1960 to 2012. <i>Source: Election Commission of India</i>
5. Political Participation	Besley and Burgess 2002	1958-1992, for 16 major states <i>Estimation: Fixed Effects (state and year)</i>	Newspaper circulation; Electoral turnout; Political competition	1. Voter turnout rate, 1960-2012 <i>Source: Election Commission of India</i>
6. Party-systems	6.1 Nooruddin and Chhibber, 2004	1967-1997, for 15 major states <i>Estimation: OLS with PCSE</i>	Multi-party/ Two-party state	Multi-party/ Two-party state, 1967 to 1997. <i>Source: Nooruddin and Chhibber, 2004</i>
	6.2 Thachil and Teitelbaum, 2015	1967-2007, for 15 major states <i>Estimation: Fixed Effects (state and year)</i>	Narrow ethnic party/ Encompassing ethnic party	Narrow/ Encompassing ethnic party, 1967 to 2007. <i>Source: Thachil and Teitelbaum, 2015</i>

A.6 Descriptive Statistics

Table A5: Descriptive Statistics: Main Variables

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
<u>Dependent Variable</u>				
Proportion of Social Spending	48.45	48.31	7.75	832
<u>Representation in Government</u>				
Upper Caste	1.71	1.61	0.65	568
Hindu Upper-caste	2.79	1.92	3.65	568
Dominant Caste	1.48	2.52	4.70	568
OBC	0.47	0.42	0.30	568
Lower Caste	0.92	0.93	0.29	568
Scheduled Caste	1.03	1.03	0.41	568
<u>Status Inequality</u>				
Endogamy (Upper caste)	70.69	75.07	18.99	20
Endogamy (All castes)	71.46	76.44	20.22	20
BGI	643.52	596	258.08	19
Caste-based Inequality	1.71	1.62	0.67	19
<u>Reservations</u>				
Scheduled Caste	1.00	0.99	0.16	870
Scheduled Tribe	1.39	1.01	1.34	748
Other Backward Classes	0.49	0.43	0.59	870
<u>Main Control Variables</u>				
State Capacity	0.57	0.55	0.20	822
NDSP	24531	17841	16918	832
ELF (Caste)	0.56	0.57	0.07	832
Left-led Government	0.08		0.27	832
Turnout	62.91	64.30	10.33	830
Sub-nationalism	2.26	2.51	1.26	832
Upper-caste Population (%)	16.26	15.11	12.80	832
Literacy Rate	51.39	50.17	18.06	831

B. OBC Quotas

Table B1: Backward Classes Commissions and Committees in India, 1918-2020

	Commission	Appointment	Report
National Level			
	1. Kaka Kalelkar Commission	1953	1955
	2. B.P. Mandal Commission	1979	1980
State Level			
Andhra Pradesh	1. Manohar Prasad Committee	1968	1970
	2. Ananta Raman Commission	1970	1970
	3. Muralidhar Rao Commission	1982	1982
Bihar	4. Mungeri Lal Commission	1971	1976
Gujarat	5. Natvarsinh Solanki Panel	1971	-
	6. A.R. Bakshi Commission	1972	1976
	7. Justice C.V. Rana Commission	1981	1983
	8. Justice R.C. Mankad Commission	1987	1987
Haryana	9. Gurnam Singh Commission	1990	1991
	10. Haryana Backward Classes Commission	2012	2012
Jammu and Kashmir	11. Justice B.P. Gajendragadkar Commission	1967	1968
	12. Justice J.N. Wazir Commission	1969	1969
	13. Justice Adarsh Anand Commission	1976	1977
Karnataka	14. Justice L.C. Miller Committee (Mysore)	1918	1921
	15. R.N. Gowda Commission (Reorganized Mysore)	1960	1961
	16. L.G. Havanur Commission	1972	1975
	17. T. Venkataswamy Commission	1985	1987
	18. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Commission	1989	1990
Kerala	19. Justice C.D. Nokes Committee (Travancore-Cochin)	1935	1936
	20. V.K. Vishwanatham Commission	1961	1963
	21. G. Kumara Pillai Commission	1965	1966
	22. N.P. Damodaran Commission	1967	1970
	23. P.D. Nettur Commission	1968	1973
Madhya Pradesh	24. Ramji Mahajan Commission	1980	1983
Maharashtra	25. O.H.B. Starte Committee (Bombay Presidency)	1929	1930
	26. B.D. Deshmukh Committee	1961	1964
Odisha	27. Justice Raghunath Biswal Commission	2020	
Punjab	28. Brish Bhan Committee	1965	1966
Tamil Nadu	29. Sattanathan Commission	1969	1971
	30. J.M. Ambashankar Commission	1982	1986
	31. Venkatakrishnan Commission	1988	-
	32. K Shanmugam Backward Classes Commission	1993	1997
	33. K M Natarajan Backward Classes Commission	1997	2002
	34. Arumugam Backward Classes Commission	2002	2006
	35. Janardhanam Backward Classes Commission	2006	2015
Uttar Pradesh	36. Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission	1975	1977
	37. Hukum Singh Committee	2001	2001
West Bengal	38. Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission	1980	1980

Table B2: OBC, SC and ST Quotas in Public Employment in Indian states, 1921-2020

State ⁷	Years	Quota (%) ⁸			Notes ⁹
		OBC	SC	ST	
Andhra Pradesh ¹⁰	1927-1949	42	8	0	Madras Presidency/state reservation policies in effect in districts previously under Madras.
	1950-1962	38	17	0	BC lists from Madras and Hyderabad states combined after the state was formed in 1953.
	1963-1970	25	18	4	OBCs quota was successfully challenged by the High Court following the Balaji judgement in 1963. The first BC commission, <u>Manohar Prasad Committee</u> established in 1968. The commission identified 92 castes and recommended 30% reservations for OBCs.
	1971-1992	25	15	6	The 1971 BC list based on <u>Ananta Raman Commission</u> (1970) that recommended 30% reservations for four groups: i) tribes: 7%, ii) occupational and service castes: 10% (iii) SCs who converted to Christianity: 1%, and (iv) other communities: 7%. Telugu Desam under Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao implemented the 44% OBC quotas in 1986 following the recommendations of the <u>Muralidhar Rao Commission</u> (1982) but retracted to 25% the same year due to objections from the High Court.
	1993-2013	27	15	6	
	2014-	29	15	6	OBC breakdown by category: A: 7%; B: 10%; C: 1%; D: 7%; E: 4%.
Assam	1950-1992	0	7	15	
	1993-	27	7	15	OBC reservation introduced after the Mandal Report.
Bihar	1950-1977	0	14	10	<u>Order of 1951</u> by the Government of Bihar issued two lists of OBCs: Annex 1 (79 castes) and Annex 2 (30 castes). Order was struck down by the Patna High Court in 1963 following the Balaji judgement. The <u>Mungeri Lal Commission</u> was appointed by Daroga Prasad Rai (Congress), the first OBC Chief Minister of Bihar, in 1971. It recommended 26% and 24% OBC quotas in government jobs and education respectively.

⁷ While caste-based quotas go back to 1921, state administrative boundaries have undergone numerous changes in the last century. I make a note of these changes in cases, in footnotes below, wherever OBC reservations were in effect *before* the state boundaries evolved. State names are *italicized*.

⁸ Acronyms for caste/class-based administrative categories: OBC: Other Backward Classes; BC: Backward Classes; MBC: Most Backward Castes; SC: Scheduled Castes; ST: Scheduled Tribes; EWS: Economically Weaker Sections; EBC: Economically Backward Classes.

⁹ Public sector jobs are categorized into four classes, all of which are eligible for quotas. Class III/C and IV/D are lower skilled jobs. Class IV jobs like driver, peon, cleaner, security guard, require primary school or less in educational qualifications. Class III jobs are non-supervisory in nature and include positions like clerks, assistants, typist, police constables, drivers, electricians, etc. Class I/A and II/B jobs require a college degree and comprise about 11.5% of all the jobs. Class II include jobs like police inspector, junior engineers, schoolteachers, technicians, etc. Class I jobs are managerial positions where candidates are recruited through Public Service Commissions. It includes civil servants, engineers, and scientists. In some states, the level of OBC quotas varies by type of employment. I focus on Class I & II jobs since officials in these categories are directly involved in policy implementation.

In 1963, the Supreme Court passed a judgement in the famous *Balaji vs. State of Mysore* case that restricted overall caste quotas 50% on grounds of individual merit. Changes in OBC reservations in 1963 generally reflect the repercussions of this judgement. A number of states in the South, however, challenged this ruling and restored OBC reservations (generally through negotiations with the central government).

¹⁰ Formed by the merger of *Andhra State* (1953-56) with the Telugu-speaking areas of *Hyderabad State* (1948-56). *Andhra State* was created 1953, from the Telugu-speaking northern districts of *Madras State*.

	1978-1992	20	14	10	OBC quotas implemented by Chief Minister Karpoori Thakur in 1978 after the Janata Party formed the government. OBC breakdown: BC: 8%; MBC: 12%. Additional reservation of 10% for EWS and 3% for Women. OBC list updated to include 128 BCs and 93 MBCs. The policy led to massive protests by upper-castes and reservations could not be implemented in 17 districts. Objections against the reservations were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1991.
	1993-1999	26	15	9	OBC reservation increased by the RJD government under Chief Minister Lalu Yadav following the <u>State Commission for Backward Classes Act</u> , 1993.
	2000-2013	26	16	1	
	2014-	33	16	1	OBC breakdown: BC: 8%; MBC: 12%; OBC Women: 3%.
Chhattisgarh ¹¹	2000-2015	6	12	32	
	2016-2019	14	12	32	
	2019-	27	13	32	
Gujarat ¹²	1960-1977	0	7	14	<u>Backward Class Panel</u> headed by <u>Natvarsinh Solanki</u> formed in 1971 but replaced by <u>Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Commission</u> under <u>Justice AR Bakshi</u> in 1972. The commission identified 82 BCs and recommended 10% reservation in educational institutes, and 10% reservation in Class III & IV jobs and 5% in Class I and II jobs.
	1978-1992	10	7	14	Recommendations of the Bakshi Commission implemented by the Janata government in 1978. Chief Minister Madhav Singh Solanki of the Congress(I), appointed the <u>CV Rana Commission</u> in 1981. The commission identified 63 occupations as OBC and recommended 28% reservations. Solanki accepted the recommendations on quotas, which was met with violent protests. The policy was hence retracted in 1985. The next Chief Minister, Amarsinh Chaudary, set up the <u>RC Mankad Commission</u> in 1987 but OBC reservation failed to find political support.
	1993-2015	27	7	14	OBC reservations gradually increased to 27% following the Mandal Commission Report.
	2016-	27	7	14	From July 2015, the <i>Patidar</i> community mobilized to be included in the OBC list. Chief Minister Anandiben Patel formed a panel to investigate reservations. 10% quota for Economically Backward Classes (EBC) among upper-castes announced in April 2016.
Haryana ¹³	1966-1977	2	20	0	OBC reservation policy for Punjab state followed until 1977 when backward caste MPs demanded reservation.
	1978-1979	5	20	0	
	1979-1993	10	20	0	Violent opposition to the Mandal Commission recommendations from 1990 to 1993. Chief Minister Hukum Singh appointed the <u>Gurnam Singh Commission</u> to identify OBCs groups in 1990. The recommendations of the report were rejected.
	1994-2016	10	20	0	SC reservations were disaggregated by two categories in 1994. The <u>Haryana Backward Classes Commission</u> was set up in 2012. Higher quotas for OBCs adopted for Class III and IV jobs. OBC breakdown: 10% in Class I & II; 27% in Class III & IV.
	2016-	27	20	0	In 2016 <i>Jats</i> organized massive protests to be included in the OBC list. The government extended the 27% quota to all classes of

¹¹ Formed in November 2000 by partitioning sixteen southeastern districts of *Madhya Pradesh*.

¹² Carved out of *Bombay state* in May 1960 on linguistic grounds.

¹³ Carved out of *Punjab* in November 1966 on linguistic grounds.

					public employment and added four new castes, including <i>Jats</i> , to the OBC list. The bill was challenged by the High Court.
Himachal Pradesh ¹⁴	1970-1992	5	22	7.5	
	1993-	18	22	7.5	OBC reservation increased following the Mandal Report in 1993. Breakdown by job category: 18% in Class I & II; 12% in Class III & IV.
Jharkhand ¹⁵	2000-	12	26	12	
Karnataka ¹⁶	1921-1950	50	NA	NA	<u>Leslie Miller Committee</u> set up by the Maharaja of Mysore in 1918. Up to 50% reservations for non-Brahmins enacted in 1921 but enforcement remained weak.
	1950-1956	25	15	0	The <u>Mysore Government Communal Order</u> passed in 1950 but was met with multiple legal petitions. Until 1956, all castes except Brahmins, Anglo-Indians and Europeans were considered backward.
	1956-1960	25	15	3	Government updated BC list (166 castes) and implemented OBC quota at 57% in 1958 but was struck down by High Court. The <u>Mysore Backward Classes Committee</u> , under Chief Minister RN Gowda, set up in 1960. The recommendations of the committee were also rejected by the High Court.
	1961-1962	50	15	3	The recommendations of the <u>Naganna Gowda Commission</u> were implemented in 1961 and <i>Lingayats</i> were included in the BC list after protests in 1962. OBC breakdown: BC: 22%; MBC: 28%.
	1963-1971	25	15	3	Reservations challenged by the High Court in the Balaji judgment 1963 and reduced again.
	1972-1981	30	15	3	Chief Minister Devaraj Urs appointed the <u>LG Havanur Commission</u> in 1972 and increased OBC reservations. The commission recommended the following reservations: Backward Communities: 20%; Backward Castes: 10%; Backward Tribes: 5%. The government further added a new category (5%) to include low income upper-castes.
	1982-1989	30	15	3	The recommendations turned down by the Supreme Court in the Vasant Kumar case in 1982, which then led to formation of the <u>Venkataswamy Commission</u> in 1983. The commission carried out a survey of more than 90% of the state population and recommended 27% reservations for OBCs. It also included an income criterion and reduced the BC list to 35 communities. It was met with protests and its recommendations were rejected by the Hedge government.
	1990-	32	15	3	The <u>Chinnappa Reddy Commission</u> was appointed in 1989 and recommended 38% reservations. It identified three categories of OBCs: Backward Communities, More Backward Communities and Backward Occupations. It also recommended deletion of dominant castes and economic restrictions, which made it politically difficult to implement.
	1936-1949	40	NA	NA	40% reservations for BCs in Travancore-Cochin based on recommendations of the <u>Justice CD Nokes Committee</u> .

¹⁴ In 1966, hilly areas of Punjab state were merged into the union territory of Himachal. It received full statehood in January 1971.

¹⁵ Formed in November 2000 from southern districts of Bihar.

¹⁶ Formed in November 1956 by combining Kodagu and Kannada-speaking regions from Madras, Hyderabad and Bombay to the state of Mysore. Mysore state was formed in 1950 by combining Coorg and Kannada-speaking districts from western Madras Presidency, southern Bombay Presidency and western Hyderabad State. Mysore was renamed Karnataka in 1973.

Kerala ¹⁷	1950-1963	40	8	2	Reservations extended to professional colleges: BC: 35%, SC and ST: 5%. BC breakdown: <i>Izhavas</i> : 13%, Muslims: 9%; Latin Catholics: 3%; Backward Christians: 1%, Other Hindus: 9%. The first OBC commission after independence, led by <u>VK Vishwanatham</u> , set up in 1961.
	1964-1966	-	8	2	Reservations challenged by the High Court in 1963 following the Balaji judgement, which led to the formation of the <u>G Kamara Pillai Commission</u> in 1964. A revised OBC list was prepared for reservations in education, but the old OBC continued for public sector jobs in 1966. The commission recommended income ceiling which was challenged by writ petitions.
	1967-1973	40	8	2	The <u>PD Nettur Commission</u> was formed in 1968 to update the OBC list based on new data. The commission recommended 38% reservation and exclusion based on economic criteria.
	1974-1978	38	8	2	The recommendations of the commission were accepted by Chief Minister Achutha Menon in 1973.
	1979-	40	8	2	OBC reservations increased to 40% by Chief Minister Vasudevan Nair.
Madhya Pradesh	1950-1993	0	16	20	<u>Government of MP Commission</u> led by <u>Ramji Mahajan</u> was set up in 1980. The commission recommended 25% reservation for OBCs, which was enforced in 1984 through <u>Act 29</u> . The legislation was legally challenged, and the High Court issued a stay on the order.
	1994-2013	13	16	20	OBC reservations implemented following the Mandal Commission report in 1994 through the <u>Lok Seva Act</u> .
	2014-2018	14	16	20	Addition reservation of 10% for EWS implemented in 2014.
	2019-	27	16	20	OBC reservation increased in 27% in 2019.
Maharashtra	1950-1973	0	7	7	The first committee to evaluate caste-based reservations in Bombay Presidency was set up in 1930 under <u>OHB Starte</u> . Ambedkar was part of this 10-member committee that classified castes into three groups: Depressed Classes, Aboriginal and Hill Tribes and Other Backward Classes. After independence OBCs in government demanded reservations.
	1974-1992	14	12	7	The <u>BD Deshmukh Committee</u> (1961) recommended the following reservations in 1964: BC: 10, SC: 12; ST: 7, Other tribes: 4 but it wasn't implemented until 1974. The government enforced an additional reservation of 46% for EWS in 1979 but the order was struck down by the Bombay High Court in 1984.
	1993-2001	20	13	7	OBC reservation increased following the Mandal Report.
	2001-	21	13	7	Reservations revised through the <u>Maharashtra State Public Services Act 2001</u> . OBC quotas based on two categories: Special Backward Category: 2% and OBC: 19%. Quotas introduced for 4 types of nomadic tribes: De-notified Tribes (A): 3%; B: 2.5%; C: 3.5%; D: 2%. Following protests by the <i>Maratha</i> community, <u>Maharashtra Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act</u> introduced 16% quota for <i>Marathas</i> in 2018. Intervention by the High Court reduced the quota to 13%. 10% quota for EWS introduced in 2019.
Orissa	1960-1992	0	14	23	<u>Odisha State Backward Classes Bill</u> passed in 1983

¹⁷ Formed in 1956 by merging the *Travancore-Cochin state* with the Malabar district and Kasaragod taluk of South Canara district of the *Madras Presidency*. *Travancore-Cochin* was formed in 1949 by combining the princely states of *Travancore* and *Kingdom of Cochin*.

	1993-	12	14	23	The first Backward Caste Commission was constituted in 199 after the Mandal Report, but the panel was never put in place after its first tenure. OBC reservation increased to 12%. A 2008 the <u>Odisha Reservation of Posts and Services for (Socially and Educationally Backward Classes) Act</u> seeking 27% OBC reservation struck down by the State Administrative Tribunal and later by the High Court in 2017. <u>Commission for Backward Classes</u> , led by <u>Justice Raghunath Biswal</u> , set up in February 2020.
Punjab	1954-1965	2	25	0	OBC reservations largely restricted to education in undivided Punjab. 2% reservation extended to OBCs through a directive of the central government in 1954.
	1966-1992	5	25	0	The <u>Brish Bhan Committee</u> set up in 1965. It recommended reservations based on regional groups, owing to their backwardness but was struck down by the High Court and OBC reservation limited to 5%. In 1975, SC reservation was subdivided and half of the SC quota devoted to <i>Balmiki</i> and <i>Mazhabi</i> Sikhs.
	1993-	12	25	0	OBC reservation increased to 12% following the Mandal Commission Report.
Rajasthan	1950-1992	0	16	12	
	1993-2016	21	16	12	OBC reservation introduced following the Mandal Report in 1993.
	2017-	22	16	12	Proposal to increase OBC quota to 26% through the Special Backward Classes (SBC) Act struck down by the High Court in 2016. 1% MBC quota introduced in 2017 and OBC list revised to include five new groups, including <i>Gujjars</i> .
Tamil Nadu ¹⁸	1921-1926	48	0	0	Reservations enacted through the <u>Government Order No. 613</u> under Justice Party in 1921. Distribution: Brahmin: 22%; Christian Indian: 10% Muslim: 15%; Europeans and Anglo-Indians: 2%; Others: 3%
	1927-1946	42	8	0	New <u>Communal Order</u> in 1927 revised reservations: Brahmins: 17%; Muslims: 17%; Anglo-Indians/Christians: 17%; Depressed classes: 8%
	1947-1949	57	14	0	Revised quotas: Non-Brahmin Hindus: 43%; Backward Hindus: 14%; Brahmins: 14%; Anglo-Indians and Christians: 7%; Muslims: 7%
	1950-1970	25	16	0	Reservations based on religion abolished by the Constitution following Independence. Revised quotas: BC: 25%; SC: 16%.
	1971-1979	31	18	0	The first <u>Backward Classes Commission</u> , led by <u>Sattanathan</u> , was constituted by Chief Minister M Karunanidhi in 1969. It identified 105 OBC castes and recommended 31% and 18% reservations for OBCs and SCs respectively. It was implemented by the DMK government in 1971.
	1980-1988	50	18	0	Restrictions based on income implemented by Chief Minister MG Ramachandran in 1977 led to massive protests. The AIADMK fared poorly in the parliamentary elections. Ramachandran hence increased OBC quotas to 50% in 1980. The <u>Ambasankar Commission</u> was set up in 1982 to examine OBC following the Supreme Court ruling to redistrict reservations to 50%. The commission recommended removal of some BC groups who benefited disproportionately from reservations. In response, the government added 29 new groups to the BC list without deleting

¹⁸ *Madras state* was renamed *Tamil Nadu* in January 1969. *Madras state* emerged from *Madras Presidency* in 1950 by excluding non-Tamil-speaking parts (which formed *Travancore-Cochin* and *Mysore*). The state was reorganized again in 1953 to form *Andhra state*. In 1956, *Kerala* and *Mysore* were expanded by merging districts from *Madras* on linguistic grounds.

	1989-2014	50	18	1	the recommended groups or introducing separate provisions for MBCs. It led to protests by <i>Vanniyars</i> , the largest MBC group. The <u>Venkatakrishnan Commission</u> was set up by the Governor in 1988 to reexamine OBC reservations.
	2014-	50	18	1	Chief minister M Karunanidhi dissolved the commission and introduced <i>Vanniyars</i> to the OBC list in 1989. OBC breakdown: BC: 30%; MBC: 20%. Subsequent <u>Backward Classes Commissions</u> led by <u>K M Natarajan</u> (1997), <u>Arumugam</u> (2002), and <u>Janardhanam</u> (2006) recommended changes within the 50% BC quota.
Uttar Pradesh ¹⁹	1950-1979	0	21	1	OBC breakdown: BC: 26.5%; Muslim: 3.5%; MBC: 20% United Provinces established a list of 27 BCs and 21 Muslims BCs for educational benefits in 1945. This BC list was used to establish quotas in education (59 castes) and administration (15 castes) in 1955, which was revised in 1958.
	1980-1993	15	21	1	The <u>First Backward Classes Commission</u> , led by <u>Chhedi Lal Sathi</u> , in 1975. It used land ownership as a criterion and established three lists: MBC (36 castes), BC (18 castes), Muslim BC (23 caste). Recommended reservations: MBC: 17%, BC: 10%, Muslim BC: 2.5% (Total: 29.5%). Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav implemented 15% OBC reservations through Government Order in 1977, which was met with massive protests and legal petitions. The government won the case and OBC reservations were implemented in 1979.
	1993-	27	21	1	OBC reservations increased to 27% following the Mandal Commission Report. The Uttar Pradesh Public Service Act was passed in 1994 and the <u>State Commission of Backward Classes Act</u> was passed in 1996. In 2001, Chief Minister Rajnath Singh constituted a <u>social justice committee</u> under <u>Hukum Singh</u> . The committee recommended the following reservations: BC: 5%, MBC: 9%, EBC: 14%. The report didn't find support from political parties, including lower caste parties. In 2019 Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath enacted 10% reservations for EWS. It also constituted a new committee to evaluate reservations. The committee recommended disaggregating OBC and SC quotas by caste (<i>jati</i>).
Uttarakhand ²⁰	2000-	13	18	3	
West Bengal	1950-1992	0	15	5	
	1993-	17	22	6	OBC reservations introduced after the Mandal report. In 2019, 10% additional reservation for EWS introduced.

¹⁹ *United Provinces* was renamed *Uttar Pradesh* in 1950.

²⁰ Formed in November 2000 by from hilly districts of Uttar Pradesh.

Table B3: Caste Identity of Chief Ministers under whom OBC Reservations were enacted, 1947-2019

State	Year	Chief Minister	Party	Chief Minister's Caste
1947-1992				
1 Andhra Pradesh	1986	N.T. Rama Rao	Telugu Desam	Dominant Caste (Kamma)
2 Bihar	1978	Karpoori Thakur	Janata Party	Lower OBC (Hajjam/Nai)
3 Gujarat	1978	Madhav Singh Solanki	Congress (I)	OBC (Koli)
4 Haryana	1978	Chaudhary Devi Lal	Janata Party	Dominant Caste (Jat)
5 Haryana	1979	Chaudhary Devi Lal	Janata Party	Dominant Caste (Jat)
6 Karnataka	1961	B. D. Jatti	Congress	Dominant Caste (Lingayat)
7 Karnataka	1972	Devaraj Urs	Congress	Forward Caste (Kshatriya)
8 Karnataka	1990	Veerendra Patil	Congress	Dominant Caste (Lingayat)
9 Kerala	1973	Achutha Menon	Communist Party of India	Dominant Caste (Nair)
10 Kerala	1979	Vasudevan Nair	Communist Party of India	Dominant Caste (Nair)
11 Maharashtra	1974	Shankarrao Chavan	Congress	Dominant Caste (Maratha)
12 Punjab	1954 ²¹	Bhim Sen Sachar	Congress	Forward Caste (Punjabi Khatri)
13 Punjab	1966	G. G Singh Mussafir	Congress	Upper Caste Sikh
14 Tamil Nadu	1971	M. Karunanidhi	DMK	OBC (Devadasi)
15 Tamil Nadu	1980	M. G. Ramachandran	AIDMK	Dominant Caste (Nair)
16 Tamil Nadu	1989	M Karunanidhi	DMK	OBC (Devadasi)
17 Uttar Pradesh	1977	Ram Naresh Yadav	Janata Party	OBC (Yadav)
1993 onwards				
18 Andhra Pradesh	1993	Kotla Reddy	Congress	Dominant Caste (Reddy)
19 Assam	1993	Hiteswar Saikia	Congress	OBC (Ahom)
20 Bihar	1993	Laloo Prasad Yadav	Janata Dal	OBC (Yadav)
21 Bihar	2014	Nitish Kumar	Janata Dal (United)	OBC (Kurmi)
22 Chhattisgarh	2016	Raman Singh	Bharatiya Janata Party	Forward Caste (Rajput)
23 Chhattisgarh	2019	Bhupesh Baghel	Congress	OBC (Kurmi)
24 Gujarat	1993	Chimanbhai Patel	Janata Dal	Dominant Caste (Patidar)
25 Gujarat	2016	Anandiben Patel	Bharatiya Janata Party	Dominant Caste (Patidar)
26 Haryana	2016	Manohar Lal Khattar	Bharatiya Janata Party	Forward Caste (Khatri)
27 Himachal Pradesh	1993	Virbhadra Singh	Congress	Forward Caste (Rajput)
28 Madhya Pradesh	1993	Digvijaya Singh	Congress	Forward Caste (Rajput)
29 Madhya Pradesh	2014	Shivraj Singh Chouhan	Bharatiya Janata Party	OBC (Kikar)
30 Madhya Pradesh	2019	Kamal Nath	Congress	Forward Caste (Brahmin)
31 Maharashtra	1993	Sharad Pawar	Congress	Dominant Caste (Maratha)
32 Maharashtra	2001	Vilasrao Deshmukh	Congress	Dominant Caste (Maratha)
33 Orissa	1993	Biju Patnaik	Janata Dal	Forward Caste (Brahmin)
34 Rajasthan	1993	Bhairon S. Shekhawat	Bharatiya Janata Party	Forward Caste (Rajput)
35 Rajasthan	2017	Vasundhara Raje	Bharatiya Janata Party	Forward Caste (Rajput)
36 Uttar Pradesh	1993	Mulayam Singh Yadav	Samajwadi Party	OBC (Yadav)
37 West Bengal	1993	Jyoti Basu	CPI (Marxist)	Forward Caste (Kayastha)

²¹ Based on directives of the Central Government.

Sources of Data:

Reports and Government Documents:

- Department of Personnel and Training. 2014. "Brochure on Reservation for SC, ST & Other Backward Classes in Services." Government of India.
- Government of Haryana. 2012. "Report of Haryana Backward Classes Commission." Welfare of Scheduled Caste & Backward Classes Department, Government of Haryana.
- Government of India. 1980. "Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission)." New Delhi: Government of India.
- Government of Maharashtra. 2012. "Maharashtra Act No. VIII of 2004." Law and Judiciary Department, Government of Maharashtra.
- People's Union of Democratic Rights. 1991. "Disputed Passages: A Report on Law, Reservations, and Agitations." New Delhi: People's Union of Democratic Rights.
- Press Information Bureau. 2014. "Status of Reservation of OBC in Various States." Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment, Government of India.

Books and Articles:

- Alam, Tosib, and Surinder Kumar. 2019. "Social and Economic Status of Backward Muslims in Uttar Pradesh: Need for an Inclusive Policy?" *Social Change* 49 (1): 78–96.
- Datar, Abhay. 2017. "Defining Backwardness: Debates in Bombay/Maharashtra." *Economic and Political Weekly* 52 (51): 7–8.
- Deshpande, Ashwini, and Rajesh Ramachandran. 2017. "Dominant or Backward? Political Economy of the Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels and Marathas." *Economic & Political Weekly* 52 (19).
- Deshpande, Rajeshwari. 2014. "Seeking OBC Status: Political Strategies of Two Dominant Castes." *Studies in Indian Politics* 2 (2): 169–83.
- Galanter, Marc. 1984. *Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India*. First Printing edition. Berkeley: Univ of California Pr.
- Iyer, Lakshmi, Tarun Khanna, and Ashutosh Varshney. 2013. "Caste and Entrepreneurship in India." *Economic and Political Weekly* 48 (6): 52–60.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 2006. "The Impact of Affirmative Action in India: More Political than Socioeconomic." *India Review* 5 (2): 173–89.
- . 2015. "What 'Gujarat Model'?—Growth without Development—and with Socio-Political Polarisation." *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 38 (4): 820–38.
- . 2016. "Quota for Patels? The Neo-Middle-Class Syndrome and the (Partial) Return of Caste Politics in Gujarat." *Studies in Indian Politics* 4 (2): 218–32.
- Jodhka, Surinder S., and Avinash Kumar. 2007. "Internal Classification of Scheduled Castes: The Punjab Story." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42 (43): 20–23.
- Khanna, Gaurav. 2020. "Does Affirmative Action Incentivize Schooling? Evidence from India." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 102 (2): 219–33.
- Kumar, Mridul. 2009. "Reservations for Marathas in Maharashtra." *Economic and Political Weekly* 44 (14): 10–12.
- Mathur, M. L. 2004. *Encyclopedia of Backward Castes: Mandal, Media and Aftermath*. Gyan Publishing House.
- Mawdsley, Emma. 1996. "Uttarakhand Agitation and Other Backward Classes." *Economic and Political Weekly* 31 (4): 205–10.

- Namboodiripad, E. M. S. 1979. "Caste Conflicts vs Growing Unity of Popular Democratic Forces." *Economic and Political Weekly* 14 (7/8): 329–36.
- Narayan, Badri. 2014. "The Politics of Reservation Categories in Uttar Pradesh." *Economic and Political Weekly* 49 (5): 18–20.
- Nataraj, Lalitha, and V. K. Nataraj. 1982. "Limits of Populism: Devaraj Urs and Karnataka Politics." *Economic and Political Weekly* 17 (37): 1503–6.
- Radhakrishnan, P. 1990. "Karnataka Backward Classes." *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (32): 1749–54.
- Shah, Ghanshyam. 1987. "Middle Class Politics: Case of Anti-Reservation Agitations in Gujarat." *Economic and Political Weekly* XXII (19–20–21): AN155–72.
- Singh, Shyama Nand. 1991. "Anti-Reservation Agitations in Bihar." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 52 (1): 24–42.
- Verma, A. K. 2001. "UP: BJP's Caste Card." *Economic and Political Weekly* 36 (48): 4452–55.
- Yadav, K. C., and Rajbir Singh. 1994. *India's Unequal Citizens: A Study of Other Backward Classes*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.

Newspapers Reports:

- Bhat, Harsha. 2020. "Decoding Karnataka's Caste Conundrum: Why BJP Asked Yediyurappa to Put Announcement of OBC Status to Lingayats on Hold." *Swarajyamag*, December 8, 2020. <https://swarajyamag.com/politics/decoding-karnatakas-caste-conundrum-why-bjp-asked-yediyurappa-to-put-announcement-of-obc-status-to-lingayats-on-hold>.
- Business Standard*. 2019. "West Bengal 4th State to Exceed SC's 50-Pc Quota Cap," July 3, 2019. https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/west-bengal-4th-state-to-exceed-sc-s-50-pc-quota-cap-119070300777_1.html.
- Business Standard India*. 2018. "97% of All OBC-Quota Central Govt Jobs, Benefits Go to 25% of Its Castes," December 7, 2018. https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/lion-s-share-in-central-obc-quota-benefits-went-to-just-under-25-of-castes-118120700247_1.html.
- Business Today*. 2019. "Chhattisgarh Doubles OBC Quota from 14% to 27%, Hikes SC Benefit; Total Reservation in State to Cross 70%," August 16, 2019. <https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/chhattisgarh-obc-quota-sc-reservation-70/story/372971.html>.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2016. "Jats and the New Caste Conflict." *Foreign Affairs*, March 15, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2016-03-15/jats-and-new-caste-conflict>.
- Hindustan Times*. 2018. "Rajasthan Govt Clarifies: Gujjars Entitled to 21% OBC Reservation," July 2, 2018. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/jaipur/rajasthan-govt-clarifies-gujjars-entitled-to-21-obc-reservation/story-RelrGao7iVxmWLUdKNdIvL.html>.
- . 2019. "Madhya Pradesh Assembly Raises OBC Reservation in Govt Jobs to 27%," July 23, 2019. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/madhya-pradesh-assembly-raises-obc-reservation-in-govt-jobs-to-27/story-AUPOFR8xd7NxUoHMEw3HUI.html>.
- . 2020a. "Why Did Naveen Patnaik Government Pass the OBC Bill in a Hurry Opinion," February 21, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/why-did-naveen-patnaik-government-pass-the-obc-bill-in-a-hurry-opinion/story-E1MlbqoUfDVEz5kv1Ho40O.html>.
- . 2020b. "Maharashtra Government Constitutes Sub-Committee for OBC Community," October 15, 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai-news/maharashtra-government-constitutes-sub-committee-for-obc-community/story-fv9e47K1GxMh82ITKx1hqI.html>.

- India TV*. 2019. "Madhya Pradesh High Court to Hear Pleas against Hike in OBC Quota from August 21," August 19, 2019. <https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india-hc-to-hear-pleas-against-mp-s-hiked-obc-quota-from-aug-21-543232>.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2016. "Why Jats Want a Quota." *The Indian Express*, February 23, 2016. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jats-reservation-stir-obc-quota-rohtak-haryana-protests/>.
- Krishnakumar, R. 2004. "A History of Reservation." *Frontline*, August 27, 2004. <https://frontline.thehindu.com/social-issues/article30224191.ece>.
- Nagarajan, Banuchandar. 2019. "A Primer on Caste Based Reservations Vis-à-Vis Tamil Nadu." *Swarajya*, July 25, 2019. <https://swarajyamag.com/politics/a-primer-on-caste-based-reservations-vis-vis-tamil-nadu>.
- Narayan, Badri. 2019. "This Is Why Yogi Govt's 'Quota within Quota' System Will Be a Win-Win Move in Uttar Pradesh." *The Print*, August 23, 2019. <https://theprint.in/opinion/this-is-why-yogi-govts-quota-within-quota-system-will-be-a-win-win-move-in-uttar-pradesh/281173/>.
- Scroll.In*. 2018. "Patidar Quota Demand: Hardik Patel Meets Gujarat OBC Panel Chief, Demands Survey of Community," November 23, 2018. <https://scroll.in/latest/903219/patidar-quota-demand-hardik-patel-meets-gujarat-obc-panel-chief-demands-survey-of-community>.
- The Economic Times*. 2020. "Odisha Finally Gets a Commission for Backward Classes," February 12, 2020. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/odisha-finally-gets-a-commission-for-backward-classes/articleshow/74107136.cms?from=mdr>.
- The Indian Express*. 2015a. "Mandal Commission Report, 25 Years Later," September 1, 2015. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/sunday-story-mandal-commission-report-25-years-later/>.
- . 2015b. "KHAM Architect Madhavsingh Solanki Speaks out: Patel Agitation Won't Last Long," September 2, 2015. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/kham-architect-madhavsingh-solanki-speaks-out-patel-agitation-wont-last/>.
- The New Indian Express*. 2020a. "Odisha Forms Backward Classes Commission, Ends 27-Year Wait," February 13, 2020. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/odisha/2020/feb/13/odisha-forms-backward-classes-commission-ends-27-year-wait-2102608.html>.
- . 2020b. "With Upper Caste Quota, Uttar Pradesh Set to Breach 50 Percent Cap on Reservation," February 21, 2020. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/feb/21/with-upper-caste-quota-uttar-pradesh-set-to-breach-50-percent-cap-on-reservation-2106581.html>.
- The Print*. 2020. "SC Stayed Maratha Reservation but Maharashtra Govt Can Still Find a Way. Here's How," September 17, 2020. <https://theprint.in/opinion/supreme-court-maratha-reservation-maharashtra-govt-caste-quota-stir/504458/>.
- The Tribune*. 2017. "Rajasthan OBC Quota up to 26%," October 27, 2017. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/rajasthan-obc-quota-up-to-26-487997>.
- . 2019. "Jat Leaders Feel Let down by New Reservation Law," January 10, 2019. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/haryana/jat-leaders-feel-let-down-by-new-reservation-law-711869>.

C. Additional Tests and Robustness Checks

C.1 Estimation Strategy

The most commonly used strategies for time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data are OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), Fixed Effects Models (FEM), and Random Coefficients Models (RCM) (Beck and Katz 1995; Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001; Beck 2001). Methodologists emphasize that the estimation strategy should depend both on the structure and characteristics of the data, as well as the theory we seek to test (Beck and Katz 2011; Wilson and Butler 2007; Beck 2007; Stimson 1985; Clark and Linzer 2015; Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2001).

OLS with PCSE is an improvement over pooled-OLS, but in cases of unit heterogeneity, i.e. when the unobserved characteristics of states vary, it can produce incorrect standard errors, which in turn leads us to be either too confident or insufficiently confident about the statistical significance of our variables (Wilson and Butler 2007; Clark and Linzer 2015). FEM differs from a panel models in that each unit is assigned its own intercept; the regression model hence effectively includes $N-1$ dummy variables for each state. Fixed effect assumes that the time-invariant characteristics of states are not correlated with other states (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001; Beck 2001). Though FEM is generally considered one of the most appropriate means of modeling TSCS data, it cannot account for time-invariant and slowly changing or “sluggish” variables. These variables, such as regime types or certain types of institutions, may be important for our theory, but since fixed effects are collinear with any unchanging independent variables, these variables end up getting dropped from the model (Wilson and Butler 2007; Beck and Katz 2001).

Random Coefficients Models (RCM) presents a compromise between assuming complete homogeneity or complete heterogeneity of units (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2001). RCM generalizes random effects from the intercept to all parameters of interest. Unlike fixed effects, RCM is based on the assumption that the variation across states is random and uncorrelated with the independent variables. While RCM is able to account for sluggish variables, it also presents greater risk of omitted variable bias since we are often not able to include all state-level characteristics that could potentially influence the outcome (Beck 2011; 2001; Wilson and Butler 2007). Beck and Katz (1996) suggest that serial correlation of the errors can be minimized by using lagged dependent variables.

The statistical analysis includes two dependent variables: redistributive spending, and *OBC* reservation. Since I am interested in the relationship between status inequality (which is time-invariant) and redistribution, I employ random effects estimators in models. Further, most variables are slow-moving. Even when I drop status inequality, the Hausman Test (Table C1) suggests that the variation across states in the data is random and uncorrelated with the independent variables, providing additional support for random effects estimation. For models exploring the determinants of *OBC* quotas, I use fixed effects estimation. The results of the Hausman Test are provided in Table C2.

Table C1: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Estimation: Redistributive Spending

	(FEM)	(RCM)	(FEM)	(RCM)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-4.234*** (1.517)	-3.661*** (1.094)	-2.612** (1.118)	-2.835*** (0.880)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	-2.596 (2.332)	-1.203 (1.974)	1.890 (2.034)	1.674 (1.717)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-5.772** (2.704)	-3.077 (2.361)	-2.135 (1.579)	-1.496 (1.465)
State Capacity	-6.334** (2.644)	-5.360** (2.291)	-6.616** (2.622)	-5.655** (2.277)
Log NDSP	-8.749*** (2.005)	-7.837*** (1.606)	-8.406*** (1.932)	-7.211*** (1.559)
ELF (Caste)	12.77 (12.22)	11.21 (8.876)	15.56 (12.18)	15.08* (8.784)
Left-led Government	3.037** (1.455)	2.807** (1.394)	2.262 (1.451)	2.204 (1.381)
Turnout	0.0711* (0.0401)	0.0846** (0.0370)	0.0772** (0.0392)	0.0826** (0.0360)
Sub-nationalism	0.844 (0.643)	0.436 (0.460)	0.839 (0.616)	0.566 (0.454)
Literacy Rate	0.403*** (0.0694)	0.354*** (0.0567)	0.364*** (0.0668)	0.316*** (0.0553)
Constant	118.5*** (17.18)	108.0*** (15.54)	107.2*** (16.51)	97.51*** (14.84)
R-sq	0.212		0.219	
N	558		558	
Hausman Test Chi Sq	0.7836		0.9232	

The first two models examine representation in state legislatures; the later examine representation in government. All models lag independent variables (by 1 year). Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C2: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Estimation: OBC Quotas

	(FEM)	(RCM)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-0.0405 (0.0738)	-0.0321 (0.0605)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	0.344*** (0.131)	0.355*** (0.110)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	0.144 (0.105)	0.0761 (0.0990)
ELF (Caste)	2.600*** (0.639)	1.095** (0.426)
Constant	-1.220*** (0.415)	-0.326 (0.276)
R-sq	0.075	
N	551	551
Hausman Test Chi Sq	0.0029	

Both models examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

C.2 Determinants of Redistributive Spending

Table C3: Main Results: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-5.355** (2.146)	-4.171*** (1.433)	-2.607*** (0.962)	-2.430*** (0.780)	-2.416*** (0.823)	
<i>OBC</i> Representation	2.830 (2.651)	4.804** (2.152)	1.495 (1.844)	2.148 (1.374)	2.530 (1.414)	2.487* (1.324)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-1.897 (2.470)	-0.603 (1.003)	-0.859 (2.165)	-0.00864 (1.069)		1.641 (1.155)
<i>SC</i> Representation					-0.521 (0.803)	
<i>ST</i> Representation					1.074 (0.725)	
<i>Forward-caste</i> Representation						-1.531*** (0.486)
<i>Dominant-caste</i> Representation						-0.159*** (0.0402)
Status Inequality	-0.173*** (0.0458)	-0.165*** (0.0447)	-0.110*** (0.0303)	-0.109*** (0.0274)	-0.0912*** (0.0268)	-0.104*** (0.0237)
State Capacity	4.146 (3.392)	2.943 (2.869)	-8.022*** (2.254)	-8.323*** (1.971)	-7.907*** (2.264)	-9.294*** (1.845)
Log NDSP			-5.653** (2.708)	-4.982** (2.221)	-5.537** (2.196)	-4.896** (2.297)
ELF (Caste)			22.33** (10.47)	23.93** (9.511)	18.95** (8.675)	28.31*** (10.25)
Left-led Government			-0.773 (1.696)	-1.299 (1.477)	-0.125 (1.242)	-1.905 (1.687)
Turnout			0.0763 (0.0590)	0.0774 (0.0585)	0.0656 (0.0576)	0.0580 (0.0568)
Sub-nationalism			0.627 (0.632)	0.650 (0.626)	0.789 (0.609)	0.807 (0.639)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)			-0.0218 (0.0234)	-0.0185 (0.0221)	-0.0344 (0.0238)	0.00424 (0.0179)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)			6.642*** (1.594)	6.476*** (1.589)	6.203*** (1.637)	6.451*** (1.616)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)			9.825*** (2.491)	9.108*** (2.100)	9.164*** (2.080)	8.764*** (2.295)
Literacy Rate			0.123*** (0.0462)	0.115** (0.0540)	0.123** (0.0495)	0.132** (0.0597)
Constant	67.94*** (6.142)	63.86*** (5.596)	90.02*** (31.29)	81.95*** (24.81)	88.50*** (23.93)	75.51*** (24.47)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	564	564	558	558	558	558

DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models employ RCM and lag independent variables (by 1 year). Models (1) & (3) examine representation in legislatures. All other models examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table C4: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Alternative Measures of Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.430*** (0.780)	-2.161** (0.866)	-2.509*** (0.793)	-2.507*** (0.792)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	2.148 (1.374)	1.358 (1.385)	1.472 (1.700)	1.473 (1.699)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-0.00864 (1.069)	0.879 (1.053)	1.550 (1.069)	1.552 (1.069)
Endogamy (upper-caste)	-0.109*** (0.0274)			
Endogamy (Overall)		-0.0808*** (0.0252)		
BGI			-0.00484** (0.00203)	
Caste-class Inequality				-24.08** (10.20)
State Capacity	-8.323*** (1.971)	-8.233*** (2.173)	-7.301*** (2.070)	-7.294*** (2.069)
Log NDSP	-4.982** (2.221)	-5.551** (2.323)	-5.008** (2.548)	-5.015** (2.548)
ELF (Caste)	23.93** (9.511)	25.45** (10.09)	24.81** (10.03)	24.81** (10.02)
Left-led Government	-1.299 (1.477)	-0.636 (1.395)	0.304 (1.414)	0.308 (1.414)
Turnout	0.0774 (0.0585)	0.0800 (0.0607)	0.0897 (0.0589)	0.0900 (0.0589)
Sub-nationalism	0.650 (0.626)	0.829 (0.617)	1.295** (0.531)	1.297** (0.531)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0185 (0.0221)	-0.0163 (0.0230)	-0.0459*** (0.0159)	-0.0460*** (0.0158)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.476*** (1.589)	6.163*** (1.565)	5.589*** (1.611)	5.587*** (1.612)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	9.108*** (2.100)	8.861*** (2.077)	7.804*** (2.125)	7.805*** (2.124)
Literacy Rate	0.115** (0.0540)	0.131** (0.0550)	0.121** (0.0555)	0.121** (0.0554)
Constant	81.95*** (24.81)	82.66*** (25.89)	74.15*** (27.06)	74.18*** (27.05)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558

See Appendix A.3 for measurement of status inequality. DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models employ RCM, lag independent variables (by 1 year) and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C5: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Alternative DVs, Units of Analysis, and Estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	41.09 (66.03)	17.65 (44.87)	-2.015* (1.046)	-1.885** (0.916)	-3.522*** (1.217)	-3.247*** (0.915)	-2.430*** (0.353)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	176.1 (210.1)	110.3 (129.5)	2.624 (1.875)	2.341 (1.806)	2.095 (2.308)	2.664 (1.954)	2.148** (0.895)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation			-1.796 (1.188)		-0.837 (3.117)	-0.885 (1.364)	-0.00864 (1.092)
<i>SC</i> Representation	17.90 (113.9)	0.861 (85.28)		-1.199 (1.130)			
<i>ST</i> Representation	332.4*** (103.9)	189.4*** (64.15)		-0.649 (0.673)			
Status Inequality	3.824 (4.335)	3.269 (3.234)	-0.0539** (0.0267)	-0.0547* (0.0305)	-0.0724** (0.0358)	-0.0780*** (0.0245)	-0.109*** (0.0244)
State Capacity	756.2*** (193.0)	259.3* (135.8)	-19.61*** (3.045)	-19.89*** (3.092)	-9.469** (3.929)	-10.12*** (3.619)	-8.323*** (2.556)
Log NDSP	482.1** (192.9)	274.6*** (98.40)	-6.920*** (2.325)	-6.750*** (2.181)	-4.455 (3.111)	-3.850 (2.534)	-4.982*** (1.144)
ELF (Caste)	-2,581** (1,115)	-1,562** (771.6)	23.36** (10.22)	22.92** (9.767)	18.44 (12.08)	22.19** (10.65)	23.93*** (4.462)
Left-led Government	-259.5 (219.5)	-147.2 (156.2)	0.705 (1.217)	0.970 (1.350)	0.331 (1.807)	-0.437 (1.722)	-1.299 (1.149)
Turnout	8.489 (6.740)	3.277 (3.658)	0.0153 (0.0450)	0.00341 (0.0516)	0.148** (0.0667)	0.142** (0.0648)	0.0774*** (0.0276)
Sub-nationalism	-34.63 (69.91)	21.23 (39.70)	1.888*** (0.492)	1.901*** (0.475)	0.504 (0.631)	0.580 (0.606)	0.650** (0.309)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	25.37*** (5.214)	15.32*** (3.600)	-0.0882*** (0.0299)	-0.0825*** (0.0320)	-0.0806*** (0.0244)	-0.0699*** (0.0211)	-0.0185 (0.0175)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	33.89 (104.9)	58.44 (56.86)	3.057** (1.302)	2.979** (1.439)	5.833*** (1.887)	5.975*** (1.864)	6.476*** (1.159)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	122.8 (195.3)	133.2 (97.14)	5.567*** (2.002)	5.467*** (2.000)	7.946** (3.458)	7.721*** (2.986)	9.108*** (1.704)
Literacy Rate	27.64*** (6.499)	20.83*** (4.392)	0.130*** (0.0423)	0.139*** (0.0433)	0.132*** (0.0482)	0.115** (0.0497)	0.115*** (0.0382)
Constant	-5,304** (2,135)	-3,009*** (1,144)	97.50*** (25.94)	96.45*** (24.47)	77.62** (35.18)	70.61** (28.45)	81.95*** (12.03)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√	
R-sq							0.519
N	558	558	558	558	148	148	558

DVs: Model (1): Per capita social spending; Model (2): Per capita spending in health and education; Models (3) & (4): Proportion of developmental spending in health and education; Models (5), (6) & (7): Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models except Model (5) examine representation in government; Model (5) examines representation in state legislature. Models (1) to (4) lag independent variables (by 1 year). Models (5) & (6) use government term as a unit-of-analysis. Model (7) employs OLS with PCSE. All other models employ RCM. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C6: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.421*** (0.847)	-2.941*** (0.784)	-2.428*** (0.784)	-2.826*** (0.710)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	1.729 (1.753)		2.149 (1.396)	
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation		-1.613 (2.214)		-0.497 (1.181)
Status Inequality	-0.106*** (0.0265)	-0.109*** (0.0319)	-0.109*** (0.0277)	-0.104*** (0.0272)
State Capacity	-8.175*** (2.186)	-7.752*** (2.119)	-8.323*** (1.967)	-7.999*** (1.935)
Log NDSP	-5.551** (2.561)	-6.531*** (1.880)	-4.981** (2.209)	-6.266*** (1.714)
ELF (Caste)	21.95** (10.70)	20.52** (9.986)	23.92** (9.845)	20.59** (9.223)
Left-led Government	-0.729 (1.683)	-0.887 (1.752)	-1.298 (1.540)	-1.231 (1.522)
Turnout	0.0796 (0.0566)	0.0772 (0.0605)	0.0775 (0.0550)	0.0801 (0.0601)
Sub-nationalism	0.634 (0.627)	0.611 (0.634)	0.650 (0.627)	0.627 (0.618)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0234 (0.0228)	-0.0263 (0.0233)	-0.0185 (0.0225)	-0.0300 (0.0198)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.560*** (1.568)	6.562*** (1.565)	6.475*** (1.580)	6.296*** (1.576)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	9.624*** (2.335)	9.964*** (2.380)	9.106*** (2.107)	9.228*** (2.099)
Literacy Rate	0.126** (0.0500)	0.143*** (0.0451)	0.115** (0.0541)	0.148*** (0.0526)
Constant	87.59*** (27.58)	100.5*** (21.81)	81.92*** (24.13)	96.39*** (18.95)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558

DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models employ RCM and lag independent variables (by 1 year). Models (1) & (2) examine representation in legislatures. Models (3) & (4) examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table C7: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Controls for Economic and Structural Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.385*** (0.788)	-1.823** (0.884)	-2.145*** (0.643)	-2.680*** (0.800)	-2.725*** (0.829)	-1.398*** (0.441)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	2.618* (1.557)	3.012* (1.672)	1.896 (1.662)	1.753 (1.571)	0.859 (1.863)	2.905*** (1.046)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-0.293 (0.870)	-0.518 (1.607)	-2.427* (1.389)	-0.188 (1.206)	1.403 (1.360)	2.136* (1.166)
Status Inequality	-0.114*** (0.0212)	-0.148*** (0.0348)	-0.147*** (0.0220)	-0.0904*** (0.0252)	-0.101*** (0.0329)	-0.131*** (0.0290)
State Capacity	-10.45*** (2.357)	-5.793* (3.517)	-5.437*** (1.581)	-11.91*** (2.345)	-6.631*** (2.533)	-9.808*** (1.726)
Log NDSP	-4.599** (2.316)	-3.272 (3.373)	-3.660 (2.764)	-5.450** (2.288)	-6.361*** (2.205)	-4.773** (2.204)
ELF (Caste)	27.13*** (9.083)	32.55** (14.24)	39.64*** (12.47)	19.25** (9.590)		28.13*** (10.03)
Left-led Government	-0.570 (1.173)	0.578 (1.698)	0.701 (1.507)	-0.512 (1.675)	1.039 (1.306)	-2.165 (1.589)
Turnout	0.0637 (0.0552)	0.0352 (0.0623)	0.0215 (0.0590)	0.0850 (0.0575)	0.0736 (0.0655)	0.0387 (0.0604)
Sub-nationalism	0.718 (0.574)	0.0184 (0.805)	0.734 (0.570)	0.836 (0.521)	0.331 (0.666)	0.577 (0.613)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0809*** (0.0310)	-0.0666 (0.0703)	-0.0731 (0.0667)	-0.0453* (0.0246)	-0.0222 (0.0405)	0.0356 (0.0246)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	5.703*** (1.695)		7.144*** (1.866)		5.809*** (1.796)	6.957*** (1.625)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	8.140*** (2.121)		8.388*** (1.338)		8.827*** (2.179)	9.535*** (2.383)
Literacy Rate	0.0734 (0.0477)	0.0533 (0.0980)	0.00925 (0.0914)	0.132** (0.0534)	0.157*** (0.0573)	0.123** (0.0599)
Central Transfers	1.789*** (0.507)					
Growth Rate		-0.00139 (0.0176)				
Gini			-0.0894 (0.112)			
Decade: 70s (base: 1960s)				3.407* (1.972)		
Decade: 80s				6.211*** (1.883)		
Decade: 90s				7.897*** (2.434)		
Decade: 2000s				7.996** (3.212)		
ELF					3.049 (4.330)	
<i>Muslim</i> Representation						1.256*

						(0.642)
Constant	71.31*** (26.33)	74.85** (33.78)	73.92** (31.16)	90.59*** (25.60)	105.2*** (23.26)	75.74*** (24.35)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	330	374	558	558	545

DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models employ RCM, lag independent variables (by 1 year), and examine representation in government. See Section 1.5 for measurement of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C8: Redistribution and Caste Identity of Political Elite: Controls for Political Factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.370*** (0.754)	-2.381*** (0.723)	-2.380*** (0.757)	-2.304*** (0.703)	-2.472*** (0.661)	-1.692 (1.135)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	2.113 (1.380)	2.054 (1.417)	1.900 (1.303)	2.311* (1.397)	1.301 (1.343)	1.085 (2.144)
	0.288 (1.205)	0.386 (1.161)	0.106 (1.146)	0.537 (1.129)	0.487 (1.083)	0.439 (1.846)
Status Inequality	-0.107*** (0.0282)	-0.0978*** (0.0269)	-0.0970*** (0.0287)	-0.0999*** (0.0265)	-0.0995*** (0.0259)	-0.100** (0.0419)
State Capacity	-8.161*** (2.218)	-7.550*** (2.211)	-7.795*** (2.195)	-7.281*** (2.109)	-6.754*** (2.434)	-6.345* (3.436)
Log NDSP	-4.766** (2.114)	-4.756** (2.097)	-5.095** (2.171)	-4.726** (1.983)	-5.011** (2.051)	-5.555 (3.565)
ELF (Caste)	24.33*** (7.214)	21.71*** (6.976)	20.91*** (7.080)	22.10*** (6.816)	19.48*** (6.660)	30.75** (13.75)
Left-led Government						0.841 (1.807)
Turnout	0.0791 (0.0565)	0.0754 (0.0566)	0.0718 (0.0586)	0.0786 (0.0568)	0.0538 (0.0593)	0.0490 (0.0542)
Sub-nationalism	0.634 (0.629)	0.602 (0.629)	0.639 (0.631)	0.537 (0.622)	0.536 (0.618)	0.506 (0.586)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0186 (0.0215)	-0.0246 (0.0206)	-0.0216 (0.0217)	-0.0173 (0.0211)	-0.0181 (0.0230)	-0.0726 (0.0610)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.460*** (1.550)	6.256*** (1.567)	6.110*** (1.383)	6.201*** (1.565)	5.574*** (1.461)	5.267* (2.881)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	9.291*** (2.060)	9.129*** (2.082)	8.679*** (2.007)	9.178*** (2.086)	8.199*** (2.068)	7.427** (2.922)
Literacy Rate	0.114** (0.0551)	0.112* (0.0572)	0.119** (0.0585)	0.109* (0.0577)	0.125** (0.0589)	0.0768 (0.113)
Centrist-Party led Government	1.346 (0.912)					
Right-led Government		-1.343 (1.248)				
Congress-led Government			-0.422 (0.793)			
BJP-led				-1.986		

Government				(1.310)		
Regional-Party led Government					1.301*	
					(0.732)	
Encompassing Ethnic Party						0.0287
						(0.0267)
Narrow Ethnic Party						0.0663
						(0.0683)
Coalition Government						0.214
						(1.121)
Constant	77.72***	79.93***	84.16***	79.00***	84.50***	85.88**
	(23.38)	(22.88)	(23.62)	(21.67)	(22.33)	(36.70)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558	551	366

DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. All models employ RCM, lag independent variables (by 1 year), and examine representation in government. See Section 1.5 for measurement of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

C.3 Determinants of *OBC* Quotas

Table C9: *OBC* Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: FE Estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation			-0.0413 (0.110)	-0.0789 (0.103)	-0.0642 (0.111)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	0.406** (0.173)	0.429*** (0.134)	0.308** (0.125)	0.259** (0.117)	0.371** (0.126)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	0.0565 (0.258)	0.122 (0.223)	0.123 (0.264)	0.0891 (0.259)	0.115 (0.264)
<i>Hindu Upper-caste</i> Representation	-0.0411 (0.0382)	-0.0331 (0.0360)			
ELF (Caste)	3.396 (2.468)	2.708 (1.918)	2.452 (1.824)	2.313 (1.898)	2.646 (1.883)
Congress-led Government			-0.0537 (0.0528)		
BJP-led Government				0.147 (0.0924)	
Regional-Party-led Government					-0.0313 (0.0635)
Constant	-1.531 (1.260)	-1.283 (0.991)	-1.072 (1.117)	-0.922 (1.198)	-1.180 (1.192)
R-squared	0.076	0.077	0.077	0.084	0.075
State Fixed Effects	√	√	√	√	√
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√
N	551	551	551	551	554

DV: *OBC* quota. All models, except Model (1), lag DV by 3 years and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C10: OBC Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: RCM Estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-0.0647 (0.0860)	-0.0349 (0.0865)	-0.0706 (0.105)	-0.0387 (0.0999)		
<i>OBC</i> Representation	0.366** (0.149)	0.410*** (0.126)	0.312** (0.157)	0.371*** (0.129)	0.381*** (0.141)	0.405*** (0.107)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	0.0493 (0.277)	0.106 (0.238)	-0.0330 (0.268)	0.0451 (0.230)	0.0232 (0.236)	0.0834 (0.199)
<i>Hindu Upper-caste</i> Representation					0.00549 (0.0142)	0.00916 (0.0136)
ELF (Caste)			1.571 (1.012)	1.125 (0.748)	1.502 (1.018)	1.057 (0.749)
Constant	0.362 (0.392)	0.206 (0.377)	-0.357 (0.603)	-0.307 (0.542)	-0.536 (0.532)	-0.410 (0.412)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	551	551	551	551	551	551

DV: OBC quota. Model (2), (4) and (6) lag DV by 3 years. All models employ RCM and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C11: OBC Quotas and Caste Identity of Political Elite: RCM Estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-0.0342 (0.102)	-0.0340 (0.104)	-0.0229 (0.108)	-0.0387 (0.106)	-0.0451 (0.108)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	0.364*** (0.131)	0.334*** (0.117)	0.311** (0.129)	0.308** (0.122)	0.381*** (0.135)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	0.0457 (0.232)	0.0362 (0.225)	0.0607 (0.246)	0.0259 (0.230)	0.0449 (0.239)
ELF (Caste)	1.058 (0.684)	1.005 (0.645)	1.102 (0.727)	1.043 (0.656)	1.148 (0.759)
Left-led Government	0.114 (0.169)				
Right-led Government		0.153*** (0.0360)			
Congress-led Government			-0.0703 (0.0564)		
BJP-led Government				0.157** (0.0751)	
Regional-Party-led Government					-0.0200 (0.0632)
Constant	-0.289 (0.519)	-0.254 (0.482)	-0.271 (0.513)	-0.240 (0.489)	-0.306 (0.558)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√
N	551	551	551	551	544

DV: OBC quota. All models employ RCM, lag DV by 3 years and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.

C.4 Interaction Effects

Table C12: Redistribution, Identity of Political Elite and OBC Quotas

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.404*** (0.806)	-2.515*** (0.810)	-2.634*** (0.811)	-8.174 (76.58)	-8.946 (77.87)	-21.22 (75.08)
OBC Representation	2.133 (1.331)	2.178 (1.365)	2.197 (1.425)	66.38 (185.9)	54.03 (190.4)	43.00 (187.8)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	-0.00805 (1.059)	-0.0463 (1.077)	-0.127 (1.092)	39.87 (176.3)	34.03 (169.2)	33.77 (149.7)
OBC Quotas	-0.156 (1.206)	0.560 (1.359)	1.560 (1.329)	172.3 (208.4)	193.5 (247.1)	318.0 (231.8)
Status Inequality	-0.110*** (0.0278)	-0.109*** (0.0267)	-0.111*** (0.0248)	-1.051 (5.380)	-1.291 (5.518)	-1.620 (5.513)
State Capacity	-8.365*** (1.966)	-8.158*** (1.933)	-7.873*** (1.914)	670.4*** (220.9)	680.2*** (218.5)	715.1*** (211.9)
Log NDSP	-5.013** (2.189)	-4.903** (2.177)	-4.784** (2.134)	656.5*** (234.6)	648.7*** (231.6)	661.8*** (220.0)
ELF (Caste)	23.68** (9.424)	24.89*** (9.613)	26.71*** (9.719)	-1,025 (1,323)	-976.5 (1,372)	-741.5 (1,342)
Left-led Government	-1.252 (1.553)	-1.413 (1.542)	-1.479 (1.517)	-575.6 (356.6)	-562.6 (347.5)	-560.2* (335.5)
Turnout	0.0793 (0.0550)	0.0701 (0.0534)	0.0575 (0.0516)	7.101 (6.739)	6.638 (6.633)	5.122 (6.500)
Sub-nationalism	0.652 (0.628)	0.656 (0.617)	0.688 (0.597)	-69.21 (87.17)	-65.02 (84.67)	-59.41 (81.09)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0173 (0.0232)	-0.0212 (0.0224)	-0.0222 (0.0222)	28.74*** (5.389)	29.12*** (5.623)	29.30*** (5.902)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.478*** (1.594)	6.505*** (1.573)	6.637*** (1.569)	100.1 (106.4)	112.1 (97.65)	134.8 (92.36)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	9.179*** (2.218)	8.973*** (2.156)	8.987*** (2.121)	43.36 (234.7)	75.77 (212.6)	97.54 (192.8)
Literacy Rate	0.117** (0.0527)	0.108** (0.0535)	0.0914* (0.0528)	24.71*** (8.069)	24.00*** (8.624)	21.73** (8.664)
Constant	82.22*** (24.65)	81.37*** (24.61)	80.50*** (24.41)	-6,940*** (2,633)	-6,838*** (2,579)	-6,934*** (2,463)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558	558	558

DVs: Model (1), 2) & (3): Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. Model (1), 2) & (3): Per capita social spending. Models (1) & (4) lags DV by 1 year. Models (2) & (5) lag DV by 3 years. Model (3) & (6) lags DV by 5 years. All models employ RCM and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C13: Interaction Effects of OBC Representation and OBC Quotas: Redistribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.426*** (0.733)	-2.572*** (0.718)	-2.742*** (0.721)	-1.730** (0.675)	-3.288*** (0.852)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	1.134 (1.292)	0.858 (1.238)	0.409 (1.195)	2.334* (1.403)	-0.377 (1.550)
Status Inequality	-0.0947*** (0.0257)	-0.0947*** (0.0250)	-0.0979*** (0.0242)	-0.121*** (0.0287)	-0.0678** (0.0280)
OBC Representation	-3.978 (2.988)	-3.976 (2.930)	-3.490 (2.933)	-1.174 (3.396)	-1.319 (3.829)
OBC Quotas	-3.212*** (0.972)	-2.978*** (1.106)	-2.147* (1.263)	-3.011*** (1.027)	-3.228* (1.923)
OBC Rep × OBC quotas	12.54*** (4.479)	13.24*** (4.699)	12.69*** (4.730)	13.26*** (4.333)	10.34* (5.338)
State Capacity	-8.805*** (2.029)	-8.801*** (2.091)	-8.398*** (2.047)		-11.26*** (3.780)
Log NDSP	-4.337** (1.754)	-4.269** (1.779)	-4.312** (1.782)		-2.918 (2.088)
ELF (Caste)	26.80*** (8.088)	27.69*** (7.883)	28.78*** (7.705)		23.64** (9.388)
Left-led Government	-0.630 (1.479)	-0.963 (1.400)	-1.293 (1.370)		-0.122 (1.808)
Turnout	0.0886* (0.0516)	0.0797 (0.0520)	0.0676 (0.0528)		0.156** (0.0679)
Sub-nationalism	0.605 (0.519)	0.624 (0.526)	0.662 (0.528)		0.530 (0.543)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0519* (0.0285)	-0.0520** (0.0263)	-0.0460* (0.0246)		-0.0876*** (0.0218)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.616*** (1.647)	6.684*** (1.637)	6.804*** (1.634)		5.953*** (1.885)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	9.254*** (2.178)	9.162*** (2.111)	9.208*** (2.075)		7.582** (3.067)
Literacy Rate	0.0728 (0.0562)	0.0664 (0.0567)	0.0575 (0.0543)		0.0827 (0.0532)
OBC Population (%)				-0.143** (0.0655)	
Constant	75.48*** (19.69)	75.47*** (19.52)	76.58*** (19.56)	89.30*** (19.90)	62.32*** (23.94)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558	148

DV: Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. Models (1) lags DV by 1 year. Models (2) & (4) lag DV by 3 years. Model (3) lags DV by 5 years. Models (1) to (4) lag independent variables (by 1 year). Model (5) uses government term as a unit-of-analysis. All models employ RCM and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C14: Interaction Effects of OBC Representation and OBC Quotas: Social Spending

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-15.97 (92.38)	-11.17 (87.69)	-31.57 (89.87)	-5.614 (96.17)	-32.20 (88.86)
<i>Lower-caste</i> Representation	165.9 (175.6)	219.0 (184.4)	94.26 (172.5)	184.1 (193.2)	131.8 (190.4)
Status Inequality	0.523 (5.166)	0.946 (4.879)	-0.370 (5.310)	0.205 (6.168)	2.168 (5.235)
OBC Representation	-727.5*** (268.0)	-776.8*** (251.3)	-510.3** (243.8)	-693.1** (283.3)	-505.0** (247.3)
OBC Quotas	-244.4 (155.9)	-236.2** (99.57)	-36.63 (179.5)	-244.8 (153.1)	-122.7 (195.8)
OBC Rep × OBC Quotas	1,639*** (445.8)	1,675*** (372.4)	1,214*** (445.5)	1,639*** (446.1)	1,217** (547.6)
State Capacity	600.6** (278.3)	611.7** (273.7)	664.8*** (253.0)		883.4*** (308.4)
Log NDSP	727.2*** (158.6)	746.9*** (162.3)	707.0*** (162.3)		647.1*** (198.4)
ELF (Caste)	-629.8 (1,186)	-607.6 (1,113)	-543.7 (1,217)		-773.6 (1,305)
Left-led Government	-507.0* (274.4)	-492.4* (258.9)	-542.4* (292.2)		-368.6 (256.2)
Turnout	7.825 (6.590)	8.344 (6.428)	6.090 (6.680)		7.594 (6.372)
Sub-nationalism	-68.98 (74.30)	-75.44 (73.82)	-61.87 (75.32)		-76.04 (71.22)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	25.31*** (5.253)	24.13*** (4.680)	27.03*** (5.780)		24.30*** (5.298)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	134.2 (99.25)	118.6 (106.3)	150.8 (93.35)		-3.121 (97.08)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	99.12 (194.3)	53.36 (220.4)	118.7 (177.5)		-53.58 (196.6)
Literacy Rate	18.90*** (6.636)	18.87*** (6.297)	18.48*** (7.060)		20.53*** (6.793)
OBC Population (%)				-1.761 (9.136)	
Constant	-7,567*** (2,074)	-7,841*** (2,084)	-7,309*** (2,082)	-7,397*** (2,493)	-6,930*** (2,422)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	558	148

DV: Per capita spending in social sectors. Models (1) lags DV by 1 year. Models (2) & (4) lag DV by 3 years. Model (3) lags DV by 5 years. Models (1) to (4) lag independent variables (by 1 year). Model (5) uses government term as a unit-of-analysis. All models employ RCM and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table C15: Interaction Effects of SC Representation and SC Quotas


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Representation	-2.714*** (0.842)	-2.674*** (0.849)	-2.638*** (0.853)	-3.530*** (0.936)	-10.05 (74.15)	-5.254 (73.11)	-0.711 (72.51)	-44.70 (71.07)
<i>OBC</i> Representation	1.382 (1.452)	1.456 (1.500)	1.535 (1.512)	1.948 (2.485)	-2.609 (174.3)	1.477 (169.8)	17.01 (169.4)	-124.2 (128.5)
Status Inequality	-0.0995*** (0.0295)	-0.100*** (0.0304)	-0.101*** (0.0313)	-0.0706** (0.0344)	-1.650 (5.768)	-1.612 (5.767)	-1.776 (5.621)	1.445 (5.215)
<i>SC</i> Representation	-2.082 (3.606)	-3.255 (3.477)	-6.060 (4.265)	-8.470* (4.430)	-788.6 (571.7)	-705.0 (505.8)	-784.3 (581.5)	-569.5 (453.7)
<i>SC</i> Quotas	-4.502* (2.687)	-5.437** (2.625)	-7.638*** (2.866)	-8.288** (3.239)	-679.1* (382.8)	-616.8* (337.4)	-611.1* (348.8)	-700.6** (328.1)
<i>SC</i> Rep × <i>SC</i> Quotas	0.814 (3.663)	1.931 (3.505)	4.542 (4.227)	6.106 (4.559)	742.5 (530.0)	655.5 (459.1)	733.0 (539.7)	441.3 (416.2)
State Capacity	-8.554*** (2.131)	-8.517*** (2.133)	-8.656*** (2.195)	-11.44*** (4.178)	592.7** (253.0)	602.8** (251.7)	597.7** (253.0)	931.8*** (271.3)
Log NDSP	-4.830** (2.257)	-4.626** (2.312)	-4.192* (2.363)	-2.784 (2.576)	722.3*** (241.7)	713.8*** (236.3)	723.7*** (231.2)	580.0*** (207.0)
ELF (Caste)	20.03** (8.370)	20.72** (8.549)	21.78** (8.972)	17.36 (10.72)	-1,339 (1,248)	-1,276 (1,225)	-1,155 (1,180)	-1,596 (1,228)
Left-led Government	-0.708 (1.865)	-0.674 (1.865)	-0.521 (1.872)	0.698 (2.000)	-446.9 (367.3)	-455.8 (369.4)	-449.2 (369.5)	-312.0 (320.9)
Turnout	0.0532 (0.0596)	0.0504 (0.0600)	0.0440 (0.0610)	0.0991 (0.0697)	7.251 (7.089)	7.359 (7.116)	7.443 (7.065)	6.543 (6.455)
Sub-nationalism	0.486 (0.678)	0.484 (0.668)	0.467 (0.664)	0.382 (0.689)	-86.11 (94.30)	-82.55 (93.30)	-78.52 (92.95)	-98.62 (87.87)
<i>Upper-caste</i> Population (%)	-0.0425* (0.0233)	-0.0418* (0.0230)	-0.0426* (0.0232)	-0.0974*** (0.0255)	28.98*** (6.403)	29.14*** (6.282)	29.53*** (5.957)	24.65*** (5.145)
1968-1991 (base 1960-67)	6.355*** (1.585)	6.405*** (1.585)	6.467*** (1.568)	6.000*** (1.851)	110.3 (109.3)	109.3 (111.0)	113.5 (110.7)	-11.33 (100.8)
1992-2012 (base 1960-67)	8.495*** (2.342)	8.470*** (2.309)	8.367*** (2.318)	6.717** (3.156)	59.41 (224.2)	73.08 (219.5)	89.42 (217.9)	-77.68 (224.8)
Literacy Rate	0.137*** (0.0487)	0.135*** (0.0477)	0.135*** (0.0471)	0.153*** (0.0510)	27.42*** (7.424)	27.06*** (7.379)	26.60*** (7.186)	29.88*** (7.675)
Constant	90.17*** (21.96)	88.98*** (22.64)	87.16*** (23.16)	75.99*** (26.48)	6,546*** (2,407)	6,580*** (2,374)	6,754*** (2,309)	5,110*** (1,978)
State-clustered Errors	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
N	558	558	558	148	558	558	558	148

DV: Models (1) to (4): Proportion of developmental spending in social sectors. Models (5) to (8): Per capita spending in social sectors. Models (1) and (5) lag DV by 1 year. Models (2) and (6) lag DV by 3 years. Models (3) and (7) lag DV by 5 years. Models (1) to (3) and (5) to (7) lag independent variables (by 1 year). Models (4) and (8) use government term as a unit-of-analysis. All models employ RCM and examine representation in government. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

D: Exploring Mechanisms: The Case of Bihar

Bihar is a state in eastern India with over 100 million people. It is one of the poorest states in India, ranking at the bottom of almost every measure of social and economic development. Mired in deeply entrenched inequality and has struggled to move out of its low-level equilibrium trap (Frankel and Rao 1990). Upper-caste groups have historically dominated Bihar due to a number of factors – the numerical strength of upper-castes (Jaffrelot 2003) (Jaffrelot 2003) an oppressive land tenure system that privileged upper-caste landowners or *zamindars* (Banerjee and Iyer 2005) and a strong *Brahmanical* ideology that legitimized caste hierarchy (Frankel 1990). The politics of the state, as a result, was largely dominated by upper-caste groups in the *Congress Party* in the first two decades after Independence. *Upper-caste* landlords consistently made up more than 40% of the ruling alliance until the 1990 elections (see Figure D1).

Figure D1: Caste Representation of Bihar Government, 1952-2020



Land reforms through the abolition of *zamindari* in the 1950s and the subsequent introduction of Green Revolution technologies generated an *OBC* middle class which progressively weakened the stronghold of upper-caste landlords. *OBC* groups, particularly *Yadavs*, *Kurmis* and *Koeris*, gradually asserted themselves politically. This was first reflected in intra-party conflict between the upper castes and *OBCs* within the *Congress* (Roy 1966). The decline of the *Congress* after the 1967 election in several states further created the political space for smaller parties. A number of parties led by *OBC* politicians emerged as a result. The first non-*Congress* government, under Karpoori Thakur of the *Janata Party*, won in 1977. The politics of Bihar changed dramatically in 1990 when the first *OBC*-led coalition led

by Lalu Prasad Yadav of the *Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)* assumed power. The election marked an end in upper-caste dominance. The *RJD* remained in power from 1990 to 2005, followed by another *OBC*-led coalition headed by Nitish Kumar of the *Janata Dal United (JDU)* Party.

D.1 Case Selection and Methods

Bihar is a useful case to understand how descriptive representation in the bureaucracy can influence redistributive policy because the *RJD* government prioritized representational policies as one of its key agendas. A number of scholars on Bihar have argued that caste politics was central to *RJD*'s political agenda (Blair 2018; Roy 2013; Witsoe 2013; Mathew and Moore 2011; Thakur 2006; Kumar 2002). *OBC* quotas was increased to 26%. Most importantly, the *RJD* administration appointed members of marginal groups in key administrative positions. *Yadav* and Muslim *State Civil Service (SSC)* officers were five times more likely to be promoted to the elite *Indian Administrative Service (IAS)* as compared to the previous administration. At the local level, based on data on five major districts, the proportion of *OBC* and *SC* heads of police stations (*Station House Officers* or *SHOs*) and *Block Development Officers (BDO)* doubled in this period (Figure D2) (Chakrabarti 2019).²²

Figure D2: Caste Composition of local bureaucrats in five districts in Bihar, 1980-2014



Note: Same legend as Figure D1. The data is aggregated by three periods: i) Congress tenure (1980 -1990), ii) RJD tenure under Lalu Yadav (1990-2005), and iii) Janata Dal (United) (JDU) tenure under Nitish Kumar (2005-2015). Source: Chakrabarti (2019).

The findings presented here are based on fieldwork carried out between 2011 and 2016. I conducted about 60 semi-structured interviews with current and retired civil servants, politicians, and political activists in Patna, the state capital. I made an effort to interview key officials who worked closely with

²² The data is based on primary surveys in five districts – Saran, Nalanda, Patna, Gaya, and Aurangabad.

the Chief Ministers under the *Congress* (1980-1990), *Rashtriya Janata Dal* (1990-2005), and *Janata Dal United* (2005 onwards) tenures. This allowed me to gauge the policy priorities of the respective governments.²³ I also use data from the 2000 and 2005 rounds of the *National Election Studies* (NES) surveys carried out by the *Lokniti* Unit of the *Center for the Study on Developing Societies* (CSDS), New Delhi to corroborate some of the claims presented in qualitative evidence. I begin with describing the representational policies in Bihar, focusing in particular on why measures by the *RJD* government should not be dismissed as plain patronage. In the following section, I draw on evidence from interviews to outline some of the possible pathways through which the caste composition of the bureaucracy can shape development policy and outcomes.

D.2 The Politics of Dignity in Bihar

The history of representational policies in Bihar broadly corresponds to the findings discussed in the main paper. In spite of recommendations by policy experts, *OBC* reservations were implemented only after *OBCs* gained political power. The *Bihar Backward Classes Commission*, also known as the *Mungeri Lal Commission*, was appointed by Daroga Prasad Rai of the *Congress* Party in 1971. Rai was the first *OBC* Chief Minister of Bihar. The report recommended 26% and 24% *OBC* quotas in government jobs and education respectively, but the proposal did not find support from the *Congress* government. The recommendations of the *Mungeri Lal Commission* were finally enforced by Karpoori Thakur (an *OBC*) in 1978 after the *Janata Party* came to power (see details in Table B2). It was the first legislation on *OBC* reservation in Bihar. The policy triggered massive protests by upper-castes throughout the state, which eventually led to the fall of the *Janata* government. *OBC* reservations could not be implemented in 17 districts. The legislation was also challenged in the courts. Legal objections against the reservations were finally struck down by the Supreme Court in 1991.

The *RJD* came to power in the backdrop of *Mandal* politics at the national-level that had consolidated *OBCs* as a voting-block. Representational policies of governments led by lower-caste parties, including the *RJD*, have largely been examined from the perspective of patronage politics (Chandra 2004; Mathew and Moore 2011; Kohli 2012). Governments led by *OBC* parties have been described as “neo-

²³ Fieldwork for this project adheres to the APSA *Principles and Guidelines for Human Subjects Research* and was approved through the IRB at Brown University (#1307000892). With the exception of the former Chief Minister, Lalu Yadav, I do not report any identifying information related to interviewees to protect their privacy and confidentiality.

patrimonial” – states that pursue the interests of a narrow group at the expense of public goods (Kohli 2012). Others have argued that the rise of lower caste politicians led to a “politics of retribution” against the elite, without generating an agenda for genuine social transformation (Mehta 2003). *OBC* quotas have been explained as “an offer to share the spoils of office, *not* a promise of social justice for the poor” (Weiner 2001, 204). Murali (2017, 187) argues that RJD’s policies between 1990 and 2005 were “largely symbolic with few major substantial socioeconomic improvements for subaltern groups.”

More recent research on India, however, does not find much empirical support for patronage (Auerbach et al. 2021; Chhibber and Verma 2018). In the case of Bihar, I argue that *RJD* policies on the appointment of *OBC* and *SC* officials in positions of power were part of a larger agenda on lower-caste empowerment and social justice. This was reflected in the political and policy discourse, changes in symbolic representation in the public sphere, as well as specific policy measures.

The *RJD* came to power on a strong social justice agenda. Lalu Yadav was introduced to politics by the socialist leader Jayaprakash Narayan in the seventies and was influenced by the anti-caste thinker, Rammanohar Lohia. Lohia argued that caste, more than class, was the basis of Indian society and advocated for social justice through state intervention and group-based policies (Yadav 2010). Yadav’s political campaign was explicitly based on lower caste empowerment and openly taunted the forward castes. Playing on Indira Gandhi’s “*garibi hatao*” or “eliminate poverty” motto from the seventies, for example, his election slogan was– “*bhurabal hatao*” – short for the major forward castes - *Bhoonihar, Rajput, Brahmin, and Lala*. His political speeches, as illustrated below, explicitly referred to caste-based exploitation and invoked Lohia’s principles of social justice.

“Don’t be afraid, my people, walk with your head held high. Don’t give in to the exploitation by the upper castes, don’t give in to even their littlest demands. Take courage and take your destiny in your own hands, I am here to lead you, protect you. I have defeated them in Patna, now together we will defeat them in the town and villages of Bihar. We together will end the old exploitation. Join me, strengthen my hands.”


Lalu Yadav (Thakur 2006, 99)

Figure D3: Lalu Yadav being sworn in as Chief Minister in Patna, Bihar, 1990



Lalu Yadav and the *RJD* government used several symbolic measures to signal the transformation of political power. In sharp contrast to his predecessors who took the Chief Minister's oath in the colonial-era Governor's house or *Raj Bhawan*, Yadav chose to be sworn in front of thousands of people in the capital city of Patna (Figure D3). Statues of lower-caste leaders, including Jayaprakash Narayan, Vallabhbhai Patel, Karpoori Thakur, B.R. Ambedkar, Rammanohar Lohia, were put up at prominent locations in the state capital. The Chief Minister's official residence was renamed "Karpoori Memorial" (Ahmed 1990). The policy discourse also witnessed a definite shift towards issues related to lower-caste groups (Figure D4). Social justice was explicitly discussed in the Bihar Assembly for the first time in its history. As compared to the *Congress* government in 1980-85, for example, when less than 2% of the annual Governor's speech referenced identity, about 40% of the speech was directed towards marginal groups in 1990 (Chakrabarti 2019).

Figure D4: Content Analysis of Government Speeches in Bihar, 1960-2014



Source: Chakrabarti (2019)

Most importantly, the *RJD* focused on transforming the caste composition of the civil and police administration through both formal and informal measures. Following the *State Commission for Backward Classes Act*, quota for *OBCs* was increased to 26% in 1993. Informally, *OBC* and *SC* officials were posted in important positions in the bureaucracy. An examination of the appointment process and caste composition of the local bureaucracy provides some insights into claims of patronage politics.

Though *RJD* was led by *OBC*, support for the party was not uniform across all *OBC* sub-castes. *RJD*'s core voter base was overwhelmingly *Yadav* and Muslim (see Table D1). In 2000, for example, only about a fourth of *Kurmi* and *Koeri* and a third of *SC* voters supported *RJD*. These numbers further declined in 2005. Though it is difficult to specifically identify exchange for votes for employment benefits, the logic of patronage politics would predict that public employment and postings was disproportionately directed towards *Yadavs*. That does not seem to be the case.

Table D1: Voter Base of RJD and RJD-Allies (%), 2000 and 2005

	2000		2005	
	RJD	RJD Allies	RJD	RJD Allies
Upper Caste	10.5	32.9	5.6	29.9
OBC	40.7	54.0	35.4	57.6
Yadav	78.6	89.3	67.8	85.2
Kurmi	25.0	30.2	11.2	24.2
Koeri	22.7	38.6	15.7	42.3
SC	31.9	52.1	21.3	80.3
Muslim	59.6	76.0	43.0	90.1

Source: National Election Studies, CSDS, 2000 and 2005

According to key officials who designed and oversaw the appointment process, all *OBC* and *SC* officials were considered. The Chief Minister's Office maintained a list of state officials with information on their service records and caste affiliation. All non-upper-caste officials were referred as "*dabe kuchle*" or downtrodden. If they had the required experience, the Chief Minister's Office instructed the establishment committees of the respective department to transfer them to an important position. Heads of districts (*District Magistrates*), blocks (*Block Development Officers or BDOs*) and key

positions in the police administration like the *Superintendent of Police (SP)*, heads of police stations or *Station House Officer (SHO)* were prioritized.²⁴

Data on the caste composition of *BDOs* and *SHOs* corroborates these claims (Tables D2 and D3). *Kurmi* officials, a group not believed to support RJD in large numbers, were more likely to be promoted as compared to *Yadavs*. The proportion of Muslims, a core base of the party, did not increase under RJD. The most significant change is observed among *SCs*, a group that has experienced the most severe forms of discrimination historically and was not seen as a core base of the party.

Table D2: Caste Composition (%) of BDOs in Bihar (five districts), 1980-2015

	1980-1990 [Congress]	1990-2005 [RJD]	2005-2015 [JDU]
Upper Caste	70.0	51.2	55.5
OBC	9.6	15.2	11.1
Yadav	2.2	4.4	1.8
Kurmi	3.7	6.5	4.7
Koeri	0.0	0.1	0.7
SC	7.4	21.4	23.7
Muslim	11.5	11.7	9.7

Source: Chakrabarti (2019)

Table D3: Caste Composition (%) of SHOs in Bihar (five districts), 1980-2015

	1980-1990 [Congress]	1990-2005 [RJD]	2005-2015 [JDU]
Upper Caste	69.8	41.4	48.0
OBC	9.3	21.5	19.8
Yadav	4.7	8.4	2.7
Kurmi	2.3	7.5	10.0
Koeri	0.0	0.2	0.3
SC	11.6	25.1	24.0
Muslim	9.3	9.3	7.6

Source: Chakrabarti (2019)

RJD may have used the rhetoric of social justice for political gain, but such claims need to be empirically tested. Local politicians frequently complain about an anti-Bihar and anti-lower-caste bias in the English media.²⁵ The strong criticism of the RJD government, from both academics and

²⁴ Interview (#85) with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 3rd August 2015, Patna, Bihar.

²⁵ Interview (#18) with RJD Spokesperson, 20th July 2012, Patna, Bihar.

journalists, is largely rooted in the poor governance and low state capacity in Bihar, as reflected in an interview with a senior bureaucrat from Bihar who worked in Tamil Nadu government.

“Corruption is a problem in all states, even in the South. Given the size of economy in Tamil Nadu, politicians get their money from other sources. Compromising on development is not an option for either political party – DMK or AIDMK, since development is mainstreamed in the political agenda. Politicians in the South make their money from big industries.”²⁶

This observation is interesting because it not only points to the differences in the sources of corruption – the state coffers versus the private sector, but also emphasizes the ability of the state in Tamil Nadu to deliver public services effectively which, to an extent, shields it from criticism in other spheres. Though patronage politics can hurt public goods provision and some states indeed have leaders who lack public purpose, but prioritization of policies on representation should not be confused with lack of public purpose or poor leadership.

D.3 Mechanisms: Representative Bureaucracy and Redistribution Politics

While there has been some research on the higher civil service in India (Bhavnani and Lee 2018; 2021; Xu, Bertrand, and Burgess 2021), the workings of the local bureaucracy has not received much attention.²⁷ We know even less about politician-bureaucrat relations, especially how identity may shape these dynamics.²⁸ The logic of a representative bureaucracy further stands in sharp contrast with the tenets of an autonomous and value-neutral Weberian model of bureaucracy that the Indian civil service is based upon. The bureaucracy, however, plays a key role in policy design and implementation (Lipsky 2010). Local bureaucrats are often the most visible presence of the state in citizen’s lives (Nathan and White 2021). Their inability or unwillingness to enforce and design policy can have important implications in determining the success of the policy agenda of the political class.

In the case of Bihar, the transformation of the political class took place in a context where the civil service was still overwhelmingly upper-caste. Witsoe (2013) argues that this was a source of conflict between the bureaucracy and legislature and contributed to weakening of state institutions. He writes, “Because upper-caste dominance depended on control over the state and state-directed development,


²⁶ Interview (#10) with Tamil Nadu cadre IAS officer, 2nd November 2011, New Delhi.

²⁷ A notable exception is Dasgupta and Kapur (2020) who study *Block Development Officers* (BDOs).

²⁸ Gulzar and Pasquale (2017) examine the administrative jurisdiction of politicians and bureaucrats.

systematically weakening state institutions and marginalizing development-oriented governance became a viable strategy for lower-caste empowerment. The project of backward caste empowerment, then, was not primarily aimed at “capturing the state.” Above all, it was a project to displace the dominance of upper-castes within villages, even if the pervasiveness of caste networks linking state institutions with local power made capturing, or weakening, the state a necessary part of this project” (Witsoe 2013, 67). In cases where it was not possible to appoint *OBC* and *SC* officials, generally because they didn’t have the required qualifications, important positions were kept vacant to avoid perpetuating upper-caste dominance in the bureaucracy. This was especially significant in middle and senior ranking public sector jobs. Mathew and Moore (2011), show that in engineering departments, 1305 of the 6393 Executive, Assistant, and Junior Engineer positions remained vacant. The *Bihar State Administrative Service* has a vacancy of 633 against a sanctioned strength of 2248. State capacity declined as a result. Witsoe (2013, 81) referred to the governance crisis in Bihar as “bureaucracy versus democracy.”

Figure D5: Proportional Developmental Spending in Social Sectors in Bihar, 1960-2012



Yadav’s tenure as Chief Minister was marked by poor governance and corruption. The state’s development expenditure declined, in both absolute terms and in proportion to its overall budget. As many other parts of India benefited from economic liberalization in the early nineties, Bihar’s per capita income declined. Notwithstanding the decline in state capacity, development policy did take a redistributive turn. The minimum wage for agricultural laborers in villages was increased. Slums in several cities were regularized (Witsoe 2013). In the education sector, the government introduced

charvaha schools in remote areas which allowed children to learn while tending cattle. Figure D5 shows that proportional spending in social sectors in Bihar increases following the rise in *OBC* political representation. The proportion of spending in social sectors went up to 60% during the *RJD* tenure, which was definite shift from previous decades.

I elaborate on three *possible* mechanisms through which the identity of the bureaucrats can have important implications for redistributive policy:

- i) greater alignment of policy priorities in the legislature and the bureaucracy, thus reducing conflict and improving coordination within different elements of the state,
- ii) breaking down elite patronage networks and reducing discrimination in policy design and implementation, which in turn reduces barriers in assigning state resources to its intended beneficiaries,
- iii) making the state more accessible to marginal groups and transforming inter-group relations, especially at the local level, thus creating the space for marginalized citizens to make claims on the state and generate demand for social goods.

i) Alignment of Policy Priorities between Politicians and Bureaucrats

First, in the context of high social inequality, descriptive representation in the bureaucracy can reduce the conflict between legislative and executive parts of the government through greater alignment of interests and values between the two groups, which in turn can potentially improve policy design and implementation.

Lalu Yadav is seen as a divisive figure in Indian politics and the appointment of lower-caste officials in important administrative positions was widely regarded as one of the most controversial policies of his government. During my fieldwork in Bihar over a period of six years, I found that the caste identity of the respondent was a reasonably good predictor of their normative position on his government. Upper-caste government officials believed that *RJD* was detrimental to Bihar's development. In addition to corruption scandals and the rise in crime during Lalu Yadav's tenure, they emphasized that centralization of decision-making, frequent transfers of officials, and disregard of formal procedures made governance difficult. As illustrated in interview excerpts below, they were particularly critical of patronage and believed that *OBCs*, and *Yadavs* in particular, were favored in the administration. The breakdown of law-and-order was attributed to *Yadav* dominance in police stations. This perception is

insightful because as noted earlier, though the proportion of *Yadav* *SHOs* did increase, they comprised less than 9% of the officers in the surveyed district. A vast majority (over 40%) of the police stations heads were upper-caste (Table D3).

“Lalu undermined the hierarchy of the police system. He had direct communication with the police stations and the higher levels of the police (SP, SSP, etc.) were sidelined. Hence orders went directly from the CM’s office to the police stations in villages. If a *Yadav* committed a crime, police stations did not lodge an FIR. This practice also had adverse effects in the law-and-order situation.”²⁹

“The *daroga* (*SHO*) was always a *Yadav*. Lalu did that for two reasons. One, he didn’t feel comfortable to talk with senior officers, who would talk about principles and rule of law. Two, senior officers would not do any illegal work for him; he needed his own people to do that.”³⁰

While some upper-caste officials acknowledged that *OBC* and *SC* officials had faced discrimination, they were concerned about retribution from lower-caste politicians. They narrated examples of *Brahmin* officers being humiliated by their ministers and civil servants with excellent service records being assigned less prestigious portfolios, as noted in excerpts from one the interviews below. Several upper-caste officials felt marginalized in this period. A Bihar-Jharkhand cadre officer told me that when a proposal to assign *LAS* officers to the new state of Jharkhand (carved out of Bihar) was discussed in the late nineties, many upper-caste civil servants opted to move to Jharkhand.³¹

“Although backward castes and *Dalits* had been part of the bureaucracy, they were mistreated by the upper-castes. Lalu’s government followed the approach of reverse discrimination. Upper-caste officials were transferred to less desirable postings, they were treated poorly by *Yadav* officers (including Lalu), and any display of dominance by upper-caste officials was dealt with harshly.”³²

OBC and *SC* officials, on the other hand, did not disagree with *RJD*’s poor record in governance, but argued that such criticism was unfair given the mediocre performance of previous *Congress* governments. Such difference in opinion was even more stark in the general population. In 2000, ten years after the *RJD* first assumed office, the *National Election Survey* gauged public opinion on government performance in Bihar. *Upper-castes* respondents overwhelmingly had a low opinion of *RJD* and believed that development in Bihar deteriorated during the period, while *OBC* and *SC* opinion was largely positive.³³ It is interesting that *Upper-caste* respondents believed that the government did

²⁹ Interview (#22) with Bihar/Jharkhand-cadre IAS officer, 12th December 2011, New Delhi.

³⁰ Interview (#14) with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 17th July 2012, Patna, Bihar.

³¹ Interview (#22) with Bihar/Jharkhand-cadre IAS officer, 12th December 2011, New Delhi.

³² Interview (#22) with Bihar/Jharkhand-cadre IAS officer, 12th December 2011, New Delhi.

³³ 64% of upper caste respondents reported that they were “not at all” satisfied with the government. 57% believed that development in Bihar had deteriorated in the last ten years. In contrast, 59% *OBC* voters and 46% *SC* voters were satisfied

not perform well even on issues related to dignity for the poor, which was widely seen as central to *RJD*'s agenda.³⁴

In contrast, almost every *OBC* and *SC* official I interviewed emphasized that the *RJD* had made important strides in lower-caste empowerment, which they believed was necessary for government programs to succeed. They believed the appointment of *OBC* and *SC* officials, especially in law enforcement, was necessary to reduce upper-caste dominance in villages. Referring to different models of development in Indian states, a senior *LAS* officer described *RJD*'s agenda of lower-caste empowerment as the "Bihar-Model" of development.³⁵

"In Bihar, the self-confidence of lower-castes was a precondition for development. This is the Bihar model. The people were so subservient that they could not use development."³⁶

The identity and lived experience of individuals plays an important role in shaping the ideological beliefs and policy priorities. Several *OBC* and *SC* bureaucrats in Bihar had personally experienced discrimination. I interviewed a senior government official, widely believed to be the main architect behind administrative restructuring carried out by *RJD*. Before explaining the process of transfers in the Chief Minister's Office, he recalled his own experience as an *OBC* in his native town in the Saran district in Bihar, shown below. In spite of being selected into the highly respected *LAS*, he continued to face humiliation by upper-caste neighbors because of his caste.

"Ten percent of the population used to control the other ninety – they treated them like animals. They would create sheds for their cows and buffaloes but the people who looked after their animals slept outside in the open in winters. A backward man had to stand up to greet an upper-caste man, even in his own house...I was an *LAS* in training. I had come home for *Shivaratri* (a religious holiday). I was going to the *Shiv mandir* (temple). The *bahvai* (upper-caste) was also going in. There were three-four upper-caste houses along the way. The *bahvai* shouted – remove your shoes before walking. He knew who I was (referring to his professional credentials). And this was in a town!"³⁷

with government performance. Despite widespread criticism of the *RJD* government in popular media, 34% of *OBC* respondents reported that Bihar had developed under *RJD*.

³⁴ 43% of upper-caste voters reported that dignity of poor had deteriorated; 25% reported no change. 45% *OBCs* and 28% *SCs* responded positively to this question.

³⁵ Policymakers and the media generally refer to two major types of development in India – the Gujarat-model relies on the trickle-down effects of economic growth, while the Kerala-model is based on an expansive welfare state.

³⁶ Interview (#12) with Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 16th July 2012, Patna, Bihar.

³⁷ Interview (#85) with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 3rd August 2015, Patna, Bihar.

Journalists and scholars of Bihar have argued that the conflict between the lower-caste political class and upper-caste bureaucracy was at the heart of the development crisis in the state (Thakur 2006; Witsoe 2013). This conflict was rooted in differences in ideological beliefs between upper castes and marginal groups. Witsoe (2013) for example, notes that lower-caste *LAS* officers were sympathetic to landless tenants in the “Naxalite” communist movement in Bihar. Upper-caste officials, in contrast, tacitly supported landlord militias. These ideological differences are also reflected in the general public opinions. According to the *NES* survey, more than half the *upper-caste* respondents disapproved of the recommendations of the *Mandal Commission Report* in a 1995 survey. *OBC* support for the reservations stood at 48% in contrast. I also observed that *OBC* and *SC* officers had a more nuanced understanding of social inequality and supported affirmative action. The appointment of lower-caste officers was largely carried out by *OBC* officers and politicians. Since the process often bypassed official protocol, it had to be conducted under the radar.

These ideological differences among government discussed above officials are insightful because, to an extent, both perspectives are objectively valid – the representational policies of the *RJD* government did hurt state capacity, but these measures also empowered marginalized groups. Development and dignity are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals, but the state is an important variable that connects the two. State capacity is a prerequisite for redistributive policies to be effective, but in highly unequal societies where the dominant group controls the state, distrust and (real and perceived) discrimination can also limit state-led redistribution. The beliefs of bureaucrats can play a role in shaping their relationship with political elite – to collectively translate political goals into concrete policies, and in implementing those policies effectively on the ground.

My findings in Bihar resonate with Narayan’s (2018) account of the Tamil Nadu administration as a *LAS* officer in the sixties and seventies. The bureaucracy went through a major transformation in this period due to caste quotas. He attributes Tamil Nadu’s robust welfare state to this change, emphasizing the overlooked role of social hierarchy and ideology in the development process. He argues, “from the point of view of one involved in administration and implementation, there appears to be one discourse that is missing. Between policy formulation and public claims for services, there is *a realm of implementation and the role of institutions and hierarchies* that convert ideas into action...there was politicization of the bureaucracy, and over time, the ideas of social justice of the political class were accepted and adopted by the administrative class, and this constitutes a major reason for the success

of the programmes.” (Narayan 2018, xvii). Not unlike Bihar, Narayan observed a tension between upper-caste civil servants and the lower-caste political leaders of the *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (DMK) in the sixties. The then Chief Minister Annadurai, for example, proposed a free rice program which was met with resistance from the bureaucracy since it did not fit existing institutions. Several officers retired and some were deputed to the central government in Delhi. The new recruits in the administration were more diverse in terms of class and caste. Many came from non-urban backgrounds, which Narayan argues made them more cognizant of the conditions in small towns and villages. These civil servants designed new institutions to handle the financing and logistics needed for public distribution. Tamil Nadu extensive welfare state traces its beginnings to this program. The DMK government also introduced changes in the administrative structure by formalizing the participation of local party workers in governance. Narayan (2018, 36) notes, “earlier I used to meet Panchayat Union Chairman, accompanied by their officers. Now there were district and local party functionaries, bringing representations on the availability of irrigation water, food grains, or the functioning of schools. Suddenly we had to deal with representations from the party, rather than the hierarchy. Upwardly mobile interest groups emerged, seeking the support of the party in power. Initially they pointed out public grievances for redressal, short-circuiting the established channels of administration, and over the years, these have grown into assertive demands from the district administration.” The use of state patronage in the recruitment, identification, and appointment of district-level officers sympathetic to the government, Narayan argues created an institutional channel to address public demands and helping in making state policy more welfare-oriented.

ii) Weakening Elite Patronage Networks and Discrimination

Second, descriptive representation in the bureaucracy contributed towards breaking down long-established upper-caste patronage networks and reduced discrimination in policy implementation at the local level.

Bihar has been described as an “extreme case of multi-stranded dominance” by upper-castes (Frankel 1990). This dominance is also reflected in its state institutions. While carrying out fieldwork in the state in the mid-2000s, Witsøe (2013) found that more than 65% of Bihar-cadre *LAS* officers were upper caste. Though *OBCs* were more likely to be promoted during the *RJD* tenure, the caste composition of the Bihar *SSC* officers inducted to the *LAS* continued to remain predominantly upper-caste a decade later (Chakrabarti 2019). These networks also served a means to maintain control over

lower-caste groups through the police. A large body of work has examined the role of state violence in the maintenance of caste-based hierarchy in India and in Bihar in particular (Witsoe 2013; Ashwani Kumar 2008; Fuller 1996; Frankel and Rao 1990). These patterns are consistent with other hierarchical societies like South Africa (Evans 1997; Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018) and the United States (Soss and Weaver 2017; Gourevitch 2015) where marginal groups have been repressed through formal law enforcement agencies historically.

Several policymakers and politicians emphasized that until the nineties, important positions in the government went to upper-caste individuals because of patronage networks between politicians and the local elite. A Bihar/Jharkhand cadre officer narrated the following example:

“In the 1970s the government appointed about 1 lakh (100,000) teachers – most of these were *Brahmins* and *Rajputs* (*Forward* castes). Many of them were unqualified and had no interest in teaching...The age restriction was relaxed; people as old as 30-35 were appointed. The parameters were fixed by the District Collector in such a way that only certain castes were selected. There was no transparency at the time. This was to cater to certain pressure groups. This stopped with *RJD*.”³⁸

The *RJD* aimed to compensate for discrimination against civil servants from marginal groups who, they argued, were routinely under-placed in previous governments. The appointment of *OBC* and *SC* officials in important positions was justified as one of the means to achieve social justice. Lalu Yadav used the following analogy to describe this policy, “*Humne to bas roti ko palta hai. Ek side sadiyon se jal raha tha* – One side of the bread (*roti*) had been burning for centuries. We just flipped it (to make it even).”³⁹

While this did serve a political purpose, its significance was more than symbolic. The appointment of these officials was believed to be necessary to tackle elite capture of government programs. Several policymakers I interviewed noted that upper-caste networks determined the beneficiaries of government programs in previous administrations. They also believed that lower-caste civil servants were less likely to be biased against poor lower-caste villages given the strong hold of casteism in the state. This is a reasonable assumption. Caste bias in government programs has been documented (Krishna 2018; Mosse 2018). Studies, for example, find discrimination against *Dalits* in the school environment (Desai and Dubey 2011; Desai, Darden Adams, and Dubey 2012) and in the

³⁸ Interview (#1) with Bihar/Jharkhand-cadre IAS officer, 12th January 2012, New Delhi.

³⁹ Interview (#51) with Lalu Prasad Yadav, 14th June 2014, Patna, Bihar.

administration of public services like the *Midday-Meals Scheme* (Thorat and Lee 2012). Myron Weiner (1991) in his classic study of child labor in India uncovered a widespread *belief* amongst upper-caste policy makers that the education system should reinforce the occupational divisions of the caste system – between people who work their *minds* and people who work with their *hands*. He attributed India's poor performance in mass education to caste bias.

Further, descriptive representation has been shown to reduce discriminatory behavior in India and other contexts. Chauchard (2014) finds that *SC* representation in village government or *panchayats* was instrumental in reducing caste discrimination by changing social and legal norms of interaction between groups. Similarly, female political representation led to greater recognition of gender-based violence and the reporting of crimes against women increased as a result (Iyer et al. 2012). In the United States, an increase in Black judges improved equity in sentencing by reducing Black-White gap in incarceration (Harris 2020). Hoekstra and Sloan (2022) find that black police officers are five times less likely to use gun force in predominantly black neighborhoods. Given the history of state repression against blacks, it is hence not surprising that representation of minorities in the law enforcement has been one of the main demands of the *Black Lives Matter* movement. Bureaucrats may also have more information about their own group which can improve implementation (Kasara 2007; Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018).

iii) Claims-making on the State

The first two mechanisms focus on policy design and implementation from the perspective of the state elite. Greater inclusion of members of marginal groups can also shape state-society relations from the perspective of citizens. On the demand side, descriptive representation in the local bureaucracy can make the state more accessible to marginalized groups citizens and create a space for them to make claims on the state, which can eventually generate demand for social goods.

The appointment of lower-caste bureaucrats in Bihar signaled a clear departure from previous governments. It was strategic to the extent that it symbolized political change in a context where low state capacity prevented the political elite from making tangible improvements in social infrastructure, but these measures also disturbed the traditional power structures at the local level. A government official, for example, noted:

“Lalu gave voice to the deprived sections of the people. He would make *Dalits* and *Yadavs* sit in the first row in meetings. It was the first time that the backward castes were in power and this itself was a huge change. Lalu did not have any ideas for development, but he did empower lower-castes.”⁴⁰

State institutions in Bihar had historically been occupied by upper-castes and members of marginal groups did not have the freedom to speak openly in public. When I asked a civil servant if he thought *RJD*’s political project had led to any concrete improvement in the condition of lower-castes, he gave the following response,

“Of course, it made a difference. Lower-castes would not have dared to enter the office of the DM or BDO. They thought that if they said something, they would be punished. That changed. Now they have the confidence to raise their voice against the DM. They don’t know if their job will get done, but they can enter his office without fear.”⁴¹

This observation is insightful because state capacity continues to be limited in Bihar. Citizens cannot trust that their demands, for say better schools or functioning health centers, can be fulfilled but the ability of marginal groups to make claims on the state itself represents a major departure in the state’s history. Lower-castes did not have the freedom to speak openly in public (Witsoe 2013). Demands for social goods can eventually translate into higher public spending over the long-term.

In hierarchical societies, where marginal groups have been historically excluded from public spaces, greater representation in the public sphere can have important implications on structural factors, like segregation and societal trust, that in turn influence redistributive politics. Scholars of local politics in India have argued that descriptive representation in local institutions can transform social relations in significant ways (Chauchard 2014; Kruks-Wisner 2018; Rao and Sanyal 2010). Kruks-Wisner (2018), for example, argues that representation brings members of traditionally marginalized groups into the formal space in the public sphere and hence reduces the social distance between groups. Chauchard (2014) found that representation of lower-castes in local government also affected the day-to-day social interactions and contributed towards transforming the traditional structures of domination in villages. Rao and Sanyal (2010) examined transcripts of almost three hundred village-wide *panchayat* meetings in South India to show that the inclusion of *SC* villagers in these forums shapes the discursive styles of disadvantaged groups. Members of marginal groups developed civic and political skills in

⁴⁰ Interview (#14) with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 17th July 2012, Patna, Bihar.

⁴¹ Interview (#43) with retired Bihar-cadre IAS officer, 11th June 2014, Patna, Bihar.

these spaces, which allowed them to transgress social norms and make claims for dignity as well as material goods.

Descriptive representation can also shape demand for social goods by improving the responsiveness of marginal groups to state programs in contexts of high distrust between groups. Kumbhar (2022), for example, shows that public distrust in physicians in India is rooted in the dominance of upper-castes Indians in the medical profession. This dominance nurtured a caste privilege-based elitist outlook within medical doctors and lower-caste people were hence more likely to trust their local, community-based practitioners. Similarly in South Africa, the black majority viewed the bureaucracy as the manifestation of a repressive and illegitimate regime. White policemen and bureaucrats continued to incite fear and anger even after Apartheid was dismantled. Black residents were more likely to trust black government officials, which in turn improved policy implementation (Fernandez, Koma, and Lee 2018).

E. Background Data

Table E1: Population Distribution of Castes and Religions in Indian States

	Upper Caste	Dominant Caste	OBC	Hindu SC	Hindu ST	Lower Caste
Andhra Pradesh	7.45	23.05	38.50	16.39	6.12	25.99
Assam	32.26	0.62	30.05	8.52	13.50	28.84
Bihar	22.15	0.04	50.87	16.70	0.80	25.76
Chhattisgarh	9.88	1.31	45.35	14.53	27.16	42.21
Gujarat	14.54	15.40	44.02	7.28	15.03	25.38
Haryana	26.32	17.54	29.97	21.51	0.38	23.42
Himachal Pradesh	57.11	1.30	11.06	22.22	4.41	28.19
Jharkhand	21.12	0.30	31.23	13.88	25.34	44.80
Karnataka	12.14	1.81	47.72	20.63	8.88	34.88
Kerala	13.08	13.20	32.72	8.54	1.96	33.18
Madhya Pradesh	29.70	2.87	30.10	12.51	20.61	36.62
Maharashtra	9.48	20.13	37.00	14.85	7.13	22.74
Orissa	20.48	0.68	41.07	15.27	17.10	33.05
Punjab	49.45	0.74	13.82	13.45	0.15	33.79
Rajasthan	25.41	17.07	25.54	18.35	10.22	30.51
Tamil Nadu	2.42	3.75	61.38	22.69	1.68	27.06
Uttar Pradesh	31.48	2.79	37.51	19.89	0.79	27.60
Uttarakhand	65.73	1.74	4.42	12.01	3.54	15.55
West Bengal	44.06	2.65	10.77	19.46	5.53	33.21
Bihar (pre-2000)	21.90	0.11	46.06	16.01	6.81	30.42
Madhya Pradesh (pre-2000)	24.75	2.48	33.94	13.02	22.26	38.04
Uttar Pradesh (pre-2000)	33.15	2.74	35.91	19.51	0.92	27.01

* *Upper-caste* and *Lower-caste* include all major religions. Backward Caste includes Hindu *Shudras* excluding the Dominant Caste.

** Population estimates are based on the latest round of the State National Election Survey when the research was conducted, with the exception of Jharkhand, Odisha, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh which rely on the 2005, 2009, 2008 and 2009 surveys respectively. Data on other states is based on the following years: Andhra Pradesh: 2009, Assam: 2011, Bihar: 2010, Chhattisgarh: 2013; Gujarat: 2012; Haryana: 2014; Himachal Pradesh: 2013, Karnataka: 2013, Kerala: 2011, Madhya Pradesh: 2013, Maharashtra: 2014, Orissa: 2014, Punjab: 2012, Rajasthan: 2013, Tamil Nadu: 2011, Uttarakhand: 2012, West Bengal: 2011.

*** Three new states were created in 2000 – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand. Pre-2000 social structure for Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were estimated by combining surveys of new states that were carved out of them (after accounting for their respective population): Uttar Pradesh (Uttar Pradesh, 2009 + Uttarakhand, 2012); Madhya Pradesh (Madhya Pradesh, 2013 + Chhattisgarh, 2013); Bihar (Bihar, 2010 + Jharkhand, 2005).

Table E2: Comparison of Population Estimates from Census of India and NES in Indian States

	Scheduled Caste		Scheduled Tribe		Muslim		Sikh		Christian	
	Census 2011	NES	Census 2011	NES	Census 2001	NES	Census 2001	NES	Census 2001	NES
Andhra Pradesh	16.41	16.39	7.00	6.12	9.17	8.26	0.04	0.08	1.55	0.53
Assam	7.15	8.52	12.45	13.50	30.92	24.16	0.08	0.00	3.70	0.45
Bihar	15.91	16.70	1.28	0.80	16.53	16.26	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.00
Chhattisgarh	12.82	14.53	30.62	27.16	1.97	2.68	0.33	0.20	1.92	0.13
Gujarat	6.74	7.28	14.75	15.03	9.06	5.73	0.09	0.11	0.56	0.12
Haryana	20.17	21.51	0.00	0.38	5.78	4.12	5.54	3.67	0.13	0.00
Himachal Pradesh	25.19	22.22	5.71	4.41	1.97	2.60	1.19	0.57	0.13	0.00
Jharkhand	12.08	13.88	26.21	25.34	13.85	10.71	0.31	0.15	4.06	0.00
Karnataka	17.15	20.63	6.95	8.88	12.23	11.06	0.03	0.24	1.91	0.78
Kerala	9.10	8.54	1.45	1.96	24.70	20.08	0.01	0.00	19.02	17.30
Madhya Pradesh	15.62	12.51	21.09	20.61	6.37	8.10	0.25	0.00	0.28	0.04
Maharashtra	11.81	14.85	9.35	7.13	10.60	7.31	0.22	0.00	1.09	0.25
Orissa	17.13	15.27	22.85	17.10	2.07	1.65	0.05	0.00	2.44	0.00
Punjab	31.94	32.54	0.00	0.15	1.57	0.44	59.91	68.06	1.20	0.92
Rajasthan	17.83	18.35	13.48	10.22	8.47	6.52	1.45	1.88	0.13	0.00
Tamil Nadu	20.01	22.69	1.10	1.68	5.56	3.19	0.02	0.00	6.07	0.91
Uttar Pradesh	20.70	19.89	0.57	0.79	11.92	14.74	2.50	0.27	0.32	0.01
Uttarakhand	18.76	12.01	2.89	3.54	11.92	9.17	2.50	2.02	0.32	0.32
West Bengal	23.51	19.46	5.80	5.53	25.25	25.12	0.08	0.48	0.64	0.19
Correlation	0.91		0.98		0.97		1.00		0.94	

* Population estimates are based on the latest round of the State National Election Survey when the research was conducted, with the exception of Jharkhand, Odisha, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh which rely on the 2005, 2009, 2008 and 2009 surveys respectively. Data on other states is based on the following years: Andhra Pradesh: 2009, Assam: 2011, Bihar: 2010, Chhattisgarh: 2013; Gujarat: 2012; Haryana: 2014; Himachal Pradesh: 2013, Karnataka: 2013, Kerala: 2011, Madhya Pradesh: 2013, Maharashtra: 2014, Orissa: 2014, Punjab: 2012, Rajasthan: 2013, Tamil Nadu: 2011, Uttarakhand: 2012, West Bengal: 2011.

** 2011 Census data on religion was not released by the time of writing this article.

Table E3: Comparison of SC and ST population estimates from Census of India, IHDS, and NES

	Scheduled Caste			Scheduled Tribe		
	Census 2011	NES	IHDS	Census 2011	NES	IHDS
Andhra Pradesh	16.41	16.39	24.38	7.00	6.12	3.27
Assam	7.15	8.52	17.69	12.45	13.50	13.39
Bihar	15.91	16.70	20.23	1.28	0.80	1.68
Chhattisgarh	12.82	14.53	11.86	30.62	27.16	26.21
Gujarat	6.74	7.28	10.99	14.75	15.03	10.31
Haryana	20.17	21.51	32.39	0.00	0.38	0.33
Himachal Pradesh	25.19	22.22	29.20	5.71	4.41	4.81
Jharkhand	12.08	13.88	13.01	26.21	25.34	23.21
Karnataka	17.15	20.63	18.24	6.95	8.88	10.6
Kerala	9.10	8.54	9.53	1.45	1.96	0.45
Madhya Pradesh	15.62	12.51	18.19	21.09	20.61	16.5
Maharashtra	11.81	14.85	15.63	9.35	7.13	9.37
Orissa	17.13	15.27	22.74	22.85	17.10	18.03
Punjab	31.94	32.54	39.74	0.00	0.15	0
Rajasthan	17.83	18.35	21.88	13.48	10.22	7.5
Tamil Nadu	20.01	22.69	27.81	1.10	1.68	1.67
Uttar Pradesh	20.70	19.89	21.88	0.57	0.79	7.5
Uttarakhand	18.76	12.01	36.54	2.89	3.54	1.07
West Bengal	23.51	19.46	32.70	5.80	5.53	3.33
Correlation		0.91	0.86		0.98	0.95

Note: Population estimates based on Census of India (2011), National Election Survey (2009-2014), and India Human Development Survey (2011-12)

Table E4: Estimates of OBC Population in Indian States

	NSS 62 nd Round	NSS 55 th Round	IHDS
Andhra Pradesh	47.23	44.55	54.06
Assam	25.77	19.13	16.87
Bihar	57.76	49.74	59.73
Chhattisgarh	43.23	39.48	51.21
Gujarat	34.20	28.00	45.67
Haryana	24.41	25.88	32.83
Himachal Pradesh	10.43	11.26	9.08
Jharkhand	46.11	-	40.33
Karnataka	39.69	35.80	51.44
Kerala	58.35	49.35	56.49
Madhya Pradesh	39.48	38.64	45.74
Maharashtra	31.71	24.30	33.98
Orissa	32.49	29.11	40.43
Punjab	20.00	15.32	20.05
Rajasthan	42.94	31.32	48.67
Tamil Nadu	72.34	65.41	66.08
Uttar Pradesh	50.39	40.22	48.67
Uttarakhand	10.06	-	27.14
West Bengal	4.85	6.17	8.55

Note: Population estimates based on *National Sample Survey* 55th Round (1999-2000), *National Sample Survey* 62nd Round (2005-06) and *India Human Development Survey* (2011-12)

Table E5: Comparison of % SC and ST Reserved Seats with % SC and ST Population in Indian States

	Seats (nos.)		Seats (%)		Population (%)	
	SC	ST	SC	ST	SC	ST
Andhra Pradesh	48	19	16	6	16	7
Assam	8	16	6	13	7	12
Bihar	38	2	16	1	16	1
Chhattisgarh	10	29	11	32	13	31
Gujarat	13	27	7	15	7	15
Haryana	17	0	19	0	20	0
Himachal Pradesh	17	3	25	4	25	6
Jammu & Kashmir	7	0	8	0	7	12
Jharkhand	9	28	11	35	12	26
Karnataka	36	15	16	7	17	7
Kerala	14	2	10	1	9	1
Madhya Pradesh	35	47	15	20	16	21
Maharashtra	28	25	10	9	12	9
Orissa	24	33	16	22	17	23
Punjab	34	0	29	0	32	0
Rajasthan	34	25	17	13	18	13
Tamil Nadu	44	2	19	1	20	1
Uttarakhand	13	2	19	3	21	1
Uttar Pradesh	85		21	0	19	3
West Bengal	68	16	32	8	24	6

Note: Population estimates based on Census of India (2011).

Table E6: Coding Protocol for Caste

Main Caste	Sub-Groups	Sub-castes/ <i>Jati</i>
Upper-caste	Forward Caste (Hindu)	Brahmin; Bhumihar; Lohana; Rajput/Thakur; Kayasthas; Vaishya/Bania; Thondai; Mandala; Saiva; Vellala; Jain; Punjabi Khatri; Sindhi; Karana; Other Upper Caste
	Dominant Caste	Jat; Reddy; Kamma; Nair; Marathas; Patel (Karwa, Leuva, Patidar); Raju; Velama; Kapu; Bunt; Naidu; Bhuyan; Rai Bahadur; Lingayats; Thigala; Other Peasant Proprietors
	Non-Hindu Upper Castes	Ashrafs Muslims (Sayyad, Shaikh); Mughal Muslims; Muslim Rajputs; Other Upper Caste Muslims; Jat Sikh; Khatri/Arora Sikh; Upper Caste Christians; Parsis
Other Backward Classes (OBC)	Hindu Peasant OBCs	Gujjar; Thevar; Ahir; Yadav; Kurmi; Mudaliars; Gowda; Lodh; Vanniyars; Munnuru Kapu; Koeri; Mutharayars; Mudiraj; Mutraju, Tenugollu; Vokkaliga; Kalinga; Lingayat; Thurpu Kapu; Gaderia; Koppulu Velama; Kunbi; Maratha-Kunbi; Koli; Charan; Rabari; Bharwad; Kshtriya; Chaudhary; Senai; Nadars; Ahom; Koch; Dhangan; Vanjari; Leva-Patil; Gowari; Agri; Powar; Teli; Kashyap; Kamboj; Mali/Saini; Other Peasant OBCs
	Non-Hindu Peasant OBCs	Muslim Peasant OBC (Pasmada); OBC Sikh; OBC Christians
	Hindu Service (Craftsmen and Weavers) OBCs	Bunkar; Gaderia; Darzee; Thatihar; Lakhera; Badhai; Kumhar; Lohar; Sunar; Medara; Mahendra; Kumar; Namasudra, Dami; Kosti-Sali-Padmashali; Kewat; Dhobi; Nai; Teli; Jogi; Trader OBCs (Jaiswal, Suri, Kalwar, Kanu, Halwai, Modi, Kaseria, Tamoli, Tati); Toddy Tappers; Landless Labourers; Entertaining Castes; Veluthedathu Nair; Vathi; Chutiya, Koch; Vaishya; Banik/Bania/Bjujel; Dewan/Khatri; Gurung; Jogi; Kirat Rai; Mangar; Sunwar; Thami; Bahun; Chettri; Newar; Sanyasi; Jhimar; Deh, Bhat, Bharbhujia, Pinje; Other Service OBCs
Lower-caste	Hindu Scheduled Castes	Chamar/Jatav; Satnami; Balmiki/Bhangi; Pasi; Pano; Devendrakula Vellars; Rajbanshis; Mala; Namashudras; Mahar; Boyar/Mang; Dhobi; Julaha, Kewat; Dom; Nomadic Castes; Shilpkar; Musahar; Mayavanshi; Vankar; Dhanuk; Gond; Khatik; Kori; Thiruvalluvar; Adi Karnataka; Adi Dravida; Banjara; Bhambi; Bhovi; Chalavadi; Holaya; Korama; Mala Hannai; Pulaya; Paraya; Kuruva; Vettuva; Velan; Thandan; Mali; Koibarta; Das; Hadi; Damai/Musahar; Bhuian; Manjhi/Nag; Matang/Sarki; Basith; Megh; Bagdi Duley; Bauri; Jalia Kaibartta; Jhalo Malo Malo; Kaora; Lohar; Mal; Pod Poundra; Sunri; Other Scheduled Caste
	Scheduled Tribes	Mina; Bhil; Gond/Rajgond; Oraon; Kamars; Santhall; Munda; Andh/Kondh; Naikda; Baiga; Bhattra; Binjhar; Halba; Karku; Kavar; Korwa; Nagesia; Sawar; Ho; Kharia; Bhumi; Chero; Kharwar; Lohra; Mahli; Mal Pahariya; Mahali; Patelia; Baiga; Bhilala; Mahadev-Koli; Korku; Barela; Bhotia; Buksa; Jannasari; Tharu; Malayali; Todas; Brus; Chakma; Kuki Tribes; Angami; Ao; Chakhesang; Chang; Khiamniungan; Konyak; Lotha; Phom; Rengma; Sumi; Yimchungru; Zeliang; Bhutia; Lepcha; Garo; Jamatias; Mog; Other Scheduled Tribes
	Non-Hindu Lower Castes	OBC Muslims (Service/Craftsmen/Weavers); Other OBC Muslims; Ex-Untouchables/Muslim Dalits; Dalit Christians; Dalit Buddhists
Other		Hindu no caste; Muslim No Caste; Sikh No Caste; Christians No Caste; Buddhists; Jews, Other Minorities; No religion no caste
Inadequate Information		Not available; Not Ascertained/ Failed to ask/ Answer refused

Table E7: Coding Protocol for Class

Class	Details
Upper Class	High & mid-level civil servants and politicians (class I & II employees; state/central level elected officials/politicians; district level elected officials/politicians); High & mid-level professional and managers (scientists; engineers; doctors; lawyers; accountants; college/university teachers; other administrative and managerial workers; writers; modern artists; managers; other higher professionals; science and engineering technician; computer operators; alternative doctors; medical technician; schoolteachers; nursery teachers; other lower professionals; folk and commercial artists; priests; superintendents); Large & medium business-owners; Large & medium landowners (with 5+ acres land) In case occupation data is insufficient (see “other” below), individuals with higher than middle school education, including college, graduate and professional degree.
Middle Class	Lower-level government employees (Class III & IV Employees; traditional clerks); Workers with mid-low level of skills (barbers and beauticians; mechanics, machine tool operators; electricians; tailors; weavers; jewelers; shoemakers; carpenters; other skilled/semi-skilled workers); Small business-owners (small businessmen/women; petty shopkeeper; other businessmen/women); Small farmers and tenants (livestock farmers; dairy farmers; poultry farmers; Landowner with 0-5 acres land; tenant cultivators with 5+ acres land). In case occupation data is insufficient (see “other” below), literate individuals (with lower than middle school education).
Lower Class	Low skilled workers in the formal and informal sectors (hawkers and vendors; sales executives; salespersons; shop assistants; waiters; dhobi (washer men/women); chowkidars (watchmen) and caretakers; sweepers and scavengers; masons and bricklayers; furniture, basket, and mat makers; unskilled laborers; miners; potters; stone-cutter and carvers; rickshaw pullers; blacksmiths; ayahs, maids, and domestic servants; other service workers); Landless agricultural workers (tenant cultivators with 0-5 acres land; plantation workers; agricultural laborers; other agricultural workers); Other primary sector workers (shepherds; hunters and trappers; fishermen; animal and cattle breeders; forest produce gatherer). In case occupation data is insufficient (see “other” below), non-literate individuals.
Other	Housewife/husband; students not seeking employment; employment seekers; unemployed workers and non-workers; other occupation; political activists; unidentifiable; not available.

Table E8: Summary of State Assembly Elections, 1951-2014

	Election Year	Term Period	Ruling Alliance	Party Seat Share
Andhra Pradesh	1955	Mar 1955 - Mar 1957	INC	CPI-15; INC-119; PSP-13; PP-5; KLP-22; IND-22
	1957	Mar 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	INC-68; PSP-1; PDF-22; PP-1; SCF-1; IND-12
	1962	Mar 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	CPI-51; INC-177; SOC-2; SWA-19; IND-51
	1967	Mar 1962- Feb 1967	INC	BJS-3; CPI-11; CPM; 9; INC-165; RPI-1; SSP-1; SWA-29; IND-68
	1972	Feb 1967 - Sep 1972	INC	CPI-7; CPM-1; INC-219; SWA-2; STS-1; IND-57
		Sep 1972 - Jan 1973	INC	
		Jan 1973 - Dec 1973	-	
		Dec 1973 - Mar 1978	INC	
	1978	Mar 1978 - Jan 1983	INC(I)	CPI-6; CPM-8; INC-30; INC(I)-175; JNP-60; IND-15
	1983	Jan 1983 - Dec 1984	TDP	BJP-3; CPI-4; CPM-5; INC-60; JNP-1; ICJ-1; IND-219; CPI-11; BJP-8
	1985	Jan 1985 - Dec 1989	TDP	CPM-11; INC-50; TDP-202; JNP-3; IND-9
	1989	Dec 1989 - Dec 1994	INC	CPI-8; CPM-6; INC-181; BJP-5; JD-1; IND-15; TDP-74; MIM-4
	1994	Dec 1994 - Sep 1995	TDP	BJP-3; CPI-19; CPM-15; INC-26; TDP-216; MBT-2; MIM-1; IND-12
		Sep 1995 - Dec 1999	BJP + TDP	
	1999	Dec 1999 - May 2004	INC + CPI + CPM + TRS	BJP-12; AIMIM-4; CPM-2; INC-91; TDP-180; IND-5
	2004	May 2004 - Sep 2009		BJP-2; CPI-6; CPM-9; INC-185; TDP-47-SP-1; AIMIM-44; BSP-1; JP-2; TRS-26; IND-11
	2009	Sep 2009 - Mar 2014		BJP-2; CPI-4; CPM-1; INC-156; TDP-92; TRS-10; AIMIM-7; LSP-1; PRAP-18; IND-3 (PRAP merged with INC in 2011)
	2014	Mar 2014 - Jun 2014	-	President's Rule
		Jun 2014 -	TDP	
Assam	1951	Aug 1951 - Dec 1957	INC	INC-76; SP-4; CPI-1; KMPP-1; GNC-3; APP-1; KJFSC-1; MU-3; KJD-1; IND-14
	1957	Dec 1957 - Dec 1962	INC	INC-71; PSP-8; CPI-4; IND-25
	1962	Dec 1962 - Dec 1967	INC	PSP-6; INC-79; HLC-11; RCP-1; IND-8
	1967	Dec 1967 - Jan 1972	INC	INC-73; CPI-7; PSP-5; SWA-2; AHL-9; SSP-4; IND-26
	1972	Jan 1972 - Mar 1978	INC	INC-95; SOP-4; CPI-3; SWA-1; PTC-1; IND-10
	1978	Mar 1978 - Dec 1979	JNP + CPI + PTC	JNP-53; INC-26; PTC-4; RCI-4; CPM-11; INC(I)-8; CPI-5; IND-15
		Dec 1979 - Dec 1980	-	President's Rule
		Dec 1980 - Jun 1981	INC + CPI + IND	
		Jun 1981 - Jan 1982	-	President's Rule
		Jan 1982 - Mar 1982	INC + CPI + IND	
		Mar 1982 - Feb 1983	-	President's rule
		Feb 1983 - Dec 1985	INC	
	1983	Feb 1983 - Dec 1985	INC	INC-91; CPM-2; ICS-2; CPI-1; PTC-3; IND-10
	1985	Dec 1985 - Nov 1990	IND (AGP + UMFA + IND)	INC-25; CPM-2; ICS-4; PTC-3; IND-92
	1991	Nov 1990 - Jun 1991	-	President's rule
		Jun 1991 - May 1996	INC	
	1996	May 1996 - May 2001	CPI + AGP + CPM	INC-66; BJP-10; CPI-4; CPM-2; JD-1; AGP-19; ADC-4; IND-15; NAGP-5
	2001	May 2001 - May 2006	INC	AIIC(I)-2; BJP-4; CPI-3; CPM-2; INC-34; AGP-59; ASDC-5; UMFA-2; IND-11
	2006	May 2006 - May 2011	INC + IND	BJP-8; INC-71; NCP-3; AGP-20; AITC-1; ASDC(U)-2; SAP-1; SP-1; IND-19
				INC-53; BJP-10; CPI-1; CPI(M)-2; NCP-1; AGP-24; AGP(P)-1; ASDC-1; AUDF-10; LKS-1; IND-22

	2011	May 2011 -	INC	BJP-5; INC-78; AGP-10; AIUDF-18; BOPF-12; AITC-1; IND-2
Bihar	1951	Jan 1951 - Jan 1956	INC	INC -239; SP-23; CNSPJP-11; JHP -32; LKSS -7; FBL MG-1; KMPP-1; RRP-1; UKS-14
	1957	Jan 1957 - Feb 1961	INC	CPI-7; INC-210; PSP-31; CNSPJP-23; JHP-31; IND-16
	1962	Feb 1962 - Mar 1967	INC	CPI-12; INC-185; JS-3; PSP-29; SOC-7; SWA-50; JP-20; IND-12
	1967	Mar 1967 - Jun 1968	INC	BJS-26; CPI-24; CPM-4; INC-128; PSP-18; RPI-1; SSP-68; SWA-3; JKD-13; IND-33
		Jun 1968 - Feb 1969	-	President's Rule
	1969	Feb 1969 - Jan 1972	INC + SSP	BJS-34; CPI-25; CPM-3; INC-118; PSP-18; SSP-52; SWA-3; FBL-1; JAP-14; BKD-6; LTC-9; PHJ-5; SHD-6
		Jan 1972 - Mar 1972	-	President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Apr 1977	INC	BJS-25; CPI-35; INC-167; NCO-30; SOP-33; SWA-1; HJS-1; HSD-3; JKD-1; JKP-3; PHJ-2
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980	JNP	JNP-214; INC-57; CPI-21; CPM-4; IND-24; Others-4
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Mar 1985	INC(I)	INC(I)-169; JNP(SC)-42; CPI-23; BJP-21; IND-23; Others-46
	1985	Mar 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	INC-196; LKD-46; BJP-16; JNP-13; IND-29; Others-24
	1990	Mar 1990 - Mar 1995	JD	JD-122; INC-71; BJP-39; CPI-23; IND-30; CPM-6; JNP(JN)-3; JMM-19; IPF-7; JKD-1; MCOR-2; SOP(L)-1
		Mar 1995 - Apr 1995	-	President's Rule
	1995	Apr 1995 - Feb 1999	JD + CPM + CPI + JMM(S)	JD-167; BJP-41; INC-29; CPI-26; IND-12; BSP-2; JMM-10; JPP-2; SP-2; BPP-1; CVP-1; JKP-1; JMM(M)-3; JMM(S)-6; MCOR-2
Chhattisgarh		Feb 1999 - Mar 1999	-	President's Rule
		Mar 1999 - Mar 2000	JD + CPM + CPI + JMM(S)	
	2000	Mar 2000 - Mar 2005	RJD + INC + CPI(ML) + CPI + CPM	RJD-124; BJP-67; SAP-34; INC; 23; JD(U)-21; IND-20; JMM-12; CPI(ML)(L)-6; BSP-5; CPI-5; CPM-2; KSP-2; UGDP -2; MCO-1
		Mar 2005 - Nov 2005	-	President's Rule
	2005	Nov 2005 – Nov 2010	JD(U) + BJP	JD(U)-88; BJP-55; RJD-54; LJP-10; IND-10; BSP-4; CPI-3; CPM-1; INC-9
	2010	Nov 2010 -	JD(U) + BJP	JD(U)-115; BJP-91; RJD-22; INC-4; IND-6; CPI-1; JMM-1; LJP-3
Gujarat	2000	Nov 2000 - Dec 2003	INC	
	2003	Dec 2003 - Nov 2008	BJP	BJP-50; BSP-2; INC-37; NCP-1
	2008	Dec 2008 - Nov 2013	BJP	BJP-50; BSP-2; INC-38
	2013	Dec 2013 -	BJP	BJP-49; BSP-1; INC-39; IND-1
Gujarat	1962	Sep 1963 - Sep 1965	INC	INC-113; PSP-7; SWA-26; NJP-1; IND-7
	1967	Sep 1965 - May 1971	INC	BJS-1; INC-93; PSP-3; SWA-66; IND-5
		May 1971 - Mar 1972	-	President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Feb 1974	INC	BJS-3; CPI-1; INC-140; NCO-16; IND-8
		Feb 1974 - Jun 1975	-	President's Rule
	1975	Jun 1975 - Mar 1976	NCO + BJS + BLD + SP	BJS-18; BLD-2; INC-75; NCO-56; SP-2; KLP-12; RMP-1; IND-16
		Mar 1976 - Dec 1976	-	President's Rule
		Dec 1976 - Apr 1977	INC + IND	
		Apr 1977 - Feb 1980	NCO + BJS + BLD + SP	
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	INC(I)	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Jul 1985	INC	INC(I)-141; JNP(JP)-21; BJP-9; JNP(SC)-1; IND-10
	1985	Jul 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	INC-149; JNP-14; BJP-11; IND-8
	1990	Mar 1990 - Feb 1994	JD + BJP	JD-70; BJP-67; INC-33; YVP-1; IND-11
Gujarat		Feb 1994 - Mar 1995	INC + JD	
	1995	Mar 1995 - Oct 1995	BJP	BJP-121; INC-45; IND-16
		Oct 1995 - Sep 1996	-	President's Rule

		Sep 1996 - Mar 1998	INC + Split BJP which formed RJP	
	1998	Mar 1998 - Dec 2002	BJP	BJP-117; INC-53; AIRJP-4; JD-4; IND-3; SP-1
	2002	Oct 2002 - Dec 2007	BJP	BJP-127; INC-51; JD(U)-2; IND-2
	2007	Dec 2007 - Dec 2012	BJP	BJP-117; INC-59; NCP-3; JD(U)-1; IND-2
	2012	Dec 2012 -	BJP	BJP-115; INC-61; GPP-2; NCP-2; IND-1; JDU(U)-1
Haryana		Mar 1967 - Nov 1967	INC	BJS-12; INC-48; RPI-2; SWA-3; IND-16
		Nov 1967 - May 1968	-	President's Rule
	1968	May 1968 - Mar 1972	INC	BJS-7; INC-48; SWA-2; RPI-1; VHP-16; BKD-1; IND-6
	1972	Apr 1972 - Apr 1977	INC	BJS-2; INC-52; NCO-12; BAS-1; VHP-3; IND-11
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Jun 1982	JNP (MLAs deflected - INC in 1980)	INC-3; JNP-75; VHP-5; IND-7
	1982	Jun 1982 - Jun 1987	INC	BJP-6; JNP-1; INC-36; IND-16; LKD-31
	1987	Jul 1987 - Apr 1991	LKD	BJP-16; INC-5; LKD-60; CPM-1; IND-7; CPI-1
		Apr 1991 - Jul 1991	-	President's Rule
	1991	Jul 1991 - May 1996	INC	BJP-2; INC-51; JP-16; JD-3; BSP-1; HVP-12
	1996	May 1996 - Mar 2000	HVP + BJP	BJP-11; AIIC(T)-3; INC-9; HVP-33; SAP-24; IND-10
	2000	Mar 2000 - Mar 2005	INLD + BJP	BJP-6; BSP-1; INLD-47; NCP-1; INC-21; HVP-2; RPI-1
	2005	Mar 2005 - Aug 2009	INC	BJP-2; INC-67; NCP-1; BSP-1; INLD-9
	2009	Aug 2009 - Oct 2014	INC	BJP-4; HJCBL-6; BSP-1; INLD-31; INC-40; IND-7; SAD-1
	2014	Oct 2014 -	BJP	BJP-47; HJCBL-2; BSP-1; INLD-19; INC-15; IND-5; SAD-1
Himachal Pradesh	1952	Mar 1952 - Oct 1956	INC	INC-24; KMPP-3; SCF-1; IND-8
				State ceased to exist (Oct 1956 - Jul 1963)
	1967	Jan 1967 - Jan 1972	INC	BJS-7; CPI-2; INC-34; SWA-1; IND-16
	1972	Jan 1972 - Apr 1977	INC	BJS-5; CPM-1; INC-53; LRP-2; IND-7
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1982	JNP	JNP-53; INC-9; IND-6
	1982	Feb 1982 - Mar 1985	INC + IND	INC-31; BJP-29; JNP-2; IND-6
	1985	Mar 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	INC-58; BJP-7; LKD-1; IND-2
	1990	Mar 1990 - Dec 1992	BJP	BJP-46; JD-11; INC-9; CPI-1; IND-1
		Dec 1992 - Dec 1993	-	President's Rule
	1993	Dec 1993 - Mar 1998	INC	INC-52; BJP-8; CPM-1; IND-7
	1998	Mar 1998 - Mar 2003	INC + HVC	INC-31; BJP-31; HVC-5; IND-1
	2003	Mar 2003 - Dec 2007	INC	INC-43; BJP-16; HVC-1; LJNSP-1; IND-6; LMHP-1
Jharkhand	2005	Mar 2005 - Jan 2009	BJP + JMM + IND	BJP-30; INC-9; NCP-1; JD(U)-6; JMM-17; RJD-7; AIFB-2; CPI(ML)(L)-1; UGDP-2; AJSUP-2; JKP-1; IND-3
		Jan 2009 - Dec 2009	-	President's Rule
	2009	Dec 2009 - May 2010	BJP + JMM + IND	BJP-18; INC-14; RJD-5; JD(U)-2; JMM-18; JVM-11; CPI(ML)(L)-1; JBSP-1; JHJAM-1; JKP-1; MCO-1; RAKAP-1; IND-2
		Jun 2010 - Sep 2010	-	President's Rule
		Sep 2010 - Jan 2013	BJP + JMM + IND	
		Jan 2013 - Jul 2013	-	President's Rule
		Jul 2013 - Dec 2014	BJP + JMM + IND	
	2014	Dec 2014 -	BJP	BJP-37; INC-6; BSP-1; AJSUP-5; JMM-19; JVM-8; CPI(ML)(L)-1; JKP-1; JBSP-1; NSAM-1; MCO-1
	1957	May 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	CPI-1; INC-150; PSP-18; PWP-2; SCF-2; IND-35

Karnataka	1962	Mar 1962 - May 1967	INC	CPI-3; INC-138; PSP-20; SOC-1; SWA-9; LSS-4; MES-6; IND-27
	1967	May 1967 - Mar 1971	INC	BJS-4; CPI-1; CPM-1; INC-126; PSP-20; RPI-1; SSP-6; SWA-16; IND-41
		Mar 1971 - Mar 1972	-	President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Dec 1977	INC	CPI-3; INC-165; NCO-24; SOP-3; JPP-1; IND-20
		Dec 1977 - Feb 1978	-	President's Rule
	1978	Feb 1978 - Jan 1983	INC(I)	CPI-3; INC-2; INC(I)-149; JNP-59; RPI-1; IND-10
	1983	Jan 1983 - Dec 1984	BJP + JNP + CPI + IND + CPM	BJP-18; CPM-3; CPI-3; INC-82; JNP-95; ADMK-1; IND-22
	1985	Mar 1985 - Apr 1989	JNP	CPM-2; BJP-2; CPI-3; INC-65; JNP-139; IND-13
		Apr 1989 - Nov 1989	-	President's Rule
	1989	Nov 1989 - Oct 1990	INC	BJP-4; JD-24; INC-178; JNP(JP)-2; KRS-2; IND-12
		Oct 1990 - Oct 1990	-	President's Rule
		Oct 1990 - Dec 1994	INC	
	1994	Dec 1994 - Oct 1999	JD	BJP-40; BSP-1; INC-34; JD-115; ADMK-1; B RP-1; CPM-1; KRRS-1; KCP-10; IND-18
	1999	Oct 1999 - May 2004	INC	JD(U)-18; JD(S)-44; BSP-1; INC-132; IND-19; ADMK-1
	2004	May 2004 - Jan 2006	INC + JD(S)	IND-13; BJP-79; CPM-1; JD(U)-5; INC-65; JD(S)-58; KCVP-1; KNDP-1; RPI-1
		Feb 2006 - Oct 2007	JD(S)	
		Oct 2007 - Nov 2007	-	President's Rule
		Nov 2007 - Nov 2007	INC + JD(S)	
		Nov 2007 - May 2008	-	President's Rule
	2008	May 2008 - May 2013	BJP + IND	BJP-110; INC-80; JD(S)-28; IND-6
	2013	May 2013 -	INC	BJP-40; INC-122; JD(S)-40; SP-1; BSRCP-4; KJP-6; KMP-1; SKP-1; IND-9
Kerala		Mar 1956 - Apr 1957	-	President's Rule
	1957	Apr 1957 - Jul 1959	CPI + IND (5)	CPI-60; INC-43; PSP-9; IND-14
		Jul 1959 - Feb 1960	-	President's Rule
		Feb 1960 - Sep 1962	PSP + INC + ML	CPI-29; INC-63; PSP-20; ML-11; IND-3
	1960	Sep 1962 - Sep 1964	PSP + INC	
		Sep 1964 - Mar 1967	-	President's Rule
	1967	Mar 1967 - Nov 1969	CPM + CPI + MUL + RSP + SSP + KEC + IND (KTP)	CPI-19; CPM-52; INC-9; SSP-19; KEC-5; MUL-14; IND-15
		Nov 1969 - Aug 1970	CPI + MUL + KEC + IND (RSP + ISP)	
		Aug 1970 - Oct 1970	-	President's Rule
	1970	Oct 1970 - Apr 1977	UDF: INC + CPI + RSP + MUL + PSP	CPI-16; CPM-29; IND-16; KEC-12; PSP-3; INC-30; MUL-11; RSP-6; KSP-1
	1977	Apr 1977 - Dec 1979	UDF: INC + CPI + KEC + MUL + RSP + IND (NDP + PSP)	INC-38; CPI-23; KEC-20; CPM-17; MUL-13; IND-9; BLD-6; KCP-2; MLO-3; RSP-9
		Dec 1979 - Jan 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jan 1980 - Oct 1981	LDF: CPM + CPI + INC (U) + KCP + KEC + IML + RSP	CPM-35; INC(U)-21; INC(I)-17; CPI-17; MUL-14; IND-5; JNP-5; IML-5; KCJ-6; KCP-1; KEC-8; RSP-6
		Dec 1981 - Mar 1982	UDF: INC (I) + MUL + KCJ + KCM + INC (U) + IND	

	1982	May 1982 - Mar 1987	UDF: INC + MUL + KCJ + NDP + JNP + KEC + IND (KCM + SRP + RRP + PSP)	CPM-26; INC-20; MUL-14; CPI-13; IND-34; ICS-5; JNP-4; IML-4; KCJ-8; KEC-6; NDP-2
	1987	Mar 1987 - Jun 1991	LDF: CPM + CPI + ICS + RSP	CPM-38; INC-33; CPI-16; MUL-15; IND-14; ICS-6; JNP-7; LKD-1; KEC-5; RSP-5
	1991	Jun 1991 - May 1996	UDF: INC + MUL + KCM + KEC + NDP	INC-55; CPM-28; MUL-19; CPI-12; KCM-10; IND-4; ICS-2; JD-3; KEC-1; CPI (M)-1; CPM(K)-1; NDP-2
	1996	May 1996 - May 2001	LDF: RSP + JD + CPM + CPI	CPM-40; INC-37; CPI-18; MUL-13; KEC-6; IND-5; JD-4; ICS-3; KEC(M)-5; RSP-5; JPSS-1; KEC(B)-1; KEC(J)-2
	2001	May 2001 - May 2006	UDF: INC + RSPK(B) + MUL + KEC(M) + KEC(J) + KEC(B) + JPSS + KEC	INC-62; CPM-23; MUL-16; KEC(M)-9; CPI-7; IND-3; NCP-2; JD(S)-3; KEC-2; RSP-2; JPSS-4; KEC(B)-2; KEC(J)-2; RSPK(B)-2
	2006	May 2006 - May 2011	LDF: CPI(M) + CPI + JS(S) + KEC + RSP	CPI(M)-61; INC-24; CPI-17; MUL-7; KEC(M)-7; IND-5; JD(S)-5; NCP-1; JPSS-1; KEC-4; RSP-3; DIC-1; INL-1; KCS-1; KEC(B)-1
	2011	May 2011 -	UDF: INC + MUL + KEC(M) + JS(S) + KEC(B) + KEC(J) + KRSP	CPM-45; INC-38; MUL-20; CPI-13; KEC(M)-9; IND-2; NCP-2; JS(S)-4; RSP-2; KEC(B)-1; KEC(J)-1; KRSP-1
Madhya Pradesh	1951	Jan 1951 - Jan 1957	INC	INC-194; KMPP-8; RRP-3; SP-2; SKP-2; IND-23
	1957	Jan 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	BJS-10; CPI-2; INC-232; PSP-12; HMS-7; RRP-5; IND-20
	1962	Mar 1962 - Jul 1967	INC	CPI-1; INC-142; JS-41; PSP-33; SOC-14; SWA-2; HMS-6; RRP-10; IND-39
	1967	Jul 1967 - Mar 1972	INC	BJS-78; CPI-1; INC-167; PSP-9; SSP-10; IND-22; SWA-7; JAC-2
	1972	Jan 1972 - Dec 1975	INC	BJS-48; CPI-3; INC-220; SOP-7; IND-18
	1975	Dec 1975 - Apr 1977	INC	INC-84; JNP-230; RRP-1; IND-5
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980	JNP	INC-84; JNP-230; RRP-1; IND-5
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Mar 1985	INC(I)	BJP-60; CPI-2; INC(I)-246; JNP(JP)-2; JNP(SC)-1; RKP-1; IND-8
	1985	Mar 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	BJP-58; ICS-1; INC-250; JNP-5; IND-6
	1990	Mar 1990 - Dec 1992	BJP	BJP-220; CPI-3; INC-56; JD-28; BSP-2; KSM-1; IND-10
		Dec 1992 - Dec 1993	-	President's Rule
	1993	Dec 1993 - Dec 1998	INC	BJP-117; CPI-2; CPM-1; INC-174; JD-4; BSP-11; CMM-1; KSM-1; RPI(K)-1; IND-8
	1998	Dec 1998- Dec 2003	INC	BJP-119; BSP-11; INC-172; JD-1; JP-1; RPI-1; AJBP-1; GGP-1; IND-9
	2003	Dec 2003 - Dec 2008	BJP	BJP-173; BSP-2; CPM-1; INC-38; NCP-1; JD(U)-1; SP-7; GGP-3; RSMD-2; IND-2
	2008	Dec 2008 - Dec 2013	BJP	BJP-143; BSP-7; INC-71; SP-1; BJSP-5; IND-1
	2013	Dec 2013 -	BJP	BJP-165; BSP-4; INC-58; IND-3
	1960	May 1960 - Nov 1962	INC	

Maharashtra	1962	Nov 1962 - Mar 1967	INC	INC-215; PSP-9; SOC-1; CPI-6; PWP-15; REP-3; IND-15
	1967	Mar 1967 - Mar 1972	INC	BJS-4; INC-203; PSP-8; IND-16; CPI-10; CPM-1; RPI-5; SSP-4; PWP-19
		Mar 1971 - Apr 1977	-	President's Rule
	1972	May 1971 - Mar 1972	INC	BJS-5; CPI-2; INC-222; SOP-3; BKD-1; FBL-2; MUL-1; PWP-7; RPI-2; SHS-1; IND-23
	1978	Mar 1978 - Feb 1980	INC	CPI-1; CPM-9; INC-69; INC(I)-62; JNP-99; FBL-3; PWP-13; RPI-2; RPK-2; IND-28
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Jun 1985	INC(I)	BJP-14; CPI-2; CPM-2; INC(I)-186; INC(U)-47; JNP(JP)-17; PWP-9; RPK-1; IND-10
	1985	Jun 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	BJP-16; CPI-2; CPM-2; INC-161; PWP-13; JNP-20; IND-20
	1990	Mar 1990 - Mar 1995	INC + IND	BJP-42; CPI-2 CPM-3; ICS(SCS)-1; INC-141; JD-24; MUL-1; PWP-8; RPK-1; SHS-52; IND-13
	1995	Mar 1995 - Oct 1999	BJP + SHS	BJP-65; CPI-2; PWP-6; SHS-73; SP-3
	1999	Oct 1999 - Oct 2004	NCP + INC + RPI + PWPI	BJP-56; JD(S)-2; NCP-58; CPM-2; INC-75; RPI-1; SHS-69; SP-2; BBM-3; GGP-1; NVPP-1; PWPI-5; SPJ(M)-1; IND-12
	2004	Nov 2004 - Nov 2009	INC + NCP	BJP-54; INC-69; NCP-71; SHS-62; ABHS-1; CPM-3; JSS-4; RPI(A)-1; STBP-1; PWPI-3; IND-19
	2009	Nov 2009 - Sep 2014	INC + NCP	BJP-46; INC-82; NCP-62; CPM-1; SHS-44; BBM-1; BVA-2; JSS-2; PWPI-1; MNS-13; IND-15; SWP-1; RSPS-1
	2014	Sep 2014 - Oct 2014	-	President's Rule
Orisha		Oct 2014 -	BJP	BJP-122; INC-42; NCP-41; CPM-1; SHS-63; MNS-1; SP-1; AIMIM-2; BBM-1; PWPI-3; RSPS-1; IND-7; BVA-3
	1951	May 1950 - Oct 1956	INC	CPI-7; FBL(MG)-1; INC-67; SP-10; GP-31; IND-24
	1957	Oct 1956 - Feb 1961	INC	CPI-9; INC-56; PSP-11; GP-51; IND-13
		Feb 1961 - Jun 1961	-	President's Rule
	1961	Jun 1961 - Mar 1967	INC	CPI-4; INC-82; PSP-10; GP-37; IND-7
	1967	Mar 1967 - Jan 1971	SWA + JAC	CPI-7; CPM-1; INC-31; PSP-21; SSP-2; SWA-49; JAC-26; IND-3
		Jan 1971 - Apr 1971	-	President's Rule
	1971	Apr 1971 - Mar 1973	INC + IND	CPI-4; CPM-2; INC-51; NCO-1; PSP-4; SWA-36; JAC-1; UTC-33; JKP-4; IND-4
		Mar 1973 - Mar 1973	-	President's Rule
	1974	Mar 1974 - Dec 1976	INC	CPI-7; CPM-3; INC-69; SOP-2; JAC-1; SWA-21; UTC-35; JKD-1; IND-7
		Dec 1976 - Dec 1976	-	President's Rule
		Dec 1976 - Apr 1977	INC	
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980	JNP	CPI-1; CPM-1; INC-26; JNP-110; IND-9
		Mar 1980 - May 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Mar 1985	INC	CPI-4; INC(I)-118; INC(U)-2; JNP(JP)-3; JNP(SC)-13; IND-7
	1985	Mar 1985 - Mar 1990	INC	BJP-1; CPI-1; INC-117; JNP-21; IND-7
	1990	Mar 1990 - Mar 1995	JD	BJP-2; CPI-5; CPM-1; INC-10; JD-123
	1995	Mar 1995 - Mar 2000	INC	BJP-9; CPI-1; INC-80; JD-46; JMM-4; JPP-1; IND-6
	2000	May 2000 - May 2004	BJD + BJP	BJP-38; CPI-1; CPM-1; INC-26; JD(S)-1; AITC-1; BJD-68; JMM-3; IND-8
	2004	May 2004 - May 2009	BJD	BJP-32; CPI-1; CPM-1; INC-38; BJD-61; JMM-4; OGP-2; IND-8
	2009	May 2009 - May 2014	BJD	BJP-6; CPI-1; INC-27; NCP-4; BJD-103; IND-6
	2014	May 2014 -	BJD	INC-16; BJP-10; CPM-1; BJD-117; SKD-1; IND-2
Punjab	1952	Apr 1952 - Jan 1956	INC	INC-96; SAD-13; CPI-39; ZP-75
	1956	Jan 1956 - Mar 1962	INC	INC-120; BJS-9; CPI-6; SCF-5; PSP-1

	1962	Mar 1962 - Jul 1966 Jul 1966 - Nov 1966	INC -	INC-90; SAD-19; CPI-9; BJS-8; SOC-4 President's Rule
			Haryana separates from Punjab	
	1967	Nov 1966 - Aug 1968 Aug 1968 - Feb 1969	INC -	INC-48; ADS-24; BJS-9; CPI-5; CPM-3 President's Rule
	1969	Feb 1969 - Jun 1971 Jun 1971 - Mar 1972	SAD -	SAD-43; INC-38; BJS-8; CPI-4; CPM-2 President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Apr 1977 Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	INC -	INC-66; SAD-24; CPI-10; CPM-1 President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980 Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	SAD -	SAD-58; JNP-25; INC-17; CPM-8; CPI-7; IND-2 President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Oct 1983 Oct 1983 - Sep 1985	INC -	INC(I)-63; SAD-37; CPI-9; CPM-5; IND-2; BJP-1 President's Rule
	1985	Sep 1985 - Jun 1987 Jun 1987 - Feb 1992	SAD -	SAD-73; INC-32; BJP-6; CPI-1; IND-4; JNP-1 President's Rule
	1992	Feb 1992 - Feb 1997	INC	INC-87; BSP-9; BJP-6; CPI-4; IND-4; SAD-3; IPF-1; UCPI-1; CPM-1; JD-1
	1997	Feb 1997 - Feb 2002	SAD + BJP	SAD-75; BJP-18; INC-14; CPI-2; IND-6; Others-2
	2002	Feb 2002 - Mar 2007	INC	INC-62; SAD-41; BJP-3; CPI-2; IND-9
	2007	Mar 2007 - Mar 2012	SAD + BJP	SAD-48; INC-44; BJP-19; IND-5
	2012	Mar 2012 -	SAD + BJP	SAD-56; INC-46; BJP-12; IND-3
Rajasthan	1951	Apr 1951 - Mar 1957	INC	HMS-2; INC-82; KLP-7; KMPP-1; RRP-24; SP-1; IND-35; PSP-9; BJS-8
	1957	Apr 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	BJS-6; CPI-1; INC-119; RRP-17; IND-32
	1962	Mar 1962 - Feb 1967	INC	CPI-5; INC-88; JS-15; PSP-2; SOC-5; SWA-36; RRP-17; IND-32
		Mar 1967 - Apr 1967	-	President's Rule
	1967	Apr 1967 - Mar 1972 May 1971 - Mar 1972	INC -	BSP-22; CPI-1; INC-89; SSP-8; SWA-48; IND-32 President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Apr 1977	INC	BJS-8; CPI-4; INC-145; NCO-1; SOP-4; SWA-11; IND-11
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980 Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	JNP -	CPI-1; CPM-1; INC-41; JNP-152; IND-5 President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Feb 1985	INC	BJP-32; CPI-1; CPM-1; INC(I)-133; INC(U)-6; JNP(JP)-8; JNP(SC)-7; IND-12
	1985	Feb 1985 - Jan 1988	INC	BJP-39; CPI-1; INC-113; JNP-10; LKD-27; IND-10
	1990	Dec 1989 - Dec 1992 Dec 1992 - Dec 1993	BJP -	BJP-85; CPM-1; INC-50; JD-55; IND-9 President's Rule
	1993	Dec 1993 - Nov 1998	IND + BJP	BJP-95; CPM-1; INC-76; JD-6; IND-21
	1998	Dec 1998 - Dec 2003	INC	BJP-33; BSP-2; CPM-1; RJD-1; INC-153; JD-3; IND-7
	2003	Dec 2003 - Dec 2008	JD(U) + BJP	BJP-120; BSP-2; CPM-1; INC-56; INLD-4; JD(U)-2; LJNSP-1; RSNM-1; IND-13
	2008	Dec 2008 - Dec 2013	IND + INC	BJP-78; BSP-6; CPM-3; INC-96; JD(U)-1; SP-1; IND-14
	2013	Dec 2013 onwards	BJP	BJP-163; BSP-3; INC-21; NPEP-4; NUZP-2; IND-7
Tamil Nadu			Madras State	
	1952	Apr 1952 - Mar 1957	INC	CPI-62; FBL(MG)-3; INC-152; KLP-15; KMPP-35; SCF-2; SP-13; CWP-6; MLP-5; JUSP-1; IND-62
	1957	Mar 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	CPI-4; INC-151; PSP-2; IND-48
	1962	Mar 1962 - Mar 1967	INC	CPI-2; INC-139; SOC-1; SWA-6; DMK-50; FB-3; IND-5
	1967	Mar 1967 - Jan 1971	DMK	CPI-2; CPM-11; INC-51; PSP-4; SSP-2; SWA-20; DMK-137; FBL-1; IND-6
			Tamil Nadu State	
	1971	Mar 1971 - Jan 1976	DMK	CPI-8; NCO-15; PSP-4; SWA-6; DMK-184; FBL-7; MUL-2; IND-8
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule

	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980	ADK	ADK-130; DMK-48; INC-27; CPM-12; JNP-10; IND-1; CPI-5; FBL-1
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Nov 1984	ADK + CPM + CPI + IND + FBL + GKC	ADK-129; DMK-37; INC(I)-31; CPM-11; CPI-9; IND-8; JNP(JP)-2; FBL-1; GKC-6
	1984	Feb 1985 - Jan 1988	ADK + INC + GKC	ADK-132; INC-61; DMK-24; CPM-5; IND-4; CPI-2; JNP-3; AKD-1; GKC-2
		Jan 1988 - Jan 1989	-	President's Rule
	1989	Jan 1989 - Jan 1991	DMK + CPM + JNP	DMK-150; ADK(JL)-27; INC-26; CPM-15; IND-5; CPI-3; ADK-2; ADK(JR)-2; JNP-4
		Jan 1991 - Jun 1991	-	President's Rule
	1991	Jun 1991 - May 1996	ADK + INC + ICS(SCS)	ADK-164; INC-60; DMK-2; TMC-2; CPM-1; IND-1; CPI-1; ICS(SCS)-1; JD-1; PMK-1
	1996	May 1996 - May 2001	DMK + TMC(M) + FBL + CPI	DMK-173; TMC(M)-39; CPI-8; ADMK-4; PMK-4; IND-1; FBL-1; BJP-1; CPM-1; JD-1; JP-1
	2001	May 2001 - May 2006	ADMK + TCM(M) + PMK + INC + CPM + FBL + CPI	ADMK-132; DMK-31; TMC(M)-23; PMK-20; INC-7; IND-3; BJP-4; CPI-5; CPM-6; FBL-1; MADMK-2
	2006	May 2006 - May 2011	DMK + INC + PMK + CPI(M) + CPI	DMK-96; AIADMK-61; INC-34; PMK-18; CPI(M)-9; IND-1; CPI-6; MDMK-6; DMDK-1; VCK-2
	2011	May 2011 -	AIADMK	AIADMK-150; DMDK-29; DMK-23; CPM-10; CPI-9; INC-5; PMK-3; AIFB-1; MAMAK-2; PT-2
Uttar Pradesh	1951	May 1952 - Apr 1957	INC	BJS-2; HMS-1; INC-388; KMPP-1; RRP-1; SP-20; UPPP-1; UPRSP-1; IND-15
	1957	Apr 1957 - Mar 1962	INC	BJS-17; CPI-9; INC-286; PSP-44; IND-74
	1962	Mar 1962 - Apr 1967	INC	CPI-14; INC-249; JS-49; PSP-38; SOC-24; SWA-15; HMS-2; REP-8; IND-31
	1967	Apr 1967 - Feb 1968	BJS + SSP + CPI + CPM + PSP + RPI + SWA + IND (some)	BJS-98; CPI-13; CPM-1; INC-199; PSP-11; RPI-10; SSP-44; SWA-12; IND-37
		Feb 1968 - Feb 1969	-	President's Rule
	1969	Feb 1969 - Feb 1970	INC + IND	BJS-49; CPI-4; CPM-1; INC-211; PSP-3; RPI-1; SSP-33; SWA-5; BKD-98; HMS-1; KMP-1
		Feb 1970 - Oct 1970	BKD + INC (Tripathi)	
		Oct 1970 - Oct 1970	-	President's Rule
		Oct 1970 - Apr 1971	Jan Sangh + BKD + INC(N)	
		Apr 1971 - Jun 1973	BKD + INC (Tripathi)	
		Jun 1973 - Nov 1973	-	President's Rule
		Nov 1973 - Mar 1974	INC	
	1974	Mar 1974 - Nov 1975	INC	BJS-61; CPI-16; CPM-2; INC-215; NCO-10; SOP-5; BKD-106; MUL-1; SWA-1; HMS-1; SSD-1; IND-5
		Nov 1975 - Jan 1976	-	President's Rule
		Jan 1976 - Apr 1977	INC	
		Apr 1977 - Jun 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - Feb 1980	JNP	CPI-9; CPM-1; INC-47; JNP-352; IND-16
		Feb 1980 - Jun 1980	-	President's Rule
	1980	Jun 1980 - Mar 1985	INC(I)	BJP-11; CPI-7; INC(I)-309; INC(U)-13; JNP(JP)-4; JNP(SC)-59; JNP(SR)-4; SSD-1
	1985	Sep 1985 - Dec 1989	INC	BJP-16; CPI-6; CPM-2; INC-269; JNP-20; LKD-84; ICJ-5; IND-23

	1989	Dec 1989 - Jun 1991	BJP + JD	BJP-57; CPI-6; CPM-2; INC-94; JD-308; JNP(JP)-1; LKD(B)-2; BSP-13; HMS-1; SSD-1; IND-40
	1991	Jun 1991 - Dec 1992	BJP	BJP-221; CPI-4; CPM-1; INC-46; JD-92; JP-34; BSP-12; SHS-1; IND-7
		Dec 1992 - Dec 1993	-	President's Rule
	1993	Dec 1993 - Oct 1995	SP + JD + INC + BSP	BJP-177; CPI-3; CPM-1; INC-28; JD-27; JP-1; BSP-67; SP-109; UKD-1; IND-8
		Oct 1995 - Mar 1997	-	President's Rule
	1997	Mar 1997 - Mar 2002	BJP + BSP	AHC(T)-4; BJP-174; CPI-1; CPM-4; INC-33; JD-7; BSP-67; SP-110; BKKGP-8; SAP-2; SJP(R)-1; IND-13
		Mar 2002 - May 2002	-	President's Rule
	2002	May 2000 - Aug 2003	BJP + BSP	BJP-88; BSP-98; CPM-2; INC-25; SP-143; JD(U)-2; ABHM-1; ABLTS-2; AD-3; JP-1; LJNSP-1; NLP-1; RLD-14; RPD-1; RTKP-4; SJP(R)-1; IND-16
	2007	May 2007 - Mar 2012	BSP	BJP-51; BSP-206; INC-22; JD(U)-1; RLD-10; SP-97; ABLTC-1; BJSH-1; JM-1; RPD-2; RSBP-1; UPUDF-1; IND-9
	2012	Mar 2012 -	SP	INC-28; BSP-80; NCP-1; BJP-47; RLD-9; SP-224; QED-2; PECP-4; AD-1; IEMC-1; IND-6
Uttarakhand	2002	Mar 2002 - Mar 2007	INC + IND	BJP-19; BSP-7; INC-36; NCP-1; UKKD-4; IND-3
	2007	Mar 2007 - Mar 2012	BJP + UKKD + IND	BJP-34; BSP-8; INC-21; UKKD-3; IND-3
	2012	Mar 2012 -	INC + BSP + UKDP + IND	BJP-31; BSP-3; INC-32; UKDP-1; IND-3
West Bengal	1952	Mar 1952 - Apr 1957	INC	BJS-9; CPI-28; FBL(MG)-11; FBL(RG)-2; HMS-4; INC-150; KMPP-15; IND-19
	1957	Apr 1957 - Jul 1962	INC	CPI-46; INC-152; PSP-21; FBM-8; IND-25
	1962	Jul 1962 - Feb 1967	INC	CPI-50; INC-157; PSP-5; FB-13; GL-2; LSS-4; RSP-9; SBP-1; IND-11
	1967	Mar 1967 - Feb 1968	CPM + SSP + PSP + BAC + IND	BJS-1; CPI-16; CPM-43; INC-47; PSP-7; SSP-7; SWA-1; BAC-34; FBL-13; IND-31
		Feb 1968 - Feb 1969	-	President's Rule
	1969	Feb 1969 - Jul 1970	CPM + SSP + PSP + BAC + IND	CPI-30; CPM-80; INC-55; PSP-5; SSP-9; BAC-33; FBL-21; RSP-12; IGL-4; LSS-4; MFB-1; NDF-1; PML-3
		Jul 1970 - Mar 1971	-	President's Rule
	1971	Apr 1971 - Jun 1971	CPM	BJS-1; CPI-13; CPM-113; NCO-2; PSP-3; FBL-3; RSP-3; BAC-5; BBC-1; IGL-2; JKP-2; MFB-2; RCI-3
		Jun 1971 - Mar 1972	-	President's Rule
	1972	Mar 1972 - Apr 1977	INC	CPI-35; CPM-14; INC-216; NCO-2; MUL-1; RSP-3; IGL-2; SUC-1; WPI-1
		Apr 1977 - June 1977	-	President's Rule
	1977	Jun 1977 - May 1982	CPI + CPM + RSP + BBC + MFB + RCI	CPI-2; CPM-178; INC-20; JNP-29; FBL-25; MUL-1; RSP-20; BBC-1; MFB-2; RCI-2; SUC-4; IND-10
	1982	May 1982 - Mar 1987	CPM + FBL + RSP + CPI	CPI-7; CPM-174; ICS-4; INC-49; FBL-28; SUC-2; RSP-19 IND-11
	1987	Mar 1987 - Jun 1991	CPM + FBL + RSP + CPI + SUC + IND + MUL	CPI-11; CPM-187; INC-40; SUC-2; FBL-26; MUL-1; RSP-18; IND-9
	1991	Jun 1991 - May 1996	CPM + FBL + RSP + RCPI(RB) + CPI	CPI-5; CPM-189; INC-20; JD-1; FBL-29; RSP-18; DSP(PC)-1; JKP-1; RCPI(RB)-1; IND-6; FBL-29; RSP-18
	1996	May 1996 - May 2001	CPM + FBL + RSP + CPI	CPI-6; CPM-157; INC-82; RSP-18; FBL-21; FB(S)-1; GNLF-3; JKP(N)-1; IND-5
	2001	May 2001 - May 2006	CPM + FBL + RSP + CPI + WBSP	CPI-7; CPM-143; INC-26; AITC-60; FBL-25; GNLF-3; IND-8; RSP-17

2006	May 2006 - May 2011	AIFB + CPI(M) + CPI + WBSP + DSP(P)	CPI-8; CPM-176; INC-21; AITC-30; AIFB-23; RJD-1; RSP-20; GNLF-3; IND-9; DSP(P)-1
2011	May 2011 -	AITC	CPI-2; CPM-40; INC-42; AITC-184; AIFB-11; SP-1; GOJAM-3; SUCI-1; IND-2; DSP(P)-1

References:

- Ahmed, Farzand. 1990. "Bihar CM Laloo Prasad Yadav on Statue Installation Spree." *India Today*, August 31, 1990. <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story/19900831-bihar-cm-laloo-prasad-yadav-on-statue-installation-spree-812945-1990-08-31>.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 1999. "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities." *NBER Working Paper No. 7155*.
- Alesina, Alberto, and Paola Giuliano. 2011. "Preferences for Redistribution." In *Handbook of Social Economics*, edited by Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, 1:93–131. North-Holland. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00004-8>.
- Ashwani Kumar. 2008. *Community Warriors: State, Peasants and Caste Armies in Bihar*. London; New York: Anthem Press.
- Auerbach, Adam, Jennifer Bussell, Simon Chauchard, Francesca Jensenius, Gareth Nellis, Mark Schneider, Neelanjan Sircar, et al. 2021. "Rethinking the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World: Reflections on the Indian Case." *Perspectives on Politics*, March, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592721000062>.
- Baldwin, Kate, and John Huber. 2010. "Economic versus Cultural Differences: Forms of Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision." *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 644–62.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Amory Gethin, and Thomas Piketty. 2019. "Growing Cleavages in India? Evidence from the Changing Structure of Electorates, 1962–2014." *Economic and Political Weekly* 54 (11): 34–44.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." *American Economic Review* 95 (4): 1190–1213.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, and Rohini Somanathan. 2007. "The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence from India." *Journal of Development Economics* 82 (2): 287–314.
- Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. "Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (1): 271–93.
- . 2007. "From Statistical Nuisances to Serious Modeling: Changing How We Think About the Analysis of Time-Series—Cross-Section Data." *Political Analysis* 15 (2): 97–100.
- . 2011. "Of Fixed-Effects and Time-Invariant Variables." *Political Analysis* 19 (2): 119–22.
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data." *American Political Science Review* 89 (03): 634–47. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2082979>.
- . 1996. "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models." *Political Analysis* 6: 1–36.
- . 2001. "Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon." *International Organization* 55 (2): 487–95. <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140658>.

- . 2011. “Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series–Cross-Section Political Economy Data.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (1): 331–52. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071510-103222>.
- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. 2002. “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117 (4): 1415–51. <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935061>.
- Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2009. “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics.” *The American Economic Review* 99 (4): 1218–44.
- Bhavnani, Rikhil, and Alexander Lee. 2018. “Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India.” *Journal of Politics* 80 (1): 71–87. <https://doi.org/10.1086/694101>.
- . 2021. “Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service.” *American Journal of Political Science* 65 (1): 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12497>.
- Blair, Harry. 2018. “Identity, Dignity and Development as Trajectory: Bihar as a Model for Democratic Progress in Nepal? Part I. Bihar’s Experience.” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 56 (1): 103–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1411231>.
- Borker, Girija, Jan Eeckhout, Nancy Luke, Shantidani Minz, Kaivan Munshi, and Soumya Swaminathan. 2017. “Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection.” Working Paper. <https://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/documents/research/seminars/2016-17/kaivan-munshi.pdf>.
- Chakrabarti, Poulomi. 2019. “One Nation, Many Worlds: Varieties of Developmental Regimes in India.” PhD Dissertation, Providence RI: Brown University.
- . 2022. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Inequality: Findings from India.” SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4165146>.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chauchard, Simon. 2014. “Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India.” *American Political Science Review* 108 (02): 403–22. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000033>.
- Chhibber, Pradeep, and Irfan Nooruddin. 2004. “Do Party Systems Count?: The Number of Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2): 152–87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003260981>.
- Chhibber, Pradeep, and Rahul Verma. 2018. *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India*. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, Tom, and Drew Linzer. 2015. “Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects?” *Political Science Research and Methods* 3 (02): 399–408. <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.32>.
- Dasgupta, Aditya, and Devesh Kapur. 2020. “The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India.” *American Political Science Review* 114 (4): 1316–34. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000477>.

- Datt, Gaurav, and Martin Ravallion. 1998. "Why Have Some Indian States Done Better than Others at Reducing Rural Poverty?" *Economica* 65 (257): 17–38. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00112>.
- Desai, Sonalde, Cedily Darden Adams, and Amaresh Dubey. 2012. "Segmented Schooling: Inequalities in Primary Education." In *Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India*, edited by Sukhadeo Thorat and Katherine S. Newman, 230–52. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Desai, Sonalde, and Amaresh Dubey. 2011. "Caste in 21st Century India: Competing Narratives." *Economic and Political Weekly* 46 (11): 40–49.
- Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. 2015. *An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- ECI. 2015. "Statistical Reports of General Election to State Legislative Assembly." New Delhi: Election Commission of India. http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx#.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Polity Press.
- Evans, Ivan. 1997. *Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fernandez, Sergio, Samuel Koma, and Hongseok Lee. 2018. "Establishing the Link between Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: The South African Case." *Governance* 31 (3): 535–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12319>.
- Frankel, Francine. 1990. "Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order." In *Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order: Volume 2*, edited by Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, 46–132. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Frankel, Francine, and M.S.A. Rao. 1990. *Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order: Volume 1*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Fuller, C. J. 1996. *Caste Today*. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Girard, Victoire. 2018. "Don't Touch My Road. Evidence from India on Affirmative Action and Everyday Discrimination." *World Development* 103 (March): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.008>.
- Gourevitch, Alex. 2015. "Police Work: The Centrality of Labor Repression in American Political History." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (3): 762–73. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715001322>.
- Green, Donald P., Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon. 2001. "Dirty Pool." *International Organization* 55 (02): 441–68. <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140630>.
- Gulzar, Saad, and Benjamin J. Pasquale. 2017. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 111 (1): 162–83. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000502>.
- Harris, Allison P. Forthcoming. "Can Racial Diversity Among Judges Affect Sentencing Outcomes?" *American Political Science Review*.
- Harriss, John. 1999. "Comparing Political Regimes across Indian States: A Preliminary Essay." *Economic and Political Weekly* 34 (48): 3367–77.

- Heller, Patrick. 1995. "From Class Struggle to Class Compromise: Redistribution and Growth in a South Indian State." *Journal of Development Studies* 31 (5): 645–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389508422384>.
- . 2000. "Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India." *World Politics* 52 (4): 484–519.
- Hoekstra, Mark, and Carly Will Sloan. 2022. "Does Race Matter for Police Use of Force? Evidence from 911 Calls." *American Economic Review* 112 (3): 827–60. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201292>.
- Houle, Christian, Paul Kenny, and Chunho Park. 2019. "The Structure of Ethnic Inequality and Ethnic Voting." *Journal of Politics* 81 (1): 187–200. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700200>.
- Huber, John D., and Pavithra Suryanarayan. 2016. "Ethnic Inequality and the Ethnification of Political Parties: Evidence from India." *World Politics* 68 (1): 149–88. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000349>.
- Iyer, Lakshmi, Anandi Mani, Prachi Mishra, and Petia Topalova. 2012. "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4 (4): 165–93.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Sanjay Kumar, eds. 2009. *Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of the Indian Legislative Assemblies*. New Delhi; Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa." *The American Political Science Review* 101 (1): 159–72.
- Khanna, Gaurav. 2020. "Does Affirmative Action Incentivize Schooling? Evidence from India." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 102 (2): 219–33. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00848.
- Khemani, Stuti. 2003. "Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3016. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Kohli, Atul. 1987. *The State and Poverty in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- . 2012. *Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kothari, Rajni. 1971. "The Political Change of 1967." *Economic and Political Weekly* 6 (3/5): 231–50. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4381547>.
- Krishna, Anirudh. 2002. *Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy*. Columbia University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/kris12570>.
- . 2018. *The Broken Ladder: The Paradox and the Potential of India's One-Billion*. Penguin Random House India Private Limited.
- Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle. 2018. *Claiming the State: Active Citizenship and Social Welfare in Rural India*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kumar, Sanjay. 2002. "New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar (1990-2000)." In *Caste and Democratic Politics in India*, edited by Ghanshyam Shah. Delhi: Permanent Black.

- Kumbhar, Kiran Sambhaji. 2022. "Healing and Harming: The 'Noble Profession' of Medicine in Post-Independence India, 1947-2015." Doctoral dissertation, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
<https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/37372182/Kumbhar%2c%20Dissertation%2c%20History%20Medicine%20India%2c%202022.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Sociological Review* 53 (1): 69–105.
- Lipsky, Michael. 2010. *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Mann, Michael. 1984. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie* 25 (2): 185–213.
- Mathew, Santhosh, and Mick Moore. 2011. "State Incapacity by Design: Understanding the Bihar Story." *IDS Working Papers* 2011 (366): 1–31.
- Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. 2003. *The Burden of Democracy*. Delhi: Penguin India.
- Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89 (11–12): 2325–68.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.09.004>.
- Mosse, David. 2018. "Caste and Development: Contemporary Perspectives on a Structure of Discrimination and Advantage." *World Development* 110 (October): 422–36.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.06.003>.
- Murali, Kanta. 2017. *Caste, Class and Capital*. Cambridge University Press.
- Narayan, S. 2018. *The Dravidian Years: Politics and Welfare in Tamil Nadu*. Oxford University Press.
- Nathan, Noah L, and Ariel White. 2021. "Experiments on and with Street-Level Bureaucrats." In *Cambridge Handbook of Advances in Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. Druckman and Donald P. Green. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul, Gilles Saint, and Thierry Verdier. 1996. "Inequality, Redistribution and Growth: A Challenge to the Conventional Political Economy Approach." *European Economic Review* 40 (3–5): 719–28. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921\(95\)00083-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00083-6).
- Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49 (02): 155–83. <https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1997.0004>.
- Putnam, Robert D, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Rao, Vijayendra, and Paromita Sanyal. 2010. "Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 629 (1): 146–72. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716209357402>.
- Ravallion, Martin, and Gaurav Datt. 2002. "Why Has Economic Growth Been More Pro-Poor in Some States of India Than Others?" *Journal of Development Economics* 68 (2): 381–400.
- Ray, Tridip, Arka Roy-Chaudhuri, and Komal Sahai. 2020. "Whose Education Matters? An Analysis of Inter Caste Marriages in India." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 176 (August): 619–33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.011>.

- Rodden, Jonathan, and Steven Wilkinson. 2004. "The Shifting Political Economy of Redistribution in the Indian Federation." In *Annual Meeting of the International Society for New Institutional Economics*. Tucson, AZ.
- Roy, Indrajit. 2013. "Development as Dignity: Dissensus, Equality and Contentious Politics in Bihar, India." *Oxford Development Studies* 41 (4): 517–36.
- Roy, Ramashray. 1966. "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress." *Asian Survey* 6 (12): 706–15. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2642196>.
- Sandbrook, Richard, Marc Edelman, Patrick Heller, and Judith Teichman. 2007. *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Singh, Prerna. 2016. *How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Soifer, Hillel. 2008. "State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43 (3–4): 231–51. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-008-9028-6>.
- Soss, Joe, and Vesla Weaver. 2017. "Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (1): 565–91. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060415-093825>.
- Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (4): 914. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111187>.
- Suryanarayan, Pavithra. 2019. "When Do the Poor Vote for the Right Wing and Why: Status Hierarchy and Vote Choice in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 52 (2): 209–45. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758752>.
- Suryanarayan, Pavithra, and Steven White. 2021. "Slavery, Reconstruction, and Bureaucratic Capacity in the American South." *American Political Science Review* 115 (2): 568–84. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000933>.
- Thachil, Tariq, and Emmanuel Teitelbaum. 2015. "Ethnic Parties and Public Spending: New Theory and Evidence from the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (11): 1389–1420. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015576743>.
- Thakur, Sankarshan. 2006. *Subaltern Sabeel: Bihar and the Making of Laloo Yadav*. Picador.
- Thorat, Amit, and Omkar Joshi. 2020. "The Continuing Practice of Untouchability in India." *Economic and Political Weekly* 55 (2): 36–45.
- Thorat, Sukhadeo, and Joel Lee. 2012. "Food Security Schemes and Caste Discrimination." In *Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern India*, edited by Sukhadeo Thorat and Katherine S. Newman, 287–307. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Blackwell.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2000. "Is India Becoming More Democratic?" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (1): 3–25.
- . 2003. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

- Weiner, Myron. 1991. *The Child and the State in India: Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 2001. “The Struggle for Equality: Caste in Indian Politics.” In *The Success of India’s Democracy*, edited by Atul Kohli, 193–225. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, Sven E., and Daniel M. Butler. 2007. “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to Simple Alternative Specifications.” *Political Analysis* 15 (2): 101–23. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpl012>.
- Witsoe, Jeffrey. 2013. *Democracy against Development: Lower-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
- World Bank. 2012. “Consumer Price Index (Base Year: 2010).” World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG>.
- Xu, Guo, Marianne Bertrand, and Robin Burgess. 2021. “Organization of the State: Home Assignment and Bureaucrat Performance.” *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, October, ewab022. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab022>.
- Yadav, Yogendra. 1996. “Reconfiguration in Indian Politics: State Assembly Elections, 1993-95.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 31 (2/3): 95–104. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4403675>.
- . 2010. “What Is Living and What Is Dead in Rammanohar Lohia?” *Economic and Political Weekly* 45 (40): 92–107.